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Preface 
Governments in all countries struggle with the problem of how to 
ensure that science and technology contribute effectively to solving 
national problems. In developing countries, the problem is particularly 
pressing because local scientific and technological skills are usually limited. 
In the 1960s and early 1970s, policy research, mainly carried out in Latin 
America and India, demonstrated that the lack of local skills combined with 
heavy dependence on foreign technology had sometimes led to 
undesirable patterns of industrialization. The findings spotlighted two basic 
questions: What can developing country governments do to ensure that 
their technology and industrialization policies are consistent with national 
development objectives? And what ways and means are available for 
implementing policies? The Science and Technology Policy Instruments 
project (STPI) was designed to answer these questions. 
This report consists of a summary of the research that was carried out by 
the 10 developing country teams who participated in the STPI project. 
Although the teams were provided with methods guidelines, they were 
encouraged to develop the project in their own way. The result was rich and 
varied but difficult to compress into a single synthesis or summary. Francisco 
Sagasti, the field coordinator of the project, has completed a difficult task 
well. He has brought out the variety ofthe results and national experiences, 
and, where appropriate, has drawn comparisons and conclusions. 
Although the project has not fully answered the original questions, it 
has certainly demonstrated the complexity of the problems. It has shown 
that government decisions on economic topics have a direct bearing on 
technological activities and, in fact, are often the prime determinants of 
technology policy. It has identified many policy instruments, and has 
touched on the efficacity of specific policy instruments. This is a reflection 
of the complexity of the problem. 
The results provide a wealth of information and guidelines to 
policymakers, much of which has already had an impact in the countries 
where the research was carried out. In the expectation that the results will 
also be of interest to a wider audience of policymakers and researchers in 




Science and Technology Policy Program. 
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Introduction 
This report presents the main results of the Science and Technology 
Policy Instruments (STPI) research project, a 31/2-year study undertaken in 10 
less-developed countries and sponsored by the International Development 
Research Centre, the Department of Scientific Affairs of the Organization of 
American States, national government agencies, and academic institutions. 
During the project, more than 200 reports were prepared by the 
country teams, consultants to the project, the field coordinator and his staff. 
The present report summarizes the main findings, examining them and 
deriving some implications for further research. It aims at provoking 
thought and reflection and providing tools for more intensive investigations 
and for policy guidance. 
The report comprises three parts, each reflecting its intended 
audience. The first is a review of the main issues identified and examined in 
the STPI project and is directed to high-level policymakers. The second, 
which was reviewed and approved by the STPI editorial committee in 
Ottawa in April 1978, consists of five chapters summarizing the main 
features of the STPI project and presenting the key research results. It is 
directed to government officials, who have responsibilities in science and 
technology policy, and to researchers, who may be interested in a 
comparative analysis. It is based on the country reports, reviewed and 
processed by the field coordinator, his staff, and consultants. The third part 
consists of 12 self-contained modules that comprise extracts from the 
country reports and the results of the work carried out under the 
supervision of the field coordinator's office. It is an overview of the topics 
covered in the research and is directed to researchers and to government 
officials, who may be interested in particulars of policy design and 
implementation. All three parts represent, as accurately as possible, the 
material in the country reports. The first two parts are contained in this 
volume; the third is yet to be published. 
In the first two parts, which are directed mainly to policymakers and 
researchers, the references to other works have been kept to a minimum, 
although some of the ideas and points of view have been advanced 
elsewhere in the literature. 
The report is complemented by a series of technical studies covering 
specifics, such as science and technology planning, state enterprises and 
technology policy, consulting and engineering design capabilities, and 
registries of licencing agreements. The technical studies also include 
reports solicited from consultants or prepared by the field coordinator's 
staff, such as a report on technology policy and industrialization in the 
People's Republic of China, a study on technological dependence/self-
reliance, and a review of technology transfer problems and policies. 
Colleagues and friends who were involved with the STPI project are 
too numerous to mention here. The project would not have been possible 
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without the dedication and efforts of the coordinators who were 
responsible for the research, the members of the country teams, and the 
advisers. The country coordinators and the institutions who participated are 
listed in an appendix of the report. Here, I would like to mention those who 
contributed substantially to defining the structure of this report: Alejandro 
Nadal, Jose Tavares, Eduardo Amadeo, Kun Mo Chung, Fernando Chaparro, 
and Fernando Gonzalez Vigil. 
Onelia Cardettini and Carlos Contreras from the field coordinator's 
office helped prepare the report, receiving support and advice from 
Alberto Araoz, Sergio Barrio, Francisco Sercovich, Mirko Lauer, and 
Anthony Tillet. 
Secretarial help and assistance was provided at different times during 
the preparation of the report by Fina Urquiaga, Nora Manyari, Mylenka 
Miloslavich, Andriana Barella, Cecilia Otero, Joan Redfern, Yolanda de 
Castellanos. The administrative support provided by Cecilia de Mendoza 
and the staff of the Latin American Regional Office of the International 
Development Research Centre is gratefully acknowledged. 
Also, the STPI project owes much to Geoffrey Oldham of the 
International Development Research Centre and Ruth Zagorin who was 
formerly director of IDRC's social sciences division for their constant 
encouragement and support and to Maximo Halty, formerly of the 
Organization of American States, Alejandro Moya, and Phactuel Rego of 
the same institution. To all ofthem I am grateful; they have helped provide a 
most exciting learning experience. 
Francisco R. Sagasti 
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An Overview 
Recently, technological considerations were reintroduced into 
economic theory, which had neglected them for most of the second-third 
of the present century. A new interest in science and technology policy 
emerged, highlighted by the contest between East and West for 
technological leadership in defence. People began to recognize that, 
during the last 150 years, science-based technology has nurtured Western 
industry and that the differences in dynamism between European and 
American industries have been based on advances in technology. In 
developed countries, the market economies have competed on the basis of 
technological achievements in industries, and the planned economies have 
pursued technology as a means of improving the use of productive 
resources. 
The less-developed countries are now acquiring, on the one hand, an 
artisan, technical, and engineering base (often through the evolution of tra-
ditional technologies) and, on the other, the capacity to compete in modern 
science. This is a stage in which most of the industrialized countries found 
themselves in the second-half of the 19th and the first 2 decades of the 20th 
century. Thus, there is an inherent lag in science-related industries in the 
less-developed world, for the industrialized countries have now entered 
fully into the stage of systematic, organized, and mass production of new 
technologies based on scientific findings. Not only is the process accelerat-
ing at a rapid pace in the industrialized world but also the continuous trans-
fer of the technologies, which result from these activities, is stunting the 
development of an endogenous scientific and technological base for 
industry in the Third World countries. 
From the initial manifestations of concern, many policy 
recommendations emerged. Practically all of them were concepts of 
science and technology "systems" based on those found in the 
industrialized nations. "Missing" institutions were identified, policies were 
suggested, and planning efforts were started, usually neglecting differences 
in the specific contexts of underdevelopment, employing abstract models 
as guides to policy formulation and heeding only the supply of scientific 
and technological knowledge. The common thread running through the 
recommendations was a naive and widely shared belief that governments 
could and would intervene promptly and effectively to develop an 
indigenous scientific and technological base, producing technology 
7 
relevant to the needs of industry, and that industry would adopt new 
technology as soon as it became available. Thus, general S& T policy 
recommendations were designed and superimposed on relatively 
unknown scientific, technologic, and industrial structures. 
The shortcomings soon became evident. Even in cases where policies 
and government measures were successful in creating an infrastructure for 
science and technology, the link with industrial production was nowhere to 
be seen. Faced with a lack of demand for their services, research institutes, 
universities, and supporting organizations developed a logic of their own, 
paid lip service to the" relevant" character of their activities, and demanded 
an ever-increasing share of government allocations to finance their ex-
pansion. 
The result was a negative reaction that was given strong support by 
newly available empirical studies showing the abuses of technology 
suppliers from the industrialized world, the transnational corporations in 
particular. There emerged a movement that blamed the lack of demand for 
local science and technology - the hiatus between the scientific 
technological structure and production - on the indiscriminate imports 
of foreign technology. Thus, measures to regulate imports were proposed, 
and a few institutions to control abuses were created, reducing, or at least 
modifying, the most visible abuses. 
The new movement, like the old, assumed implicitly that the state 
apparatus represented the interests of nationalistic groups oriented toward 
self-reliant development. 
The scant improvements observed after more than a decade show the 
limitations and inadequacies of earlier approaches. With very few 
exceptions, which are found in a handful of countries and in particular 
sectors, the situation has not altered significantly: science-related 
technologies generated in the less-developed countries are in no way close 
to accounting for even a modest share of the technology used in industrial 
production. The early 1970s focused on the need to understand more 
completely the nature of S& T policy formulation and implementation 
processes and to relate them specifically to underdevelopment and to the 
characteristics of different industrial branches. 
Two years of exploratory thinking and consultations with researchers 
and policymakers led to the organization of the STPI project in mid-1973. 
The idea was to generate knowledge of the complex interrelations between 
science, technology, and industry in the context of underdevelopment, 
supporting policymaking through improved information. Now that the 
project has been completed, it is clear that the initial categories and 
concepts were not free from biases. However, the structure of the project, 
the scale of the intellectual effort, and the diversity of points of view that 
were incorporated helped to overcome design limitations and to turn the 
STPI project into a collective learning exercise. 
Learning through STPI 
The STPI project was a recognition thattoo much effort had been spent 
on abstract S& T policy formulation, that positive results had been scant, and 
that too little work had been done to assess policy impact. Also, it was a sign 
of the dissatisfaction with the way in which economic development theory 
treated technological issues. When the STPI project began, the 
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dissatisfaction was not clearly articulated, but as the project advanced and 
the lack of theoretical concepts with explanatory power became apparent, 
the participants in the STPI research network implicitly reached a 
consensus: empirical data focusing on specific industrial contexts, on the 
nature of technical change, and on state intervention were absolutely 
necessary before theorizing could provide satisfactory explanations. 
The STPI project was organized as an action-oriented, collective 
learning process, aimed both at providing inputs to policymakers and at 
advancing knowledge. Furthermore, it was a temporary coming together of 
a large number of researchers and policymakers with a common concern 
that transcended the bounds of STPI: how to gear science and technology 
more effectively toward development. A large number of the persons that 
became engaged in STPI had already done work in science and technology 
policy and most of them continued in the field after STPI was formally 
terminated in late 1976. 
Complexity Acknowledged 
From the beginning, it was accepted that the STPI project dealt with a 
most complex area of concern; however, acknowledging complexity and 
devising effective ways to handle it are two different things. At times, there 
was a temptation to break the problem area into self-contained, 
independent, and smaller subproblems that would be more manageable 
and to introduce assumptions that would be amenable to conventional 
research approaches. The scope of the research was enlarged to include 
considerations that are normally not regarded as part of science and 
technology policy, and the project was organized to bring together various 
disciplines and to emphasize, although to different degrees in each of the 
participating country teams, the connection with policymakers that 
provided a realistic underpinning to the research efforts. 
The process of translating ideas into tools that actually influence 
decision-making on technological matters became the main focus of the 
research. The historical and economic context of industrial science and 
technology policies and the nature of technical change were the two 
anchor points preventing STPI research from drifting into the trap of 
producing acontextual formal findings and recommendations. 
The range of scientific and technological activities that were examined 
as part of the STPI project went beyond traditional categories of" research 
and development" to include "minor" S& T activities, such as quality 
control, engineering, etc., which in the Third World play a most important 
role in the development of S& T capabilities. Furthermore, the development 
of an adequate human resources base was regarded as one of the major 
tasks in S& T development. 
STPI research on the industrial sector examined a broad range of 
industrial and economic development policies in terms of their impact on 
S& T capabilities. For example, it considered large investment projects, 
which are one means to create a substantial demand for local S& T activities 
but are not usually examined in terms of their technological implications. 
The initial framework of concepts and the research design prepared by 
representatives of international agencies was, as could be expected from an 
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a priori design, rather formalistic, borrowed heavily from the "systems 
approach" school of thought. Nevertheless, it offered the country teams a 
starting point, one that could be changed as the research proceeded. In due 
course, conceptual categories were added and discarded, explanatory 
frameworks were introduced, and the research procedures were altered a 
number of times. However, the unifying concern for the STPI teams 
remained the process of policy implementation, and this set the bounds 
within which modifications were made. 
Initially, an implicit belief that guided the search for knowledge about 
policy implementation was that policymakers' mistakes were due to 
ignorance and could be reduced by information. It was believed that 
various parties intervening in the process of S& T development would work 
in harmony if they understood the direct and indirect effects of their 
actions. This implicit belief changed as the findings began to indicate that 
policies were being made and implemented with complete disregard for 
their technological implications and that the policymakers' actions were not 
only due to ignorance but to real conflicts among the interest groups that 
had stakes in industrial growth. Thus, toward the end of the project, the 
earlier belief gave way to the belief that it was important to understand the 
nature of conflicts of interest and to expose the value premises on which 
differing viewpoints were based. 
Another belief at the heart of STPI research efforts was that S& T 
capabilities help achieve the autonomy necessary to orient the growth of 
industry toward self-reliant development. A corollary to this belief was that 
a less-developed country must acquire a measure of control over its own 
technological evolution, identifying and developing industrial S& T options 
and determining the best course to follow. Collaboration among less-
developed countries was considered essential, and the STPI project itself 
was one step in this direction. 
Some Issues 
The STPI project studied three interconnected aspects of policy design 
and implementation: the historic and socioeconomic background; the 
characteristics of state intervention; and the nature of technical change 
in industrial branches. Each one was correlated with the issues derived from 
the research findings to illuminate the contextual factors that condition the 
design and implementation of S& T policies and the ways in which policy 
instruments operate and interact with each other. The objective was to 
discover their impact on technical change at the industrial branch level and 
on the development of S& T capabilities for industry. 
One of the basic premises of the research in STPI was that the specific 
characteristics of underdevelopment and the diversity of country contexts 
must be taken into account. The dynamics of history, particularly of industry 
and of science and education; the economic environment in which 
industrial growth takes place; and other cultural, social, and geographic 
factors condition strongly the opportunities for technological development 
in industry, and their influence on the effectiveness of policy instruments 
cannot be ignored. In fact, their importance signals the dangers of extra-
polating specific findings and recommendations from one context to 
another. Findings do not have universal validity - at least until some 
general theory to interpret them is developed - but they do help focus on 
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relevant problems, variables, sources of influence, and possible interfer-
ences. They provide partial, highly useful knowledge that transcends dif-
ferent contexts, but they cannot be wholly accepted in cross-country 
comparisons or even in industrial-branch comparisons in the same country. 
This last point deserves emphasis because of the overriding importance 
of focusing on the impact of S& T policies and policy instruments at the level 
of industrial branches. Time and again, the results obtained by the country 
teams showed that S& T policies designed for industry as a whole were 
ineffective and that policy instruments employed to effect technical change 
in productive units were likely to be unwieldy and difficult to operate. STPI 
research indicated that the traditional concept of industrial branch, as 
defined in economic stat1st1cs, needed to be enlarged to include 
government agencies, research institutes, consulting firms, financial 
entities, and so on. 
Before the design and implementation of industrial S& T policies can be 
geared to local situations, there are a variety of contextual issues that need 
to be examined. Only the most important will be highlighted here. They are 
presented as questions that partially overlap, covering issues such as the 
emergence of industry, the relations between industry and agriculture, the 
importance of the foreign sector, the nature of the internal market, and so 
on. 
How did industrialization begin? How was it sustained? and What was 
the role of the state in it? 
In most STPI countries, industrialization began almost in an involuntary 
way, prompted by external crises (recessions, war) or by balance of pay-
ments difficulties that forced countries to restrict imports and to start 
domestic production. Then, deliberate protectionist policies were adopted 
to stimulate local industries; they included tariffs, import licences, foreign 
exchange controls, and import prohibitions. In some cases, the imposition 
of tariffs on imports was considered as a way of generating revenue for the 
government. With only recent exceptions, protectionist measures in STPI 
countries have not been regarded as devices to guide industrial growth but 
rather as corrective mechanisms to be employed in economic crises. Thus, 
policy instruments that protect and stimulate the growth of industry are 
seldom used to guide selectively the expansion of industrial activities and 
are used even less to stimulate the growth of specific S& T capabilities for 
industry. 
What has been the nature of intersectorial relations during the process 
of industrialization? 
In all STPI countries, the means for industrial growth came from the 
primary sector, which produced sufficient quantities to permit international 
exchange and to generate an economic surplus. The main burden for the 
support of industry fell on agricultural activities, which provided foreign 
exchange for the imports of machinery and intermediate products for 
industry; provided cheap labour (rural-urban migrants); provided the 
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resources necessary for many industries (textiles, food processing); and 
provided a profitable market for industrial products; agricultural goods 
were sold at a low price in contrast to the prices for industrial products from 
the cities. The list of agricultural contributions, which exemplify the 
phenomenon of resource transfer, is still applicable in STPI countries after 
many years of industrialization and is similar for other primary activities, 
such as oil production, mining, and fishing, that are export oriented. 
Resource transfers have been regarded as acceptable tools for stimu-
lating the growth of industry in less-developed countries, and they have 
continued indefinitely because of industry's inability to support itself. In the 
long run, they promote complacency, limit productivity, and even 
discourage the development of an indigenous technological base. In 
addition, continued resource transfers make industry vulnerable to 
fluctuations in the production and export of primary commodities. 
How did the different industrial branches emerge? How did they 
interlink with each other over time? and How did they affect the pattern of 
demand for technology? 
In the STPI countries, as in most less-developed countries, producers of 
both durable and nondurable consumer goods were the first branches of 
industry to emerge. They grew under the stimulus of protectionist measures 
that restricted the import of consumer goods and provided incentives to 
import the machinery and equipment to produce consumer goods. There 
was little protection instituted for the local manufacture of capital goods or 
industrial inputs. The result has been that capital goods branches have not 
emerged, and governments have been forced to promote them by 
launching special legislative measures, financing investment projects in 
basic industries, and generating demand for machinery and equipment 
produced locally. 
The lopsided development of consumer goods branches of industry 
has implied massive imports of machinery and equipment that embody 
modern technology rather than technological knowledge. Thus, the 
knowledge has been imported separately in "disembodied" form, primarily 
through licencing agreements and foreign technical assistance. 
How did rhe demand and the supply of foreign technology evolve and 
condition each other? and What was their impact on the growth of local 
technology? 
When local goods are substituted for imports, they must comply with 
tastes and habits that have already been established and must imitate as 
closely as possible the goods that they are replacing. Thus, substitution 
industries require imported technology, machinery, and intermediate 
inputs. They cannot rely on the local scientific and technological base for 
information on how to expand their activities (with the exception of routine 
testing, norms, and standards, etc.); therefore, they forge strong ties with 
foreign suppliers of technology. The proven character of foreign 
technology, the fact that the foreign suppliers can guarantee continuity, 
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and the risk aversion of local entrepreneurs (including those in state 
enterprises) all reinforce the reliance on foreign sources of technology. 
There were other mechanisms at work that cemented the ties with 
foreign producers, the most important of which was foreign financing. 
When financing for industrial projects was obtained from abroad 
- through bilateral government credits, multilateral agencies, or private 
banks - the use of foreign technology, equipment, machinery, and 
engineering services usually was a condition for granting the loan, and there 
was little opportunity for local engineering or research groups to 
participate. 
Finally, the expansion of direct foreign investment, mainly through 
transnational corporations, made the ties between local industry in 
less-developed countries and the suppliers of technology from the 
industrialized world even stronger. The leading role played by transnational 
corporations in many industrial branches has been reflected not only in 
their share of the market but also in the technological trends that they 
imposed. 
The pressure of foreign technology led to impassivity on the part of 
local entrepreneurs who made few efforts to diversify sources of supply or 
to evaluate the foreign technology being offered. Needless to say, potential 
local resources (if they could be said to exist) were ignored, and local 
industry became totally dependent on foreign technology and rather 
vulnerable. Although technology imports do not always hamper the growth 
of domestic S& T capabilities, the wholesale importation of technology 
without efforts to screen, control, and absorb it usually stunts the growth of 
domestic S& T capabilities. Thus the problem is not one of cutting the inflow 
of foreign technology but rather of regulating it. The high degree of 
dependence on foreign technology is not an exclusive characteristic of 
import substitution industries. When an export-oriented strategy is 
followed, the technology required to manufacture goods for export is 
usually imported, and the ties with foreign markets are strong. 
How have foreign sectors influenced industrialization and techno-
logical capabilities? 
Most less-developed countries, and all of those in the STPI project, are 
open economies in which the foreign sectors play a significant role. Because 
they are primarily exporters of primary commodities or exporters of 
other goods with narrow domestic markets, they are highly dependent on 
foreign trade and foreign transfers of resources for industrial expansion. In 
fact, foreign trade upheavals were largely responsible for initiating 
industrialization in them. 
Chronic shortages in foreign exchange have limited their capacity to 
import capital goods and inputs required for industrial production. Over 
the long-run, the shortages have acted as a limited stimulus for the local 
production of certain machinery and equipment, or at least the repair, 
maintenance, and reconstruction of imported equipment. Similarly, 
periods of international crisis (recessions, wars), when the supply of 
products to import is restricted, have also stimulated local production. 
On the one hand, foreign investment has provided a large share of the 
capital required for the expansion of some technologically advanced 
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branches, and foreign loans (tied to foreign technology) have provided 
much of the capital for large investment projects, which are usually beyond 
the accumulation capacity of the less-developed countries. On the other 
hand, the transfers of profits, interests, royalties, technical assistance fees, 
and so on, from local entrepreneurs and from subsidiaries to the 
headquarters of transnational corporations have drained the industrial 
sector in less-developed countries, drawing off a substantial portion of the 
limited surplus that industry is capable of generating. 
How has the internal market affected the growth of industry and of 
technological capabilities? 
The structure of industry, and hence its technological characteristics, is 
closely related to the pattern of consumption. The size of the internal 
market, its relation to income distribution and concentration, and the 
consumption habits of the population all condition the orientation, scale, 
and characteristics of industry: what will be produced, for whom, in which 
quantity, and with which attributes. These constitute the basic or primary 
decisi ans in the development of industry- the foundation for decisions on 
technology. The orientation and conditioning of the overall structure of 
industry is seldom attempted in less-developed countries, and when 
attempted, is not always successful. Thus, the patterns of consumption and 
their evolution are left to the play of market forces, and, in consequence, 
technology for industrial expansion is derived from them in a haphazard 
way. 
Industry in the less-developed countries has not evolved gradually as it 
did in a handful of Western countries. In the latter, productive techniques 
were developed and were merged with findings from scientific activities to 
generate science-related technologies. The whole process took a rather 
long time to mature. The less-developed countries did not begin to 
undertake directed, organized scientific and technological activities until 
the beginning of the 20th century, and their development has been 
influenced strongly by the evolution of science and technology in the 
industrialized countries. The lack of a continuous historical tradition in 
science and technology and the limited human, physical, and financial 
resources of most less-developed countries make it very difficult to sustain a 
viable scientific and technological effort. The same holds for the artisan, 
technical, and engineering bases, which, if viable, would permit the 
absorption and internalization of scientific findings for the purpose of 
industrial production. 
The less-developed countries are now acquiring, on the one hand, an 
artisan, technical, and engineering base (often through the evolution of 
traditional technologies) and, on the other, the capacity to compete in 
modern science. This is a stage in which most of the industrialized countries 
found themselves in the second-half of the 19th and the first 2 decades of 
the 20th century. Thus, there is an inherent lag in science-related industries 
in the less-developed world, for the industrialized countries have now 
entered fully into the stage of systematic, organized, and mass production 
of new technologies based on scientific findings. Not only is the process 
accelerating at a rapid pace in the industrialized world but also the 
continuous transfer of the technologies, which result from these activities, is 
14 
stunting the development of an endogenous scientific and technological 
base for industry in the Third World countries. 
Given the preconditions, what are the opportunities and limitations for 
the development of industrial S& T capabilities in the less-developed 
countries? 
The present unequal distribution of industrial and innovative 
capabilities between industrialized and less-developed countries cannot be 
drastically altered in the short- or medium-term. The process of building up 
an endogenous scientific and technological base for industry is a very long 
one and requires determined and sustained efforts. Nevertheless, many 
actions could be taken in the short- and medium-run to anticipate subse-
quent, more substantial efforts and to ameliorate some of the harmful 
effects associated with indiscriminate technology imports, turning them 
into a positive force for the development of local S& T capabilities. 
Clearly, the opportunities for improving the S& T base are bounded by 
the growth and evolution of industry. If industrial S& T capabilities (research 
and development, technical education, support services, experimentation, 
information, etc.) outstrip local industry, they fall into a vacuum, void of 
effective demand. Research institutions become self-centred; skilled 
personnel emigrate, and resources are wasted producing an infrastructure 
that cannot be put to effective use. More often, the case is that industry 
surpasses the local S& T capabilities for generating new technology 
and absorbing imported technology. For example, turnkey plants 
are often imported in package form, ensuring productive capacity 
but effectively blocking the development of corresponding technological 
capacities. Thus, the problem is one of balancing the development of 
industrial production with that of an S& T capacity so that one reinforces the 
other. In this process, the human resources development, engineering 
activities, and the development of an engineering science base that can 
absorb imported technology become, perhaps, more important than the 
growth of a local basic and applied research capacity, at least in the initial 
stages. Once an engineering base has been acquired, emphasis can shift 
toward research and development. 
To consider the development of industrial science and technology 
independently from the growth of industry amounts to idle speculation, 
and, thus, S& T policies must be integrated with industrial development 
policies. The question is: how can the limited opportunities that are 
available be exploited to the fullest possible extent? The first step is to 
promote political, managerial, and technobureaucratic groups who share a 
common view of the development of industry and of the role of technology 
in it and who can bring pressure to bear for the growth of industry-related 
science and engineering. 
In general, policy instruments have been employed to promote the 
expansion of industry but seldom to orient the pattern of consumption 
and the corresponding industrial structure. There have been some 
exceptions, many of which were urgent actions for specific industries, 
responding to the interests of influential pressure groups. For example, 
among the STPI countries, measures were aimed at reducing the cost 
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of labour (subsidies and tax rebates on payrolls to encourage industrial 
employment, training of the labour force in government organizations); 
reducing the cost of capital (easy credit terms for industry, tax incentives to 
promote investment); providing basic services and industrial inputs at low 
cost (energy, water, transport, communications, iron, and steel); and 
restricting imports of competing goods (tariffs, import licences, foreign 
exchange controls). The measures usually applied to both local- and 
foreign-owned enterprises, even though the former were sometimes given 
more support. 
Countries that do not have a well-defined and discriminating 
industrialization strategy have only vague S& T policies, of a general 
supportive nature, and do not have strong policy instruments. They usually 
offer incentives and inducements that encourage a general infrastructure 
for industrial S& T but ar~ incapable of guiding the development of scientific 
and technological capabilities for industry. The converse is also true: 
countries that have defined an industrialization strategy, established 
priorities, and determined the scope and nature of government 
intervention have formulated S& T policies that correspond to the aims of 
industrial development. 
Explicit science and technology instruments are those intended to 
affect directly the decisions having to do with the growth of local S& T 
capabilities; implicit ones are those that affect decision-making indirectly 
through second-order effects. The great weight, both in number and 
influence, of the latter limits the potential impact of the former. For this 
reason, when studying their impact on the development of S& T capabilities, 
the analysis gravitates naturally toward implicit S& T policies, even though 
one of the central aims of S& T policy formulation may be to align explicit 
and implicit policies. 
A basic issue is whether policy instruments used to implement 
industrial development policies have any impact on the behaviour of pro-
ductive units. Unfortunately, at times, the array of policy instruments has 
been designed with little knowledge, or with a very naive understanding, of 
the nature of industrial productive activities, the rationality of entrepren-
eurs, or the forces orienting the expansion of industry. The result is that 
policies and policy instruments are formally superimposed on an industrial 
structure that does not respond to the prescriptive, motivating, or coercive 
measures they contain: although policy instruments are designed and im-
plemented according to an assumed or perceived reality by government, 
often industry operates according to a different logic and responds to 
different stimuli. 
The pitfalls involved in policymaking and legislating without 
considering the inner workings of industry and the complex and conflicting 
interests and pressures that shape its evolution are reflected in the 
irrelevance and the impotence of policy instruments. 
Clearly, the design and operation of precise and accurate policy 
instruments that produce the desired effects in a straightforward manner 
remain a technocratic illusion. Most often, policy instruments do not have 
the influence they are supposed to have because of the many factors 
intervening, the conflicting sources of influence, or the practical problems 
in implementing them. 
This should not be interpreted as a cause for despair but as a plea for 
deeper understanding and less formalism. There are many examples of 
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policy instruments of various types that have been successful in developing 
industrial S& T capabilities. All have been designed and implemented with 
full awareness of the opportunities, limitations, conflicting interests, and 
real possibilities to effect change. 
Policy Implementation 
It is difficult to characterize S& T policy instruments individually, and in 
any case, it is more important to examine their interactions. As a whole, the 
policy instruments, both explicit and implicit, exhibit several characteristics, 
some of which define the style of policy implementation. The findings in the 
STPI project highlighted several general characteristics that merit attention. 
Generality: The majority of the policy instruments identified in the STPI 
project were general, their impact to be felt in decisions regarding overall 
industrial growth and in inter-branch decisions (e.g., incentives to promote 
investments, tariff structures to foster the growth of certain branches). The 
greatest proportion applied across the board to all industrial branches and 
all types of enterprises regardless of the products they manufactured or the 
technologies they used. Thus, the impression that remains is one of policy 
instruments lacking the necessary selectivity to orient the growth of 
industrial S& T capabilities. An assumption underlying the sweeping policies 
is that all branches of industry and all types of enterprises are equally 
important and that the reasons for the behaviour of the different types of 
firms and branches are all the same. 
Some policy instruments are designed in such a way that discretionary 
power is vested in the government agencies that are in charge of applying 
them. In theory, the agency's authority counteracts the generality of the 
policy instruments, according to the peculiarities of each case. The problem 
is that the lack of well-defined criteria for the use of discretionary power has 
in fact precluded more selective use of policy instruments. For example, the 
registries of licencing agreements, which were designed to regulate 
technology imports and which gave discretionary power to the officials 
approving the agreements, have seldom been used to regulate the flow of 
imported technology in accordance with industrial development strategies, 
precisely because of the lack of well-defined industrial policies and the 
consequent impossibility of establishing criteria for screening and 
approving licencing agreements. 
Heterogeneity: In most STPI countries, many policy instruments of 
various types, responding to different policy orientations and assuming 
different forms of rationality of industrial enterprises, were found 
coexisting, even though they all were not actually used. The diversity in the 
array of policy instruments did not alter their generality, for most of them, 
however different, were general in terms of their effects on technological 
decisions. The heterogeneity has been a consequence of the temporary 
presence in government of certain power groups seeking to advance the 
policies they propose but leaving the preceding structure of policy design 
virtually unchanged. Thus, in some countries it is possible to find different 
vintages of policy instruments, of which only the latest are put into practice. 
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The heterogeneity of policy instruments has sometimes derived from 
power conflicts within the state. The government itself is not homogenous 
and may include competing groups who influence the use of policy 
instruments for their own purposes. The result is a rather mixed set of policy 
instruments and a collage of criteria used to put them into practice. The 
effects are most noticeable when policy instruments involve discretionary 
power, when several agencies are involved, and when there is a lack of 
coordination in the application of policy instruments. The lack of 
administrative continuity and the erratic behaviour of government 
agencies in charge of policy instruments also contribute to the 
heterogeneity of the array of policy instruments and lead to contradictions 
in their operation. 
Closely related to heterogeneity in policy implementation and 
contributing strongly to it is the instability and vacillation of industrial 
development policies. Although flexibility is desirable, most often the 
tenuous nature of policy instruments is not planned. There are, however, a 
few cases in which policy instruments have been designed in accordance 
with the different phases of industrialization, new instruments superseding 
outdated ones as the process of industrialization advances. 
Passivity: The majority of policy instruments identified in STPI were 
passive, i.e., the agency in charge did not initiate the actual application of 
the instrument; rather, the onus was on the productive units, research 
organizations, engineering firms, etc. that were to be affected by them. The 
passivity wa~ intimately tied to the nature of the instruments, which primar-
ily provided incentives to the industrial firms. The effectiveness of passive 
instruments is often limited because the intended beneficiaries are un-
aware of them. STPI findings were that relatively few enterprises took ad-
vantage of the opportunities offered by the policy instruments and thus a 
small number of industrial firms accounted for a large share ofthe benefits. 
The majority of enterprises were not affected by government measures and 
worked without paying attention to them; therefore the benefits were 
poorly distributed and marginal. Furthermore, the conditions for the appli-
cation of instruments were often defined in such a complex way that they 
became irrelevant to all but a small number of large industrial enterprises 
having the means to apply for and secure the benefits. 
Redundancy: There are a large number of policy instruments aiming at 
a common goal, such as conferring benefits on industrial enterprises, and 
these are redundant. For example, the STPI project discovered that coun-
tries often had many instruments designed to lower the cost of capital for 
enterprises (various types of special credit lines, tax rebates on interest 
payments, low tariffs for the import of capital goods, special tax exemptions 
for reinvesting profits, accelerated depreciation rates, special tax credits for 
investment in certain regions, basic infrastructure services provided by the 
state, and so on). Even though each of the instruments has a special purpose, 
their combined effect limits any inherent selectivity. Practically any 
industrial firm can benefit from several of them, and some firms will seek to 
benefit from most of them. In this way, large enterprises with the means to 
take advantage of the measures can easily reap a disproportionate number 
of the benefits. 
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Incompleteness: Incompleteness is a characteristic most often found in 
policy instruments that are supposed to restrict and to control the 
behaviour of industrial firms (e.g., import restrictions, foreign exchange 
controls, registry and approval of licencing agreements, etc.). According to 
STPI findings, most negative instruments did not cover the whole range of 
productive units; they left ample room for exceptions; and state enterprises 
were particularly prone to circumvent the regulations that were designed to 
stimulate the growth of local industry and foster the development of indig-
enous technological capabilities. For example, import prohibitions 
intended to promote local production were often ignored or revoked by 
state enterprises or government agencies, and the same applied to the sign-
ing of licencing agreements containing restrictive clauses forbidden by 
existing legislation. Thus, negative policy instruments were found to be in-
complete and likely to be circumvented through exceptions. 
Formalism: Most of the primary decisions, referring to the choice of 
products and also to the choice of technologies to manufacture them, are 
not influenced by the array of policy instruments and are the result of other 
forces at play. Policy instruments intended to develop S& T capabilities, and 
particularly the explicit ones, focus on the formal or secondary aspects of 
decisions to incorporate technology into productive activities: they affect 
the conditions under which decisions are put into effect but not decision-
making. 
Most policy instruments, both positive and negative, could be removed 
without affecting the basic decisions taken by enterprises. For example, if an 
enterprise is already convinced of the value of research and development 
activities, it will carry them out regardless of the existence of tax incentives 
for research activities, and, conversely, tax incentives will not prompt an 
enterprise to undertake research. Policy instruments do not affect an 
enterprise's competitive position and profitability sufficiently to induce a 
change of attitude on the part of entrepreneurs. Registries of licencing 
agreements are a good example. Whereas they are supposed to eliminate 
restrictive clauses in technology-sharing agreements, they only have 
control over the formal contract. A potential licencee who needs tech-
nology is in fact at the mercy of the licencer who has the technology. No 
amount of government intervention can restrict the pressures imposed by a 
licencer, and most licencees submit voluntarily to the demands, although 
the formal contract may not reflect any controls. 
There are other inadequacies in present S& T policy instruments that 
need to be examined, including the time it takes a particular policy 
instrument to have an impact, but, first, a more detailed analysis of 
individual policy instruments is required to appreciate fully the 
opportunities and problems involved in their application. Based on their 
impact on the development of science and technology capabilities, there 
are five categories of policy instruments: those that promote the demand 
for local technology; those that develop an S& T infrastructure and generate 
local technology; those that promote the absorption of technology by 
industrial firms; those that regulate technology imports; and those that 
promote S&T enterprises. A few key policy instruments merit individual 
attention because of their relatively stronger impact; these include 
industrial financing, state enterprises,S& T planning, fiscal measures, import 
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controls, research and development institutes, registries of licencing 
agreements, and so on. 
The way in which policy instruments actually influence development of 
S& T ca pa bi lities for industry also deserves attention; otherwise the study of 
policy instruments remains abstract. Some of the questions that need to be 
answered are: What is the differential impact of various policy instruments 
on technical change at the enterprise level? What other sources of influence 
mediate the impact of policy instruments? On which specific decisions do 
S& T policy instruments act? What has been the impact of industrial S& T 
policy instruments in orienting and shaping technological change? These 
questions cannot be answered by looking at the functioning of policy 
instruments alone; they require an understanding of the process of 
technical change and innovation in industrial enterprises. 
Technical Change 
Policy instruments do not affect technological change at the branch 
and enterprise level in a linear, straightforward manner; in fact there are 
many complex factors and conflicting sources of influence intervening in 
the process of S&T policy design and implementation. In addition to the 
context of industrial development and the functioning of the government 
machinery, the orientation and pace of technical change in itself is a key to 
understanding the possible impact of policy instruments. The experience in 
STPI suggests that the appropriate level of analysis is the industrial branch 
even though the opportunities and constraints within a particular branch 
are not the same for all enterprises and the impact of policy instruments will 
vary accordingly. The STPI findings indicate that the design, implementa-
tion, and impact of policy instruments cannot be studied at the level of 
industry as a whole nor at the level of a particular enterprise. 
An issue that must be kept in mind when examining the impact of 
policy instruments on technical change is that the technological 
innovations introduced in the less-developed countries originate, for the 
most part, in the industrialized countries. In the latter, technical 
improvements result from the interaction of factor endowments, market 
forces, and competitive strategies. For this reason, the range of industrial 
technologies at the disposal of the less-developed countries is determined 
externally, even though the selection of a specific technology and the 
possibilities for absorbing and improving it still leave room for shaping the 
local technological base. 
The STPI studies on technical change and the impact of policy 
instruments point out certain key paths or sequences that link 
macroeconomic conditions and variables with technological decisions 
within each firm. These paths define the pattern of interaction between 
context, economic conditions, the characteristics of industrial branches, 
and technological decision-making by industrial firms; they show the dif-
ferential impact of S&T policy instruments during the chain of events and 
indicate the most effective means of linking macro with micro phenomena. 
There are three categories of factors that must be taken into 
consideration when examining the impact of S& T policy instruments on 
technical change at the industrial branch level: the characteristics of the 
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technology itself and the nature of the technical changes taking place; the 
structural and dynamic characteristics of the industrial branch; and the 
main features of the enterprises. The order of importance of the factors 
depends on perspective, i.e., engineers privilege the nature of technical 
change, economists the structure of the branch, and sociologists the charac-
teristics of the enterprise and the entrepreneurs. Participants in the STPI 
project agreed on the combined importance of the three categories but 
could not agree on the most influential category. 
The characteristics of technology and the nature of technical change 
can be studied from several points of view. It is possible to focus on product, 
process, materials, major trends, a particular innovation, a chain of 
productive activities, or the main way in which technology is incorporated 
into the productive process (through equipment and machinery, process 
specifications, product specifications, intermediate products, or through 
human resources). 
The objective of analysis is to discover how technology is related to the 
structure of the branch and to the characteristics of the enterprises so that 
the inherent constraints and limitations may be understood clearly. 
The structural and dynamic characteristics of the branch involve 
factors such as the size and rate of growth of the market, the degree of 
concentration and competition in production, foreign investment, and the 
geographic dispersion of production. Of particular importance is the way in 
which a branch is articulated with the rest of industry and the economy, i.e., 
whether it is dependent on imported or local raw materials, inputs, and 
equipment; whether it is largely isolated or is closely linked to other 
industrial branches; whether the products are final consumption, 
intermediate, or basic; and so on. 
The most important factor in the characteristics of the branch is the 
predominant form of competition among the firms and the role that 
technology plays as a channel or mechanism of competition. The forms of 
competition vary widely from branch to branch, and the role of technology 
changes with the structural and dynamic characteristics of a given industrial 
branch. 
The predominant channels or mechanisms of competition include 
price reductions to capture a larger share of the market; product 
diversification to expand the existing market or create a new one; 
development of distribution channels to place the product close to the 
consumer; provision of after-sale services to secure consumer loyalty; 
specialization of production to exploit market niches; promotion of exports 
to transcend the limitations of local markets; regionalization of production 
to take advantage of lower transport costs; vertical integration to ensure the 
control of raw materials and intermediate products; introduction of new 
production technologies to take advantage of economies of scale, 
increased productivity, and of more efficient use of inputs with the aim of 
reducing costs; and so on. The mechanisms are combined by different firms 
to form their competition strategies. The predominant form of competition 
resulting from the interaction among firms decides the relative importance 
of technical change in the strategies of individual firms, and, in 
consequence, the impact that the different policy instruments are likely to 
have on the development of S& T capabilities in the branch. 
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The characteristics of the enterprises constituting the branch are also 
important. They emerge not only as a result of a firm's competition strategy 
but also as a statement of its size, ownership, location, degree of technical 
expertise, financial structure, and managerial attitudes. The factors strongly 
affect a firm's decision to introduce a particular technical innovation, the 
sources from which it will be obtained, the way in which it is to be 
incorporated into the productive process, and so on. In the last analysis, the 
building up of technical capabilities in industry can only be achieved 
through the aggregated upgrading of individual enterprises and other 
organizations and agencies involved in industrial science and technology. 
The factors within the three categories interact with each other to 
mould technological evolution and to condition the impact of S&T policy 
instruments. At present, the interactions are abstract and are a long way 
from providing a satisfactory theory of technical change in less-developed 
countries. However, the framework of the three categories and the factors 
that have been identified in each provide a guide to the identification of 
major conditioners of technical change in industry and of the impact of S& T 
instruments. 
Explicit Instruments Lack Impact 
The empirical evidence gathered in the STPI project shows 
overwhelmingly that the explicit S& T policy instruments (with the exception 
of personnel training) have little impact on technological change, 
particularly at the early stages of industrialization. The interactions among 
the three categories are themselves the main determinants of technological 
change in industry and of the development of industrial S&T capabilities. 
Furthermore, it was found that enterprises often make technological 
decisions without a consideration of S& T policy instruments. After decisions 
have been made, the firms either take advantage of the benefits or look for 
ways of getting around the penalties specified in the instruments. 
To date, policy instruments have not exerted much pressure on 
technical change in enterprises and branches, but at times they have had a 
powerful impact on the development of an infrastructure to perform 
science and technology activities. S&T infrastructures have been 
successfully developed in some cases, ostensibly for industry, and have 
been primarily the product of explicit government intervention. However, 
the capacity to perform scientific and technological activities has tended to 
grow and remain in isolation. The institutions that compose it are serving 
the whole industry or particular branches and are not able to meet the 
specific demands posed by individual firms. Thus, the response capacity of 
the S&T infrastructure has been geared to general activities in S&T, i.e., 
those that are common to a variety of industries and to different enterprises 
in a given branch. 
Nevertheless, S& T capabilities are one of the keys to directing industrial 
development. Less-developed countries that value national autonomy must 
acquire the ability to evaluate, choose, and absorb imported technology 
and to generate local technology, transforming it into viable industrial 
projects. This capacity is dependent on a country's own industrial S&T 
capabilities. 
Furthermore, as development proceeds and a country becomes able to 
accumulate income and an economic surplus, it will only be able to invest its 
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surplus internally if it has suitable S& T capabilities, a thriving capital goods 
industry, and policies that support local technology and the capital goods 
industry. 
Essential Ingredients in S& T Policymaking 
The development of S& T capabilities and of an endogenous scientific 
and technological base for industry will take very long for most less-
developed countries, but development (whichever political or social form it 
takes) is not viable if the potential benefits of modern science and 
technology are rejected: science and technology are necessary 
components of any development strategy in the last third of the 20th 
century, although the Western style of S&T development is not the only 
way. There is room for choice, albeit limited, in the sequence of steps and 
the particular ways science and technology are to be used. 
At present, the West commands disproportionately the S& T 
endowments; the possibilities of rapidly or radically changing the 
disparities are minimal. However, the margin for maneuver within the 
absolute constraints is certainly larger than perceived by most leaders from 
the less-developed world. 
The upheavals of the Western industrialized economies in the 1970s 
and the international redistribution of industrial activities may signal new 
opportunities for the less-developed countries. A country's ability to 
respond will depend largely on its strategies of industrial S& T development. 
It must delineate areas in which local S&T capabilities are to be developed 
fully and indigenous technologies made the basis of productive activities; 
areas in which capabilities for choosing, modifying, and absorbing 
imported technologies must be built up; and areas in which the existing 
base of traditional technologies must be preserved and developed further. 
The policies are bound to fail, regardless of good intentions, unless they 
are embedded in a context that favours S& T development; unless they are 
closely articulated with industrial development policies; and unless they 
acknowledge and incorporate the characteristics of technological change, 
of the industrial branch structure, and of the enterprises in particular 
branches of industry. Thus, they must be designed to suit the specific needs 
and situations in which they will be applied. 
The only generalization, therefore, that emerges out of the research in 
STPI is that S& T policies and policy instruments must be specific. There is a 
need to avoid sweeping generalizations and the elaboration of "standard" 
models or frameworks for S& T policy design and implementation. There are 
many pitfalls associated with disregarding the specific contexts of 
underdevelopment or overlooking the full range of factors, both internal 
and external, that condition the development of indigenous S& T policies. 
Finally, in learning about the process of S& T development in a given 
country, it is necessary to avoid simplistic conceptualizations borrowed 
from one discipline or another, combining instead various research 
approaches, disciplinary perspectives, and ideological points of view to 
apprehend the interplay of forces and interests that shape S& T 
development. Considering the diversity of contexts of underdevelopment, 
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there is no substitute for determined local efforts - however modest 
at the beginning - to understand the particular situation of industry 
and of S& T capabilities, their possible future development, and the types 





The Science and Technology Policy 
Instruments (STPJ) project was in many 
respects unique. For 3 years, it linked more 
than 150 researchers from institutions in 10 
less-developed countries (Argentina, Brazil, 
Colombia, Egypt, India, Mexico, South Korea, 
Peru, Venezuela, and the Republic of 
Macedonia in Yugoslavia); it generated 
knowledge and information that in many 
instances were used directly by policymakers; 
and it showed that a large, temporary research 
project yielding practical results can be 
organized and managed in Third World 
countries. 
STPI consisted of a loosely structured 
network of research teams1 from countries 
with different cul tu res, levels of development, 
political systems, and ideologies. The 
researchers on the teams represented a variety 
of institutions and a multiplicity of roles in 
policymaking. They also represented different 
levels of experience and seniority as well as 
different professions and disciplines. There 
were also marked differences in personalities, 
ways of thinking, and - as in any large under-
taking - degrees of commitment to the pro-
ject and reasons for joining. The cohesive 
element was a common desire to examine 
ways and means of exploiting science and 
technology for development objectives in the 
industrial sector. 
The idea for the project originated in 
1 For a list of the participating institutions see 
Appendix, p. 102. 
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February 1971 at a meeting of representatives 
of Latin American science policy 
organizations. The participants believed a 
situation had been reached where many 
policy recommendations had been made by 
national experts, international organizations, 
and academic institutions for the 
development of science and technology but 
there was practically no information about 
how to put them into practice and make them 
work. It was noted that government agencies 
had an array of well-defined legislative, 
institutional, and operational measures, i.e., 
policy instruments, to reflect, for example, 
monetary policies but had no comparable 
instruments to reflect science and technology 
policy. 
The initial idea was to survey and compare 
the ways in which different less-developed 
countries approached the design and 
implementation of science and technology 
policies. The goal was to help planners and 
decision-makers choose the most appropriate 
way of tackling the problem in their own 
countries. In 1971, when several international 
organizations were contacted for project 
support, both the Department of Scientific 
Affairs of the Organization of American States 
(OAS) and the International Development 
Research Centre (IDRC) of Canada showed 
interest in sponsoring a project in the area. 
Background reports were prepared and 
feasibility studies were conducted in Peru and 
Argentina during 1972. The results of these 
studies, together with a draft proposal, were 
considered at a meeting convened by the 
IDRC in Barbados in January 1973. Participants 
from 10 countries attended the meeting and 
later submitted research proposals to their 
respective institutions for approval and to the 
IDRC and the OAS for possible funding. Nine 
countries decided to join the project, and 
subsequently two more were added, although 
one dropped out in mid-1974. The two 
funding agencies responded positively, with 
the IDRC contributing substantially to cover 
the costs of the 10 national teams and the OAS 
underwriting some of the costs of Brazil, 
Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela. 
The project effectively began during the 
second half of 1973, when most of the country 
teams were formed and the field coordinator's 
office was set up in Lima. Each team was 
headed by a coordinator, who was a member 
of the coordinating committee (see 
Appendix I). The first coordinating committee 
meeting was held in August 1973, and most of 
the country teams were fully operational by 
January 1974 and had launched their research 
efforts. Then in the middle of 1976, a workshop 
was held at the University of Sussex to discuss 
the results obtained by the country teams and 
to outline the final comparative reports. Not 
all the teams finished their work in time for the 
Sussex workshop, and several of them 
continued their research into 1977 and the first 
half of 1978. 
The goals of the research evolved during the 
lifetime of the STPI project. Originally, the 
intention was to prepare a dictionary of policy 
instruments describing the tools at the 
disposal of the planner or government 
decision-maker. However, the participants 
found the approach to be excessively formal 
and preferred to compile case studies focusing 
on a particular context and on the functioning 
of a few selected policy instruments. At the 
Barbados meeting, they agreed on a balanced 
approach: to complete individual country 
studies sharing a common framework of 
concepts and concerns. 
At the beginning of the STPI project, the 
plan was to conduct a series of country studies 
that would produce results of direct value to 
policymakers in each country and as a 
secondary objective to produce material for 
an international comparative report. 
The plan changed as the research took 
shape and as new governments and policies 
emerged in several countries. In one country, 
practical research was minimized in favour of 
academic content; in others, the opposite was 
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true, and the results of research were used 
directly by policymakers. Most of the teams 
tried in their own way to strike a balance 
between the academic and practical 
components. 
While increasing the project's national 
focus, the changes limited its use as a tool for 
cross-national comparison and for the 
synthesis of country reports. Participants at the 
Barbados meeting even rejected the option of 
having common research methods to be 
closely supervised by the international 
coordinator. They pointed out that the 
inherent procedural and conceptual rigidities 
would reduce the project's potential 
usefulness to policymakers at the national 
level. 
The Approach 
All the participants in the STPI project had a 
common objective: to gather, analyze, 
evaluate, and generate information that 
would help policymakers, planners, and 
decision-makers in reorienting science and 
technology toward development objectives. 
The industrial sector was chosen as the 
primary field of inquiry to make the research 
tasks manageable. 
To realize the objective, the project had to: 
• Examine the general roles that science 
and technology play in attaining development 
goals in different socioeconomic and political 
systems, i.e., undertake a study of the scientific 
and technological network and its relation to 
the national economy and industry in 
particular. 
• Identify - by analyzing the technolo-
gical behaviour of government agencies, 
productive units, research institutes, and 
other organizations in science and techno-
logy - the major instruments and 
mechanisms that are most likely to be effective 
in implementing science and technology 
policy in a particular context. 
• Study technical change at the enterprise 
level in several branches of industry to 
compare influence of policy instruments with 
other factors affecting technological 
decisions. 
• Examine the major controls, practices, 
and procedures of government agencies that 
decide science and technology policy. (This 
required a detailed study of government 
machinery and of officials' behaviour when 
enforcing controls.) 
The complexity of the subject and the wide 
coverage that was required to deal with it were 
underestimated at the beginning of the 
project. Many issues associated with the main 
line of work on policy instruments needed to 
be investigated, and the participants required 
several background reports including 
tech no log ica I de pen de nee/self-rel ia nee; 
technology policies in the People's Republic 
of China; science and technology planning; 
technology policies in post-war Japan; 
technology transfer; development of 
consulting and engineering design 
capabilities; role of state enterprises in 
technology policies; and constraints imposed 
on the design of policies by the nature of 
technologies. 
The central line of research on policy 
instruments generated many detailed studies 
- a large body of empirical material gathered 
through the efforts of the teams in the 
STPI network. No comparative report can 
do justice to the amount and diversity of the 
material produced. 
The research was action-oriented, aimed at 
directly supporting policymaking, decision-
making, and planning activities. It re-
quired a departure from academic social 
science research, and the action it demanded 
was interpreted differently among the country 
teams. 
The research focused not on policy 
formulation at the macro level nor on 
technical change at the micro level, but rather 
on interrelations between the two - a rather 
elusive focus, which created many conceptual 
and practical problems in the project. The 
methods guidelines2 provided some means for 
dealing with this problem, but they needed to 
be modified extensively by the country teams. 
The research was designed to study science 
and technology policy in each country, 
considering both the history and the 
environment in which policies are designed 
and put into practice. 
The researchers represented multiple 
disciplines and institutional interests. Most of 
the teams comprised engineers and 
2 See Methodological Guidelines for the STPI 
Project, 1976. Ottawa, International Development 
Research Centre, monograph IDRC-067e. 
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economists, and some included scientists, 
sociologists, and lawyers. The teams were 
careful to avoid representing only a single 
discipline. 
Although there was always one host 
institution where the country team was 
located, other organizations intervened in 
practically all cases, some in an active way and 
some by providing access to data or 
information. In at least two countries, the 
research team acted as a catalyst to bring 
together several national agencies that were 
working independently in the field of 
technology policy. 
Those participating in the project desired to 
learn from the experience and to establish a 
network of personal and professional 
relationships that would continue 
indefinitely; toward this end, they undertook 
field-work, exchanged experiences, and 
visited other countries. 
Key Concepts and Categories Used 
The main concern of the STPI project was to 
determine what and how different factors 
influence the generation, diffusion, transfer, 
and utilization of scientific and technical 
knowledge in industry as a whole and within 
its branches. The basic idea was to explore the 
possible causes and effects systematically and 
to generate hypotheses that better explain 
science and technology functions and 
activities. For this purpose, a set of S& T 
functions and activities was defined, and three 
categories of sources of influence were 
identified and modified as the research 
proceeded. 
The set of functions and activities comprised 
all the steps in the generation, modification, 
and distribution of scientific and 
technological knowledge. They were 
classified into demand, supply, and linkage. 
The rationale behind the categories was that 
knowledge is an input in the production of 
goods and services, and that productive units 
generate an expressed need for S&T 
knowledge (demand), that scientific and 
technological knowledge can be either 
produced domestically or imported (supply), 
and that the flow of S& T knowledge between 
producers and users takes place through 
intermediaries, i.e., institutions (linkage). 
Policy instruments act upon functions and 
activities in these three areas. 
Productive units may demand knowledge 
from domestic or foreign sources and may 
need know-how, patented knowledge, 
technical assistance (disembodied 
knowledge) or equipment and capital goods 
(embodied). Or they may demand the 
capability to improve and assimilate 
knowledge. The demand for knowledge may 
be met by conducting in-house research and 
development, troubleshooting, specialized 
maintenance, etc.; by purchasing or otherwise 
acquiring it; or by consulting science and 
technology publications. 
Three groups of activities are included in the 
supply category. First is the generation of 
technology for productive activities. This is 
usually done by personnel in research centres 
and some specialized engineering design 
firms. Second, is the supply of scientific and 
technological services that allow the 
productive system to take advantage of 
knowledge generated locally or purchased 
abroad. Third, is the supply of skilled 
personnel to perform a variety of S& T 
functions and activities. In addition to these 
three groups of activities, there is the supply of 
knowledge incorporated or embodied in the 
machinery, equipment, and intermediate 
products used by the productive units. 
Relating supply to demand and providing 
the channels through which knowledge can 
flow is linkage, which includes engineering 
and cons.ulting services, regulation of 
technology imports, and industrial 
information and extension services. 
Sources of Influence 
Three types of sources of influence were 
identified by STPI personnel: 
• Explicit science and technology policy 
and its instruments, which have the definite 
and identifiable purpose of affecting S& T 
functions and activities. An explicit science 
and technology policy deals with an issue in 
S& T, setting criteria for decision-making, 
objectives, and desired outcomes. A policy 
may have a direct impact but usually is put into 
practice through policy instruments. 
• Implicit science and technology policy 
and its instruments, which affect variables 
outside S& T functions and activities but have 
an indirect influence on them. A better knowl-
edge of implicit policies may allow their 
negative influence to be reduced and their 
positive effects increased, eventually trans-
forming them and their related instruments 
into purposeful indirect means for developing 
science and technology. 
• Contextual factors - sources of 
influence that cannot be ascribed to current or 
recent government policies. They are a result 
of the country's history, cultural, and social 
features, resources, geography, etc. They 
cannot be rapidly changed and for the 
purpose of STPI research have been 
considered fixed. They affect S& T functions 
and activities by limiting the possible impact of 
explicit and implicit policies and their 
instruments. 
Contextual factors may be invariant 
(resources, climate, size, location), 
superstructural (cultural traits, value norms, 
economic systems, etc.) or policy-dependent 
(for example, characteristics of the industrial 
structure arising from import substitution 
policies). 
The three sources of influence were 
considered the independent variables in the 
STPI project. Research efforts centred on the 
analysis of explicit and implicit policies, their 
interactions, and the policy instruments 
associated with them. Policy-dependent 
factors were also looked atand several of them 
were dealt with in detail because of their 
impact on the design and operation of policy 
instruments and on technological behaviour. 
S&T Policies and Policy Instruments 
A policy can be defined as a statement of 
government intentions, which is set out by a 
high-level government official or institution 
(such as a ministry or a planning agency); it 
expresses a purpose and may set objectives, 
desired outcomes, and even establish targets. 
Policies provide criteria for generating and 
choosing among alternatives in the 
performance of functions and activities and, 
thus, guide decision-making. Although 
policies primarily correspond to the interests 
of government officials, in countries where 
the private sector has a significant influence, 
policies may also be formulated by 
representatives of the private sector. 
Because a policy is only a statement of in-
tentions, it needs to be supported by policy 
instruments - means by which it is put into 
practice. Policy instruments are the vehicle 
used by policymakers to orient other peoples' 
decision-making. Thus, policy instruments are 
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supposed to induce individuals and 
institutions to make decisions following the 
lines established by those in power: in short, 
the connecting link between the purpose 
expressed in a policy and its actualization. 
A policy instrument is called direct when it 
refers explicitly to S&T functions and activities 
and indirect when, although referring 
primarily to policies, functions, and activities 
other than science and technology, it has an 
important indirect effect on them. 
An instrument is a complex entity 
comprising one or more of the following 
components: 
• A legal device, which may also be called 
the legal instrument. This embodies the 
policy, or parts of it, in the form of a law, 
decree, resolution, or regulation. Formal 
agreements and contracts may also be 
considered here. The legal device goes 
beyond a policy and stipulates obligations, 
rights, rewards, and penalties connected with 
its being observed. 
• An organization, which is put in charge of 
implementing the policy. This includes not 
only the formal institution but also, the pro-
cedures, methods, decisions, criteria, and 
programs operating within the institution. The 
latter are administrative and technical, speci-
fying the steps that must be carried out in 
applying a policy. 
• A set of operational mechanisms, which 
are the levers, or actual means, through which 
the organization makes decisions and at-
tempts to obtain the desired effect specified in 
the policy. 
Policy instruments that do not have all three 
components give rise to some anomalies in the 
implementation of policies. 
Policy instruments seldom act in isolation. 
Usually all the instruments associated with a 
given policy interact closely causing a variety 
of effects. This is cal led a policy-oriented 
cluster of instruments. Sometimes, several 
policy instruments associated with different 
policies all have effects on a particular S&T 
function or activity. This is called a 
function-oriented cluster of instruments. 
Most of the analysis of policy instruments in 
STPI was done using the concept of cluster of 
instruments as the basic category. 
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In practice, a policy instrument does not 
remain fixed but evolves through a series of 
stages, eventually becomes obsolete, and is 
replaced by another one. In this process, the 
agents in charge of operating it, who may 
be called the policy keepers, play a most im-
portant role. 
Assessing the performance of an instrument 
of science and technology policy is a rather 
difficult task. Some of the criteria that may be 
employed in an evaluation refer to the range 
of S&T functions affected (specificity); the 
proportion of productive units, government 
agencies, research organizations, etc. it 
affects (coverage); the impact on units that 
have similar characteristics (equity); the 
relation between the effort required to 
operate the instrument and the results it 
produces (efficiency); and other 
characteristics such as flexibility, time lags, 
degree of stability, information requirements, 
and so on. 
The evaluation of policy instruments in the 
STPI project has been a task as complex as was 
anticipated, and there are few instances where 
a clear-cut evaluation was possible. A major 
problem was to extricate the policy instrument 
from the policy itself, because of their 
interdependence. At times, it was found that 
policy instruments had been created, but no 
policies had been for mu lated. A yardstick of 
effectiveness for policy instruments was 
elusive, particularly because effectiveness is 
highly dependent on the performance of the 
policy keepers. 
Policy instruments are often designed to 
influence more than one S&T function, and 
they may be successful in varying degrees. 
Therefore, it may be necessary to examine the 
effectiveness of an instrument as a whole, 
considering the several functions it should 
affect and also the positive or negative side 
effects it may have on activities and decisions 
in fields other than science and technology. 
The problems in evaluating a single policy 
instrument a_re usually compounded several 
times over, because, in practice, instruments 
appear in clusters. A policy instrument often 
cannot be evaluated adequately unless a 
whole cluster is taken into consideration. 
The Industrial Branch 
During the empirical phases of STPI 
research, when interviews were being 
conducted to determine the impact of policy 
instruments on technological behaviour, it 
became necessary to focus more precisely on 
certain industrial branches and their 
enterprises, research centres, engineering 
firms, etc. The STPI use of the term branch 
differed from normal use in economics and 
industry. For STPI, an industrial branch was 
defined as the collection of productive, 
supply, linkage, and service units that interact 
closely to form a relatively coherent whole. 
The productive units are grouped according 
to criteria such as the products manufactured, 
the degree of vertical integration, technology, 
etc. The supply, linkage, and service units are 
determined by their interactions with the 
productive units. Government agencies with 
policy-related functions are included among 
the service units. 
Interactions take place not only among 
productive and supply, linkage, and service 
units, but also among the productive units 
themselves. These interactions may be a 
source of cooperation and interdependence 
or of competition and conflict. The degree of 
interconnectedness of all types of units makes 
the branch the most appropriate unit of 
analysis for technology policy. 
A branch may be more or less well 
structured, depending on whether all the 
units that are deemed relevant for its func-
tioning are present, and on whether all the 
necessary interactions are established. The 
completeness of the branch and its missing 
units or interactions can thus be assessed and 
identified. 
The technological behaviour of a branch 
results from technological decisions taken. 
The impact of policy instruments on 
technological behaviour can be examined 
through the estimation of parameters such as 
productivity indexes, relative importance of 
local and foreign sources of technology, rate 
of increase of local organized technical 
capabilities, sources of raw materials and 
intermediate products, and so on. 
Technological Behaviour 
Technological behaviour can be considered 
as one manifestation of the interactions 
between the productive unit and its 
environment, including the branch 
containing the unit, the industrial sector, and 
the whole economy. A productive unit's 
behaviour results from entrepreneurial 
decisions in fields such as financing, 
procurement, labour, market strategy, etc., 
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and its technological behaviour is the result of 
decisions relating to technology. The 
components of technological behaviour in 
enterprises are, th us, technological decisions, 
which for analytic purposes can be classified 
into primary and secondary decisions. 
Primary and Secondary Decisions 
The primary decisions are those affecting 
quality and quantity in production and the 
production process, that is, transforming 
inputs into the output mix. There is a close 
connection between technological decisions 
and the choice of goods and services to be 
produced. Secondary technological decisions 
are those affecting the capacity to transform 
inputs into outputs and the way in which this 
capacity is incorporated into the production 
process and then utilized. They include, 
among others, the choice of channels to 
acquire technology, the choice of suppliers of 
equipment and inputs, and the decision on 
the performance of activities such as 
maintenance, repair, and quality control. 
Secondary technological decisions also 
include those relating to the organization and 
management of the productive unit. 
The effects of all types of decisions can be 
observed in the pattern of demand for 
technological knowledge and the technology 
absorption capacity of the enterprise. The 
demand for tech no logy refers to the 
knowledge needed by the enterprise to 
improve and develop products and processes. 
This knowledge may be domestic or foreign 
and may be embodied in capital goods, inter-
mediate products, operations manuals, or may 
be provided by technicians and experts. The 
absorption capacity depends particularly on 
decisions regarding the assimilation and 
improvement of the technology already 
incorporated. 
Productive Units' Behaviour 
To conceptualize the technological 
behaviour of productive units, information 
may be gathered on the characteristics of the 
product mix (type of goods, quality levels, 
market being served, etc.); the characteristics 
of the technology used; the origin of the tech-
nology used (sources of capital goods, of inter-
mediate products, of technical assistance, 
etc.); the form in which the technology is 
acquired; the technical capabilities 
within the firm (maintenance facilities, 
research and development activities, 
engineering and quality control, etc.); the 
firm's capacity to define, contract out, and 
evaluate the results of technological activities 
and services; the attitude of managers and 
directors toward technological innovation, 
their degree of confidence in local technical 
abilities, and so on. 
Other Influences 
The changes in an enterprise's techno-
logical behaviour that are induced by a 
given policy instrument are an indication of 
the instrument's impact; however, they are 
influenced by other environmental and 
internal characteristics. The task is to single out 
the impact due to policy instruments, 
separating it from the effects of other factors. 
Using the method suggested by STPI 
personnel, it is possible to identify explicit 
policies, implicit policies, and contextual 
factors among the sources of influence. 
The set of contextual factors includes the 
invariant contextual factors (geography, 
climate, etc.,), which probably affect the 
enterprise indirectly through their influence 
on the economy as a whole; the super-
structure contextual factors, which define the 
social and cultural milieu in which the 
enterprise operates (such as attitudes toward 
work, educational levels, etc.); and the 
policy-dependent contextual factors that are 
the result of cumulative policymaking over a 
long period (such as the enterprise's relatively 
easy economic climate resulting from 
indiscriminate protection). 
Explicit policies and their instruments are 
those relating to the performance of S& T 
activities in the enterprise, the control and 
regulation of technology imports, the 
provision of engineering design services, etc. 
Implicit policies are the financial, labour, 
fiscal, pricing, location, foreign investment, 
and other decisions made by the government 
that indirectly condition the technological 
behaviour of productive units. 
Other contextual influences that were 
identified by STPI are the structure and 
characteristics of the branch to which the 
enterprise belongs and the internal structure 
of the enterprise as well as its technological 
capabilities. The former is closely related to 
the concept of technological behaviour of the 
branch. The configuration of the branch, the 
degree and nature of interaction among its 
productive units, and the number and 
characteristics of units in the branch all exert 
influence on the way the enterprise behaves. 
The latter also conditions and limits the 
enterprise's behaviour. The way in which the 
enterprise organizes its technical personnel; 
the existing stock of technology embodied in 
capital equipment; the existing capacity for 
problem-solving and for quality control, 
research, and adaptation; the ownership; and 
the composition and attitudes of the executive 
and professional staff are all influential. 
The task of identifying the impact of policy 
instruments is clearly not an easy one. Never-
theless, it was attempted and completed in 
STPI with varying degrees of success. 
Behaviour of Research Centres 
The research centres were considered the 
archetype in the supply of local technology. 
The concept of research centre includes 
organizations such as independent contract 
research units, university laboratories, 
research units within enterprises, col-
laborative research units formed by several 
enterprises, government laboratories, and so 
on. 
Research centres are subject to the same 
type of pressures and influences as enter-
prises: contextual factors, explicit and implicit 
policy instruments. 
The scientific and technological behaviour 
of a research centre is a manifestation of the 
decisions to identify, formulate, approve, 
conduct, monitor, and evaluate research 
projects - the research project or program 
being the basic unit for technological 
decision-making in research centres. 
The study of a research centre can focus on 
issues such as the historical evolution of the 
centre, its objectives, the nature of the 
demand for its services, the financing patterns, 
the quality of its staff, the internal organi-
zation, and the institution's self-image. In 
STPI, because the focus was on industrial 
enterprises, few teams examined the 
technological behaviour of research centres. 
Units in Linkage 
Units in linkage are all the institutions and 
mechanisms that link productive units with 
the units supplying technology. They either 
find available solutions to the needs of 
productive units or have them produced by 
the supply units. Linkage institutions also 
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interpret the results of the supply units into a 
form that can be readily incorporated by the 
productive units. 
The range of institutions and mechanisms in 
linkage is wide and varied, and the STPI 
researchers focused on the consulting and 
engi,neering design organization as the most 
important and representative. The role of 
engineering firms was defined, and most 
teams surveyed the firms and studied their 
behaviour to detect the policies and policy 
instruments that would be most appropriate 
for their development. 
Changes in Guidelines 
The key concepts used in the STPI project 
were a fleshed-out version of those proposed 
in the methods guidelines. One of the first 
additions was the distinction between explicit 
and implicit science and technology policies. 
The distinction was somewhat artificial 
because the contradictions between explicit 
and implicit policies disappear when explicit 
policies are conceived and formulated in 
harmony with overall industrial development 
objectives. Nevertheless, the research showed 
explicit policies to have a relatively minor 
impact on technological behaviour at the 
branch and productive unit levels, influencing 
only slightly the demand for technology but 
having greater effect on the behaviour of units 
supplying technology. 
The initial concept ot contextual factors did 
not distinguish between invariant, 
superstructural, and policy-dependent 
factors. STPI personnel found the distinctions 
worthwhile, because they found that 
cumulative policymaking over a relatively 
long period of time deserved more weight 
than invariant or superstructural contextual 
factors. The refinement of the concept 
allowed the teams to focus more precisely on 
an important source of influence and proved 
to be a very useful analytical tool. 
When the first draft of the guidelines was 
prepared, the industrial branch was given little 
attention as an object of research. By the time 
the final version was prepared, the experience 
of some teams and their discussion of the 
concepts proposed initially showed the 
necessity of introducing the concept, to 
describe the unit that mediates between the 
industrial sector and the enterprise. The idea 
of "branch as a system" was put forward, and 
concepts such as "technological behaviour of 
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the branch" and "the branch as the basic unit 
for the design of technology policies" 
emerged and were incorporated. 
Late in the project, the concept of 
"technological behaviour" proved insuffi-
cient for analytical purposes and for 
explaining the technological changes in 
enterprises. However, primarily because of 
time limitations, it was impossible to develop 
an improved concept. 
Concepts whose importance was 
diminished during the research were those 
referring to supply and to research centres in 
particular. The few teams who pursued the 
theme structured the research in their own 
way. The STPI network considered that 
research centres had been frequently studied 
in the past, that a new approach to their 
evaluation was required, and that the work 
was outside the scope of the STPI project. 
In contrast, the teams considered consulting 
and engineering design organizations very 
important and not adequately covered in 
previous research efforts. They focused 
attention on the subject, but because of time 
pressures, none completed their work as 
thoroughly as considered necessary. 
In retrospect, the methods guidelines 
performed the function for which they were 
designed, providing a basis for initiating 
research. The country teams were able to 
build on this and produce a workable design. 
Initial Research Design 
The initial design of the STPI project was 
outlined at the Barbados meeting when the 
research proposal for the project was pre-
pared. It drew on various contributions and 
draft proposals made over an 18-month 
period, and particularly on the feasibility 
studies carried out in Argentina and Peru. The 
initial design was the basis of the methods 
guidelines, which were aimed at providing the 
participating teams with a common set of 
concepts and research procedures to facilitate 
the exchange of experiences and results. 
The STPI approach was reflected in the pre-
paration of the guidelines in at least three 
ways. Theory was not stressed, and no single 
possibility was presented for testing. The 
guidelines aimed at identifying and 
structuring the elusive relationship between 
policy formation at the government level and 
technological behaviour at the enterprise 
level so that it could be researched. The 
subject matter took into consideration the 
specific conditions of underdevelopment of 
the countries in the project. 
The diversity of the teams, the varied 
contexts in which they operated, and their 
action-oriented approach precluded the 
preparation of precise instructions. 
Consequently, the methods guidelines sought 
to offer a frame of reference for translating the 
work of the country teams into a common 
language. 
The research design agreed to in the 
Barbados project proposal and expanded in 
the methods guidelines included five phases: 
•Phase 1 was to provide the necessary 
background information for interpreting the 
work of later phases. It involved a description 
of the country's socioeconomic system, its 
evolution and trends, and a study of 
technology in industry, focusing on particular 
branches; it also included an investigation of 
the country's scientific and technological 
system, its links with socioeconomic develop-
ment objectives, its past, and its probable 
future. 
•Phase 2 was to analyze policy instruments, 
identifying their effects as a basis for 
hypotheses on their behaviour. In this phase 
the most important influences on science and 
technology functions and activities were 
identified. Studies were made of the 
organizational structures that filter and 
mediate the sources of influences, and the 
sources and effects of explicit policies, implicit 
policies, and contextual factors were also 
examined. Phase 2ended with the formulation 
of hypotheses that were to be tested 
empirically in phases 3 and 4. 
•Phase 3 was to test hypotheses concerning 
demand generated by branches and 
productive units. This phase consisted of 
empirical studies to measure the impact of 
policy instruments and contextual factors on 
technological behaviour. The focal points 
were the industrial branch and the enterprise. 
Two approaches were suggested for phase 3: 
top-down studies - identifying government 
policies and tracing the instruments used to 
implement them - and bottom-up studies, 
starting from decisions taken at the productive 
units and tracing the factors that influenced 
them with emphasis on policy instruments. 
33 
•Phase 4 was to test hypotheses for units 
engaged in supply and linkage. Phase 4 was 
similar to phase 3 but focused on agencies 
involved in the supply of technology and its 
linkage with demand, including research 
institutes, consulting and engineering firms, 
registries of technology agreements, and 
information systems. Empirical studies were 
carried out on the impact of government 
policies and policy instruments on the local 
supply of technology and on the linkage 
between supply - both local and foreign 
- and demand. 
•Phase 5 was to prepare country reports 
and a comparative analysis. The results of the 
research in phases 1 through 4 provided 
information that was summarized by most of 
the country teams and served as a foundation 
for several international comparative reports. 
The initial design was offered as a research 
model that could be adapted to the conditions 
in each country. The design was modified to 
various degrees by the country teams, some of 
them following the sequence through phases 
1 to 4, others combining phases 1 and 2, some 
working directly on phase 3, and still others 
focusing on branches only and carrying out 
the work for all phases in each branch. 
At a given time, teams were working in 
different phases, some teams were involved in 
more than one, and the variations introduced 
by the teams made it difficult to monitor their 
progress internationally. 
As it happened, all the teams that completed 
the research went through all the phases; 
however, it would be highly artificial to 
reorder and reorganize the results to fit the 
initial design. Instead, results have been 
presented in a way that reflects the evolution 
of ideas and findings in STPI. 
The approach adopted in the STPI project 
provided the opportunity to carry out a new 
kind of research on a large scale and to 
demonstrate its feasibility. However, the 
adoption of a particular approach means the 
rejection of others and imposes limits 
associated with the nature and characteristics 
of the approach chosen. Thus the STPI project 
had limitations, and it is worthwhile indicating 
the main ones. 
First, there were the problems inherent in 
the heterogeneity of the research in various 
countries and the changes introduced in the 
methods guidelines. These have already been 
discussed, and it is only necessary to add that 
the initial research design and the conceptual 
framework were perhaps excessively formal. 
They were formal in the sense that definitions 
and categories were proposed to classify data 
and order ideas and to organize findings, 
although there was no requirement to 
describe the inner logic or the underlying 
forces of the behaviour observed. 
Second, problems arose from not taking the 
time dimension fully into account or 
integrating it into the research methodology. 
Policies and policy instruments were studied 
as they were operating at a given time and not 
monitored over a period of time. The 
dynamics of the country's industry and 
technology were taken into account, but only 
as antecedents to the present structure and 
functioning of the various sources of 
influence. Hence, the results of STPI do not 
indicate how a particular S&T function or 
activity evolved as a result of policy instru-
ments and other influences. However, some 
of the country teams attempted to provide 
more than just an account of the dynamic 
forces leading to the present and they care-
fully documented and examined the 
evolution of policies over time. 
Other problems were the result of the 
loosely structured framework for research in 
the STPI network. Although it was necessary to 
avoid a rigorous design, this left a gap between 
the abstract categories and concepts of the 
guidelines and the empirical data to be 
gathered by the country teams. No 
intermediate conceptual categories were 
offered, and they had to be developed by the 
individual teams to fill the gap. Some of the 
teams were late to realize the need for a bridge 
between the guidelines and the data they 
were collecting. 
The research did not interpret the state's 
role in the emergence of policies and policy 
instruments. This would have required the 
extensive use of concepts such as class 
interests represented by the state, the origin 
and functions of the state in dependent 
capitalist economies (which most of those 
studied in STPI were), and so on. No theory of 
technical change in enterprise was postulated 
either. As a result, there was no unifying 
theoretical framework allowing all the teams 
to interpret the results in a clear-cut way 
providing a standard basis for explanation and 
prediction. 
However, some teams began to fill in the 
gap between the abstract categories of the 
guidelines and the concrete results of the 
empirical research, delineating the elements 
of a theory. By focusing on the policy 
instrument as a mediator between the 
collective (macro) and individual (micro) 
rationalities, some teams were able to lay the 
foundations for later theorizing that would 
integrate the macro and micro aspects of 
scientific and technological development. 
Some members of the STPI network felt it 
necessary to go beyond science and 
technology and to examine the evolution of 
productive forces and relations of production 
that could provide a starting point for the 
study of the role of science and technology in 
the peripheral economies. This theme was not 
developed fully as part of STPI, and although a 
few teams made attempts at wrestling with it, it 
was beyond the scope of STPl's initial terms of 
reference. 
Unraveling the Web 
Placing technology at the focal point of 
research efforts meant that other components 
of socioeconomic development such as 
capital accumulation, industrial growth, 
employment, etc. were studied in terms of 
their impact on science and technology 
functions and activities and not in their own 
right. The aim was to unravel the web of 
interactions between different development 
policies where they have an impact on science 
and technology. Distortions may have 
resulted, but an effort was made to avoid the 
problems that might have arisen from ignoring 
the inner logic and function of the other 
factors. 
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The original design of STPI as an 
action-oriented research project seeking to 
provide answers to policymakers had a 
technocratic bias. Nevertheless, most of the 
country teams were aware of it and were able 
to cope with it. None had a "technocratic 
illusion" that blinded them to the 
development process in their countries. To 
avoid the technocratic bias totally would have 
required a thorough knowledge of the actors 
in the political process and an understanding 
of their motivation, both of which were 
beyond the framework of the STPI project. 
Realizing the development potential of 
science and technology by designing and 
using appropriate policy instruments 
constitutes a difficult task, made more difficult 
by the lack of knowledge about how policies 
are transformed into effective action. The STPI 
project, whatever its limitations, attempted to 
reduce the ignorance so that the real 
constraints would emerge in full view. 
STPI worked through action-oriented 
research and it had limitations resulting from 
the degree to which knowledge and action 
can be effectively merged and uncertainties 
reduced. Clearly, STPI did not provide a final 
answer to any question posited either by 
policymakers or by academic researchers. 
What it sought was to develop explanations, 
confirmed to an acceptable degree, to reduce 
the uncertainty due to ignorance and help 
in relating knowledge to action. 
Action-Oriented Research 
From the early stages of the STPI project 
proposal, the idea was to conduct research 
that would have direct impact on S& T 
policymaking and decision-making in 
industry. STPl's initiators were anxious to belie 
the widespread criticism that researchers 
produce interesting but useless reports in 
science and technology policy. For this reason 
both the participants in the Barbados meeting 
and the sponsoring agencies emphasized the 
action-oriented approach of STPI. The first 
steps in organizing the country teams, 
identifying the host institution, and setting the 
research in motion underlined the 
implications of action-oriented research. Still, 
some teams decided on an academic rather 
than an action-oriented research approach. 
Action-oriented research in the field of 
science and technology policy requires first a 
dual commitment, both to research (to 
advancing the state of knowledge) and to 
action (providing advice to policy- and 
decision-makers). A dual commitment, in 
turn, requires the ability to maintain a delicate 
balance. For example, having access to 
information may compromise the freedom to 
publish research results. Researchers may be 
obliged to uphold the official views of an 
agency providing information even when 
their values and ideologies conflict. At times, 
researchers supporting the objectives of 
particular agencies may exercise 
self-censorship to avoid damaging their 
credibility and effectiveness. 
The Dangers 
The conduct of action-oriented research is 
fraught with possibilities of losing the balance. 
A first danger is confusing action-oriented 
research with "service" projects; in the latter 
no commitment to advancing the state of 
knowledge is implied and the task consists of 
giving advice based on existing knowledge. 
One type of service project is the simple 
collection of data to justify decisions made in 
advance. 
A second danger is to concentrate only on a 
particular problem, with the aim of explaining 
and predicting behaviour. This may be done 
through either developing theories or 
gathering empirical data without directing the 
outcome to the policy- and decision-making 
processes. 
A third danger, which is the most difficult to 
avoid once the idea of providing advice is 
accepted, is to overemphasize action within 
the existing political framework. The 
expedient or practical approach should not 
preclude the search outside the existing 
framework for new ideas and solutions that 
could provide better answers to the problems 
at hand but that would require the policy- and 
decision-makers to deviate from their normal 
course. If no scope for change is seen by the 
researchers, the work and its results may be 
directed to groups challenging the existing 
framework, with the action orientation 
turning into "counter research" or "advocacy 
research." 
The dangers in action-oriented research can 
only be dealt with by the individuals and re-
search teams; they are outside the control of a 
central coordinating body. Forth is reason, the 
country teams in STPI needed to be 
autonomous, their members facing the issues 
and resolving them in what they considered 
the best way possible. 
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In one country, the STPI team believed that 
linking to policymakers within the existing 
framework would not lead to improved 
decision-making in science and technology 
policies; nevertheless, as soon as the reports 
and documents resulting from the research 
were released, they were delivered to the 
appropriate government agencies and 
policymakers. 
In another country, one of the top 
government economic planners joined the 
team as a consultant and participated in all the 
deliberations of the team while the research 
was in progress. The flow of information 
allowed the introduction of new concepts and 
ideas into government economic policy long 
before any reports were made available. 
In both countries, the teams were in 
academic institutions. Other teams, located in 
government organizations, did not have the 
problem of linking up formally with 
government organizations and policymakers. 
However, the degree of their integration into 
the decision- and policymaking processes was 
quite varied, showing that locating a team in 
government does not guarantee success. 
Gap Between Theory and Practice 
Action-oriented research should not be 
reduced to simple units for investigation. The 
entire picture needs to be viewed 
simultaneously. Thus, the STPI teams did not 
concentrate on only one aspect of the process 
of formulating and implementing science and 
technology policies but attempted to bridge 
the conceptual and practical gap between the 
process of formulating government policy and 
the behaviour of individual agencies or 
productive units. The methodological 
problems encountered should not be under-
estimated; however, each team dealt 'with 
them more or less successfully. The methods 
guidelines furnished a starting point for 
systematically handling this complexity and 
were expanded by the teams to suit their 
needs. 
Another characteristic of action-oriented 
research is that it must be contextual, 
reflecting the history and present situation. 
STPI research was placed in context by the use 
of the implicit policies concept and the 
adoption of an historical perspective. 
In the field of policy design and 
implementation, action-oriented research 
must focus on the interrelations between 
policy formulation and individual decision-
making. Policies are formulated by govern-
ment (macro level) to guide and orient 
specific actions by agencies, institutions, and 
enterprises (micro level). The link between 
policymaking and action, however, is not 
usually considered. This is true even though 
the link can be a deciding factor in individual 
decisions at the micro level, which determine 
the way in which the country's S& T capabilities 
develop. Therefore, perhaps the key task in 
STPI research was to determine how policies 
filter down through the government 
machinery and condition individual decisions 
- in other words, the way in which policy 
instruments mediate between policies and 
actions. 
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Clearly, talking about two levels - the 
macro and the micro - is a simplification. In 
fact, there are several levels of policy 
formation and decision-taking, and, at each, 
investigators must examine the nature of 
conflicts between individual and collective 
reasoning. This task requires a basic under-
standing of the driving forces and motivations 
of the actors at all levels and is only mildly 
aided by formal concepts. Nevertheless, 
concepts such as "policy instruments" and 
"cluster of policy instruments" helped to 
focus the research of STPI on the interrelation 
between policies and decisions on S& T 
activities. 
Some teams chose to follow the 
methodological guidelines in an orthodox 
way, went as far as they could go, and then 
developed their own set of concepts, 
borrowing in most cases from other develop-
ments in the literature. Some teams 
concentrated on a specific problem within 
S& T functions; they modified the guidelines 
early, finding that the concepts in the guide-
lines were too general. However, in all cases 
the aim of examining the interrelations 
between policy and decision was maintained. 
Another characteristic of action-oriented 
research is that the researchers' value systems 
also influence investigations. Within STPI, 
there was an array of ideologies and values 
held by the participants in the network, and 
there was no use ignoring the differences. 
However, there were no major conflicts 
possibly because there was greater 
homogeneity of views than initially 
anticipated but more likely because of the way 
in which the STPI project was designed and 
organized. 
Values in Research 
Although the participants in the STPI 
network held different political views with 
regard to the future of their own countries and 
the development model that should be 
followed, they held a similar view of the 
policies needed for applying science and 
technology to development objectives. 
Agreement was easily reached on the 
objectives and approach of the STPI project as 
contained in the original STPI project 
proposal. In addition, the autonomy of the 
country teams and the agreement to exchange 
information prevented any conflicts that 
might have emerged from one group's trying 
to impose its views on others. In fact, there was 
good ground for mutual understanding, and 
the ideological conflicts were not as acute as 
anticipated. 
Attempts were made by some teams to 
define their values explicitly. One of the teams 
outlined a desired model of society, providing 
a norm for the redesign of science and tech-
nology policy instruments. A second team 
chose to work within the framework 
established by the government but sought to 
reorient the treatment of science and tech-
nology in the context of the 5 year economic 
development plan. Another team decided to 
focus efforts on defining government policy 
and policy instruments for particular industrial 
branches, where change seemed to be more 
realistic. 
The operational characteristics of action-
oriented research are primarily organizational 
requirements. For example, the research must 
produce knowledge and results in time to be 
useful for policy- and decision-makers. The 
research timetable is particularly important if 
the results are to be provided to users as the 
research proceeds. In the STPI project, timing 
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was not a major problem, because most of the 
teams did not interact with policy- and 
decision-makers on a day-to-day basis. In one 
case, the country coordinator became a top 
policymaker in industrial science and 
technology policy and altered the timing and 
content of one part of the research to provide 
information on the institution he was 
managing. Changes in government policy also 
modified the timing and content of the 
research, and in one case a new director of a 
science and technology agency demanded 
results for a national congress on science and 
tech no logy. 
Another organizational requirement of 
action-oriented research is to involve the 
"actors." Ideally, the researchers, 
policymakers, and decision-makers engage in 
a collective search for solutions, without 
impositions by any party. In STPI, very few of 
the teams reached the ideal. Only one team 
secured participation from consultants and 
government officials. Most other teams 
exposed decision- and policymakers to partial 
results but did not involve them in the 
research activities. 
Chapter 2 
The STPI Countries 
The growth of industry and the evolution of 
science and technology in the STPI countries 
along with the specific conditions of 
underdevelopment provide the backdrop for 
the development of scientific and 
technological capabilities. In this chapter, the 
emphasis has been placed on identifying 
common features and on deriving 
implications from the comparison of national 
situations. The specificity of the national 
studies, however, and the heterogeneity of 
research approaches of the country teams 
limit the comparability of findings. 
Consequently, the generalizations, of this and 
subsequent chapters should be considered as 
working hypotheses requiring further study 
and development. 
Common Features in Industrialization 
Much industrial growth among STPI 
countries was due to import substitution, 
which was introduced first by Argentina, 
Brazil, and Mexico after the Great Depression 
of 1929, and later (in the 1950s) by the other 
Latin American countries (Colombia, 
Venezuela, and Peru) as well as Egypt.3 
Initially, import substitution was an attempt to 
deal with crisis shortages of manufactured 
products in international markets or with 
contractions in the markets for primary 
commodities that were a country's source of 
foreign exchange to pay for imports. Because 
the growth of industry was conditioned by the 
imports of intermediate and capital goods, any 
crisis in the balance of payments immediately 
turned into a crisis for industry. Import 
substitution industrialization started as a 
response. 
South Korea combined import substitution 
3 Because no material was made available, India 
has been excluded from the analysis. 
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with the production of goods for export to the 
Western industrialized nations, emphasizing 
the latter both with respect to total output and 
investment. As a consequence, South Korean 
industry is highly vulnerable to changes in the 
international market as well as to economic 
recessions in countries that supply South 
Korea with industrial inputs and absorb its 
products. 
The present industrialization drive in Korea 
began after a devastating war, concurrently 
with the reconstruction efforts financed by the 
US A. In the middle 1950s the problem was not 
one of substituting imports, for they had been 
limited by the war, but rather of preventing 
new imports from flooding the domestic 
market. In this sense, protection of the 
domestic market had a different character 
than in Latin America. 
Like South Korea, the Socialist Republic of 
Macedonia was involved in war just before 
moving toward industrialization. However, it 
represents a special case on several accounts. 
First, it is a republic of Yugoslavia; second, its 
productive, financial, and trading systems 
have been controlled by the state and by a 
self-managed economic system; and third, it 
occupies a special position between Eastern 
and Western Europe. The pattern of 
industrialization has been influenced by all 
these factors, and particularly by the state 
control of the economy during the 
reconstruction period after World War II. 
Collective control, self-management, and 
government planning - still in force 
though much weakened by several reforms 
(1965, 1971, 1974) - have also shaped industry. 
The Macedonian industrial structure, similar 
to the Yugoslavian one, rests on the heavy 
industry that was established with the 
assistance of foreign technology imports. 
The consumer industry branches in 
Macedonia were not expanded early enough 
to support industrial growth, and since 1965 
foreign loans, imported technology, and joint 
ventures and collaboration agreements with 
foreign enterprises have been the mainstay of 
industry. As a result, industry has been unable 
to absorb the expanding labour force, and 
there are serious unemployment and 
migration problems. 
Import Substitution Industrialization 
Import substitution industrialization found 
in the Latin American countries and in Egypt 
began as a result of world crises. The 1930s 
depression and the Second World War led to 
deficits in the trade and payments balances so 
that countries needed to save foreign 
currency by reducing imports. Moreover, the 
two events restricted the supply of products 
manufactured by the Western industrialized 
countries4 and stimulated investment in local 
industry to satisfy the social strata with 
purchasing power. In other words, the main 
components of import substitution industrial-
ization were deficits in the balances of trade 
and payments, the availability of finance for 
local investment, and the existence of a social 
class with the means for increasing and 
diversifying its consumption. 
In general terms, import substitution has 
two stages: first, substituting consumer and 
some light durable goods and, later, 
intermediate, basic, and capital goods. Not 
all the countries under consideration have 
managed to make a smooth transition from 
the first to the second stage, and their 
industrial development shows the strain. The 
countries that proceeded to the second stage 
early (Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico) 
encountered less difficulties than Colombia, 
Egypt, Peru, and Venezuela because they had 
larger internal markets to support their 
industrial structures and a greater industrial 
base at the time import substitution was 
initiated. 
Before import substitution began, local 
industry was rudimentary, producing low-cost 
consumer goods. It was profitable because the 
high costs of transport provided natural 
protection from import competition. In some 
countries, such as Brazil, during the first 3 
decades of the present century, local industry 
produced an incipient mass market for 
4 To a certain extent, Venezuela was an exception 
to this because of the privileged and strategic 
character of its oil exports. 
industrial products. The technological 
requirements of industrial production were 
low, and quality did not matter. Obsolete 
machinery and equipment could be imported 
at a relatively low cost as it was discarded in 
the more advanced countries (which were 
expanding their industry very rapidly). Jn 
general, the governments levied no duties on 
imports of machinery. Argentina was an 
exception, imposing duties on imports of 
capital goods up to the 1930s. (Brazil levied 
tariffs on some capital goods imported in the 
1930s). Jn Argentina, throughout the early 
phases of import substitution, prices of capital 
goods were high compared to consumer 
goods, making the process of capital 
formation in industries very difficult. 
In Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico, the 
mechanisms utilized by the state to support 
and protect existing manufacturing provided 
the framework for capital accumulation and 
subsequent expansion of the light industry 
sector. 
During the early phases of industrialization, 
the primary sector - agricultural activities 
in particular -supported industrial growth in 
a variety of ways. Agricultural activities 
supplied low-cost food to the urban centres 
and raw materials that were transformed by 
industry. The migration of rural workers to 
industrial centres generated a pool of jobless 
people and allowed wages to be kept down. 
For example, in Mexico, the elimination of 
traditional landholding patterns that tied the 
rural worker to the land and the elimination of 
internal duties, which impeded the flow of 
agricultural products, led to a flow of peasants 
to the urban areas in the 1920s and 1930s, an 
abundant source of cheap labour for industry. 
Agricultural exports also generated the 
foreign exchange to import the capital goods 
and material inputs required for industrial 
activities. Finally, through unfavourable terms 
of trade between rural and urban production, 
there was a net transfer of resources toward 
urban manufacturing that helped in the 
process of industrial accumulation. 
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Today, agricultural activities continue to 
support industry in most STPI countries. In 
Argentina, agriculture and cattle raising still 
generate the foreign exchange required to 
import capital goods and industrial inputs. In 
Colombia and Brazil, coffee exports are the 
main sources of foreign exchange. In Peru and 
Egypt, manufactured products continue to 
benefit from trade despite some measures to 
protect agriculture. Since World War II, how-
ever, agricultural activities have stagnated and 
are no longer able to support industrialization 
in the same way as previously. 
In some countries, other exports generated 
foreign exchange for industry, i.e., oil in 
Venezuela, minerals and fishmeal in Peru, 
whereas agriculture has been the source of 
displaced labour, resource transfers, raw 
materials, and food. Thus the general picture 
that emerges during the first stage of import 
substitution industrialization is one of industry 
eliciting support from primary activities for its 
expansion and receiving political support 
from government. During this phase, the 
countries under study began to attract foreign 
investors, and many industrial activities came 
under foreign control - a situation that still 
obtains for the smaller STPI countries 
following the import substitution road to 
industrialization (Colombia, Peru, Venezuela, 
Egypt). 
The 1930s 
In the economic crisis of the 1930s 
foreign markets could not absorb all the 
exports of primary commodities; the 
monetary chaos reduced sharply the flow of 
foreign investment. This meant that capital 
would have to come from internal sources, 
such as the primary sector and the state. New 
institutions were created to take charge of 
fiscal, monetary, and credit policies (central 
banks, development financing corporations) 
and to manage new policies regulating the 
flow of imports, etc. At the same time, 
measures were taken to expand higher 
education and to create an incipient scientific 
and technological infrastructure. In Mexico, 
the oil industry was nationalized and in the 
large countries the role of the state in 
orienting economic growth began to expand. 
The interests of the state and those of 
private industry coincided to a large extent 
during this period, and government policies 
promoted the selective distribution of credit 
to bolster local industry. Monetary policies 
alternately benefited local entrepreneurs and 
foreign investors (stable exchange rate 
periods followed by devaluations); imports 
and exports were taxed selectively to 
eliminate foreign competition and to sustain 
the income of local exporters of primary 
commodities generating the necessary foreign 
exchange. In some cases, as in Mexico, tariffs 
were instituted as a way of generating income 
for the state, in addition to providing industrial 
protection. 
The policy instruments introduced in the 
1930s were kept in force throughout the 
Second World War, and production 
continued to be directed toward the export of 
primary commodities. A local market 
emerged, and imports were primarily capital 
and intermediate goods, which were 
absorbed by the productive system. Some 
consumer goods were also imported in 
relatively small quantities (and taxed highly) 
for the benefit of the high-income minorities; 
the needs of the majority of the population 
were satisfied, although not fully, with locally 
produced goods: foodstuffs, household 
goods, textiles, footwear, building materials, 
and other light durables. 
· As the economies expanded, the state 
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became more involved, undertaking 
unprofitable but essential investments, such as 
the provision of energy, transport, and other 
basic services. State intervention in these 
activities was not always a willing and planned 
undertaking; in Brazil, for example, the state 
could be considered a reluctant entrepreneur 
in taking over electricity generation and 
steelmaking. The state was less reticent in oil 
production and refining, particularly in 
Mexico and Brazil, where it acted against 
foreign enterprises, which had a virtual 
monopoly. The pattern of state involvement 
was the same for all the STPI countries. In the 
case of Egypt, state-owned enterprises 
accounted for a very high percentage of 
industrial production, reaching 75% in the late 
1960s. 
During and preceding World War II, 
international demand for raw materials and 
primary commodities was at a high. The 
countries under survey were able to 
accumulate foreign exchange but due to 
shortages of foreign supplies were forced to 
cut back imports. The combined effect was 
increased public expenditures, expansion of 
industry (including the use of existing idle 
capacity), and growth of the domestic market, 
particularly in urban areas. 
The economic booms were followed by 
economic crises in all the STPI countries 
involved in import substitution. One of the 
problems was the depletion of foreign 
reserves; it was compounded by the shortage 
of foreign capital, which was channeled 
mainly to the reconstruction of the European 
and Japanese economies. Also, the first im-
pulse toward import substitution industrializa-
tion was reaching its limits. The substitution of 
consumer goods and light durables was 
constrained by the narrowness of domestic 
markets; and agriculture was stagnating, not 
able to provide support to the same degree as 
in the early stages. Foreign exchange 
shortages resulted from the inability to sustain 
exports; the accumulation of capital within 
the industrial sector had not reached the 
proportions required for a self-sustained 
expansion of industry; and the transfer of 
financial resources from the industrialized 
centres was not forthcoming. The crises were 
felt first in the larger countries (late 1950s and 
early 60s) accompanied by deep monetary 
instability, inflation, and unequal balance of 
payments, which led to devaluations, debt 
rescheduling, and, toward the end of this 
period, to a new inflow of foreign capital 
through loans and direct investment, 
channeled mainly to manufacturing industry. 
During the crises, the countries moved 
toward the second stage of import substitution 
in a gradual way; the transition was shaped by 
the measures taken to overcome the crises. 
New legislation was introduced to restructure 
industrial protection and promote the 
expansion of intermediate and capital goods 
industries. Import licences and quotas were 
introduced; tax rebates and other fiscal 
benefits for industry were put into effect; 
special regimes were designed for selected 
industries; and government agencies· were 
reinforced or created to provide credit 
facilities for industrial expansion. This array of 
protectionist policy instruments helped to 
promote the growth of industry and motivated 
the import of capital goods, intermediate 
products, and of technology, which together 
began to account for about three-quarters of 
the total import bill. The result was 
incompressibility or rigidity in the structure of 
imports; any reduction in the volume of 
imports was bound to affect not only final 
consumption but also industrial production, 
curbing significantly the activity of some 
industrial branches. In turn, the 
incompressibility of imports led, in the face of 
uncertain foreign exchange earnings, to 
greater indebtedness. 
Furthermore, the tariffs and administrative 
controls associated with protectionist policies 
had a differential impact on the growth of 
various industrial branches. Toward the end of 
the first stage and, to a lesser degree, during 
the second stage of import substitution, goods 
for final consumption were protected more 
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heavily than intermediate or capital goods. 
Thus, the incipient capital goods industry 
faced competition from foreign machinery 
and equipment that was imported at low 
duties and was subject to limited controls. The 
competition, along with the small size of the 
internal market and the difficulties in 
acquiring and assimilating technology, limited 
the growth of the capital goods industry. 
Despite some problems, the growth of the 
capital goods industry was promoted by state 
intervention. State enterprises intervened in 
articulating a demand for locally produced 
machinery and equipment in Brazil and 
Argentina, imposed tariffs for certain capital 
goods that could be manufactured locally, and 
introduced supportive policies. For example, 
Colombian regulations that forced 
depreciation of machinery and equipment in 
10 years stimulated repair and maintenance 
activities and created a market for used and 
reconstructed machinery. When incentives 
were given to the metal-working industry, the 
existing capacity to repair and reconstruct 
equipment - primarily associated with the 
large enterprises (mainly textile mills) - was 
instrumental in the transition toward the 
manufacture of some capital goods, and repair 
shops were converted into metal-working 
firms. 
Protection: Boon or Bane 
Protectionist policies helped to turn 
manufacturing industries - particularly 
consumer goods industries - into profitable 
ventures (capital was supplied at low cost, 
industrial inputs were subsidized, fiscal 
incentives were provided, and so on). Local 
entrepreneurs operated in an easy environ-
ment and did not develop cost consciousness, 
technological inventiveness, or risk-taking 
ventures. 
As well, protectionist policies attracted 
tariff-jumping foreign investment to exploit 
the local market; combined with measures to 
stimulate the inflow of foreign capital and the 
renewed availability of international capital, 
they led to a new wave of foreign investment 
in STPI countries. By the end of the 1950s and 
the beginning of the 1960s, foreign capital 
dominated the most profitable industrial 
branches, through direct investment, 
purchases of already established firms, 
joint-venture agreements, or public and 
private loans. Foreign investment was 
designed to establish new lines of production 
or to modernize old ones, tying the inflow of 
capital to the supply of technology in the form 
of machinery and equipment, intermediate 
products, technical assistance, licencing 
agreements, etc. Multinational firms were at 
the forefront, providing foreign capital and 
serving as channels for technology transfer. 
Due to the economic conditions prevailing in 
the recipient countries, their weak industrial 
structure, and the limited size of the domestic 
market, the foreign firms operated from the 
state as monopolies or oligopolies. 
In taking advantage of the market, foreign 
firms were chiefly responsible for introducing 
technical change in the newly established 
industrial branches. They brought 
technologies from abroad, introducing few 
adaptations to meet local conditions. Large-
sca le capital-intensive techniques of 
production were employed in the branches 
that attracted foreign capital, and the new 
technologies raised productivity without 
significantly bolstering industrial employment 
levels. 
The Domestic Market 
Throughout import substitution industrial-
ization the narrowness and composition of the 
domestic market has limited the growth of 
industry. Although there was a moderate 
enlargement of the domestic market with the 
expansion of the urban population, the import 
substitution industries catered mainly to the 
high-income strata of the population. 
Inequalities in income distribution prevented 
the emergence of a mass market for 
manufactured goods even in countries, such 
as Brazil, with large populations. Furthermore, 
the narrowness of the domestic market, 
coupled to investments in large-scale plants, 
led to the widespread underuse of installed 
capacity. 
The predominance of agricultural and 
artisan activities, which are not fully integrated 
into the market economy, and the existence of 
large sectors of the population engaged in 
marginal service activities in urban areas 
(Mexico, Brazil, Egypt) limit the purchasing 
power of the majority of the population, 
preventing them from joining the market for 
industrial goods. This situation has been 
aggravated by the fact that industry has been 
unable to generate adequate employment 
opportunities to absorb the increasing labour 
force. As a result, the domestic markets for 
industrial products have remained small in 
comparison with the potential based on full 
participation of the populations. 
The inability of agriculture or industry to 
finance industrial expansion has meant a 
massive inflow of foreign finance. The result 
has been heavy foreign indebtedness and high 
payments for interest and amortization. An 
increasing share of foreign exchange earnings 
have been devoted to the external debt 
instead of purchases of intermediate products 
and capital goods for industry. In some 
countries, like Peru and Egypt, foreign 
exchange availability for industry has been 
further reduced by the amount that is devoted 
to food imports. 
Recent attempts to sustain the drive 
toward industrialization in the STPI countries 
following the import substitution road 
include, among others, the promotion of 
manufactured exports in the industrialized 
economies (Argentina, Brazil, Mexico), the 
expansion of domestic markets through 
regional agreements (Colombia, Peru, and 
Venezuela as members of the Andean 
Common Market), redistribution of income 
(Peru), encouragement of foreign investment 
(Egypt), and increased exports of primary 
commodities (oil in Venezuela and minerals in 
Peru). In all cases, the efforts toward building a 
more coherent industrial structure 
progressed, and the importance of building 
up a local base of industrial technology began 
to be recognized. 
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South Korean Strategy 
South Korea is the only country in the STPI 
network that has developed an industrial 
structure oriented primarily toward export of 
manufactured goods. In contrast with the 
countries examined previously, South Korea 
does not derive most of its foreign exchange 
from exports of primary commodities. Rather, 
it exports manufactures for which low wages 
provide a competitive edge. 
Industrialization in South Korea was 
preceded by post-war reconstruction in the 
1960s, carried out with large-scale financial 
assistance from the USA. At the same time, the 
educational system was expanded, and a large 
number of South Korean professionals were 
sent abroad for postgraduate studies. During 
this period, a minimum governmental 
infrastructure was created and consolidated. 
After reconstruction, industrialization 
began with the production of consumer goods 
and light durables through a process of import 
substitution, but government measures were 
directed to preventing imports into the South 
Korean domestic market rather than to 
promoting their substitution. Previously, 
imports had been drastically reduced because 
of war, and before that, during the Japanese 
occupation they had been rather limited. This 
import substitution component of South 
Korean industrialization has remained in force 
even throughout the period of export-
oriented industrialization, which began in the 
1960s and continues today. 
After the 1950-53 war, the redistribution of 
land accompanied the beginnings of industry. 
For 2 decades trade between rural and urban 
areas favoured the latter although this was 
offset by subsidies to farmers and by food aid 
from the USA. More determined attempts to 
correct this imbalance have been made in the 
1970s. Rural areas also provided displaced 
labour to industrial and service activities. 
Lacking natural resources and cultivable land, 
South Korea has exported negligible primary 
commodities. Efforts have turned instead to 
reaching an acceptable level of self-suffi-
ciency in food supply. 
Starting in 1961, the government 
intervened actively in shaping the industrial 
structure and began to interact with private 
interests, primarily the exporters of 
manufactured goods. As a result, the majority 
of government measures were directed 
toward supporting the exports of 
manufacturers and ensuring the profitability 
of firms exporting a substantial part of their 
output. Direct government intervention in 
productive activities has been limited to 
providing the necessary infrastructure for 
industrial growth and to initiating ventures in 
areas too risky for private entrepreneurs. The 
close link between private entrepreneurs and 
government officials provides a framework for 
putting into effect government plans and for 
ensuring state support to private industry. 
Because of its industrialization strategy, 
South Korea has become highly vulnerable to 
changes in the international market. Given 
that the bulk of its manufactured exports go to 
the United States of America and Japan, any 
downturn in their economies immediately 
translates into reductions of exports. 
Furthermore, the lack of natural resources 
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makes South Korean industry highly 
vulnerable to fluctuations in supply and price 
levels, as was shown by the rise in oil prices in 
1973-74. Although foreign exchange 
represents a rather high percentage of the 
Gross Domestic Product, it has not been 
sufficient to sustain South Korean industrial-
ization. Japanese and American investments in 
key branches of industry, suppliers of credit 
for capital goods, and foreign loans guaran-
teed by the government have supported 
South Korean industrialization. 
In contrast with other countries following 
the export promotion route to 
industrialization (Singapore, Taiwan, Hong 
Kong), South Korea has a rather large potential 
domestic market, which could absorb more 
output, should industry be oriented from 
exports toward local consumption. There may 
in fact be a trend in this direction as inequali-
ties in income distribution have been 
diminishing in the 1970s and measures have 
been taken to correct the rural-urban 
imbalances, keep peasants in rural areas, and 
eliminate the bias toward industrial and 
service activities that drain resources from the 
labour force engaged in agriculture. 
The relatively high level of technical skills 
and education of the South Korean labour 
force has been of great importance in 
supporting the drive toward industrialization. 
The investments in education of the 1950s and 
early 1960s paid off for industry at least. The 
high educational level of the population and 
the low level of wages provided South Korean 
industry with trained, low-cost labour and a 
means to compete successfully in the 
international market. However, the rising 
levels of per capita income and the measures 
taken in the mid-1970s to lessen inequalities 
will divest industry of its labour costs 
advantage. Anticipating this, the government 
officials are now talking about switching from 
labour intensive to "brain intensive" 
industries, increasing the technical and 
professional level of its labour force and 
industry to compete in the international 
market during the 1980s. 
Mixed Industrialization in Macedonia 
Macedonia is unique in the context of the 
STPI project: it is a republic of Yugoslavia, it 
has occupied a singular position between East 
and West Europe, and it has planned and 
managed its economy. After World War II, 
Yugoslavia (and Macedonia as part of it) was 
engaged in reconstruction with the assistance 
of the Soviet Union. The reconstruction 
period was characterized by a planned 
approach to industrial development that 
emphasized import substitution and the 
growth of basic and heavy industries in the 
socialist manner. At later stages, when the ties 
with Eastern Europe were loosened and 
regional autonomy increased, an employment 
generation component was added to the 
industrialization strategy of Yugoslavia. The 
strategy was complemented later by efforts to 
find a place within the international division of 
labour of the industrialized market 
economies, primarily by fostering exports of 
manufactured goods. The country sought 
joint-ventures with Western enterprises, 
imported large amounts of capital goods, and 
attempted to upgrade its technology. Thus, 
Yugoslavia in general, and the Republic of 
Macedonia in particular, followed an 
industrialization strategy that combined a 
variety of components. 
Industrial growth in Macedonia has been, 
and still is, supported by resource transfers 
from the agricultural sector. Imbalances in the 
terms of trade between rural and urban areas 
have led to the net transfer of capital from the 
former to the latter, and agricultural activities 
have been a source of industrial labour. 
Furthermore, agricultural exports have 
provided some foreign exchange. 
State intervention has been dominant 
throughout industrialization in Macedonia. 
Protectionist measures fostered the growth of 
basic industries first and consumer goods and 
light durables later. Throughout the 1950s, a 
variety of government-controlled sources of 
financing provided capital for industrial 
expansion, and after 1965, the measures 
introduced to promote exports led to the 
establishment of new industries. 
Constitutional reforms have weakened the 
role of the federal and republican 
governments and have given more autonomy 
to the self-managed enterprises, although 
government intervention is still present in 
industrial activities. 
Yugoslavia switched from the division of 
labour within the socialist sphere of influence 
to the division of labour among Western 
market economies but retained ties with both 
camps. The switch gave a peculiar character to 
the influence of the external sector on Yugo-
slavian and Macedonian industrialization. 
Joint-venture and commercialization agree-
ments with Western enterprises have allowed 
industry to obtain financing and technology 
and to find export outlets in the West, 
generating foreign exchange. The access to 
Western technology and the trading agree-
ments with Eastern European countries have 
provided new market opportunities that are 
not open to the same degree to Western 
economies. 
However, the narrowness of the domestic 
market and the regional disparities in the 
Yugoslav federation have been a barrier to 
industrial expansion in Macedonia. 
Unemployment and migration, which are 
related both to the relative stagnation of 
agriculture and to the inability of industry to 
absorb an expanding labour force, limit the 
possible expansion of industrial activities. 
Common Features 
Despite the differences arising from 
specific historical conditions, size of the 
market, resource endowments, characteristics 
of the population, and other contextual 
factors, there are similarities in 
industrialization in the STPI countries. 
First, in none of the STPI countries, has 
modern industry developed as a result of the 
gradual transformation of local crafts and 
artisan activities. Rather, it resulted from 
transplants of productive facilities and of 
technology from countries that had achieved a 
higher degree of industrialization. Imports of 
machinery and equipment, migration of 
skilled personnel, purchases of technology 
and foreign technical assistance have been at 
the centre of modern industrial growth in the 
STPI countries, whereas local invention, 
innovation, and even adaptation of foreign 
technologies have played a minor role. Thus, 
industrial development has been strongly 
conditioned by the possibility of acquiring and 
absorbing foreign technology. 
Second, in all STPI countries agriculture 
has provided the initial accumulation base for 
industry and has supported industrialization in 
a variety of ways. Only in South Korea was the 
agricultural input minor. In some countries in 
the STPI network, mineral exports also 
provided limited support to industrialization, 
particularly through the generation of foreign 
exchange to finance industrial inputs. In most 
countries, the transfer of resources from the 
primary (mainly agricultural) sector to the 
44 
industrial sector still continues, and industry 
has not been able to generate the surplus and 
the foreign exchange necessary to sustain its 
own expansion. As a result, the relative 
stagnation of agriculture and the fluctuations 
in the international commodity markets have 
had a disturbing effect on the growth of 
industry. 
Third, the state has been of paramount 
importance in shaping industrial development 
in the STPI countries. When deliberate 
industrialization efforts began, protectionism 
played a key role in stimulating local 
production, particularly in the countries that 
followed the import substitution road. 
Protectionist measures have had a mixed 
impact on industrial growth and on the 
development of technological capabilities, 
but it is hard to see how local industry could 
have developed in any other way during the 
initial stages. Even the countries that have 
followed an export-oriented (South Korea) or 
planned (Macedonia) approach to 
industrialization have included import 
substitution components in their 
industrialization strategy. Protectionist 
measures taken by government and 
maintained for long periods have created a 
relatively facile environment for local 
entrepreneurs and have stimulated the inflow 
of foreign investment to take advantage of the 
local market. 
The large number of government 
measures and the variety of contexts that 
mediate their effects have created in all STPI 
countries a complex web of interactions. The 
impact of a single government measure is 
difficult to assess, as is the real influence of 
policy instruments. Active government 
intervention in productive activities through 
state enterprises adds another dimension to 
the problem. In this regard, key issues are the 
coincidence and interpenetration of interests 
between the state and industrial 
entrepreneurs and the extent to which the 
state is prepared to support industrialization. 
Fourth, all the STPI countries are open 
economies in the sense of depending, in some 
way or other, on the external sector for 
industrial growth. Those that relied entirely on 
import substitution continue to depend on 
the export of primary commodities to 
generate foreign exchange for importing 
industrial inputs. South Korea is highly depen-
dent on foreign markets for the export of its 
manufactured goods (primarily consumer and 
light durables), and particularly on the 
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channels that place its products in the USA and 
Japan. Most of the STPI countries are also 
dependent on imports of oil (with the 
exception of Venezuela and Mexico), and all 
of them have required large transfers of 
financial resources to support their 
industrialization drives. All have incurred 
heavy foreign debts. Even Venezuela, with its 
surplus of foreign exchange generated by oil 
revenues, has been unable to substitute the 
imports of foreign capital, which come tied to 
technology, productive facilities, and several 
other services required to materialize 
industrial investments. 
Finally, the narrowness of the domestic 
market for industrial products in most STPI 
countries has limited the growth of industry 
and has been closely related to unequal 
income distribution, with large segments of 
the population remaining at the margin of 
economic life. Industry has not been able to 
absorb the expanding labour force, and 
industrial employment cannot be counted on 
as a means for expanding the domestic 
market. However, in South Korea, which has a 
large population, rising incomes, and more 
balanced income distribution, the potential 
domestic market could absorb industrial 
output in the near future if necessary to offset 
export difficulties. 
The common features of industrialization 
indicate that the STPI countries have not 
generated enough demand to stimulate the 
growth of domestic scientific and 
technological capabilities. The appearance of 
modern industry as a transplant from Western 
industrialized countries instead of an 
outgrowth of local crafts; the inability of 
industry to finance its own expansion and the 
reliance on primary activities to sustain it; the 
ambiguous environment provided by protec-
tionist policies; the lack in most cases of a 
clear technological development plan on the 
part of government (with the recent 
exceptions of India, Brazil, and South Korea); 
the reliance on foreign technology; and the 
structure of the domestic market combined in 
all the countries to make industry dependent 
on foreign sources and to limit the demand for 
local scientific and technological activities. 
Science and Technology 
Three strands can be discerned in the 
development of Western science and 
technology - the emergence and growth of 
scientific activity, generating organized 
knowledge to understand and control 
physical, biological, and social phenomena; 
the evolution of modern productive 
techniques, slowly at first and then explosively 
as science-related technology emerged; and 
the relative stagnation (and frequently, 
disappearance) of traditional crafts. The last 
strand is of particular importance in the 
countries that did not participate actively in 
the scientific and technological revolution. 
For them, the traditional non-Western 
technological base was, and still is, of great 
importance for productive activities. They 
would likely benefit from a study of the 
traditional crafts, artisan work, or subsistence 
productive activities that are displaced by the 
last strand of S& T development; however, 
such study was not considered within the 
scope of STPI research. 
In a few countries, science merged with 
technology toward the second half of the 19th 
century (e.g., Western Europe and, later, Japan 
and the USA), and a veritable scientific and 
technologic revolution took place, led to the 
generation and spread of technologies, even-
tually resulting in a solid endogenous scien-
tific and technological base. In STPI countries, 
the symbiosis between science and produc-
tion technology did not take place. Instead, 
they imported the technology required for 
modern industrial activities, and they now 
have an exogenous scientific and technologi-
cal base, which is not designed for their 
specific conditions and characteristics. 
Furthermore, because of their rather low level 
of scientific and technological development, 
they have not been capable of providing the 
knowledge required for maintaining, 
replacing, or improving the imported 
technological base and have been forced to 
rely continuously on foreign inputs. 
Before Western Europeans imposed their 
culture on the peoples of Latin America, the 
Middle East, India, and Southeast Asia, the 
indigenous technology had reached a rather 
high level relative to the social, economic, and 
political situation. Through a slow process of 
trial and error, the traditional technological 
base had been gradually improved. In some 
areas, notably India and Central America (the 
Mayas), speculative thought had also 
developed but was far from being combined 
with the advancement of productive 
techniques. 
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The Spanish conquest during the 16th 
century disrupted the traditional organization 
of productive activities in Latin America. After 
a short period of acculturation, during which 
the newly arrived Europeans learned to 
operate in an alien environment, a systematic 
di~placement of traditional ways of doing 
things took place, accompanied by religious 
intolerance, which put an end to indigenous 
speculative thought. The arrival of the British 
in India was slightly different primarily 
because it happened nearly 2 centuries later, 
when the industrial revolution had produced 
its first fruits. Scientific and engineering 
advancements were used to determine the 
best way of exploiting the Indian 
subcontinent, and British products were 
introduced, smothering traditional crafts and 
ancient modes of thinking. In the Middle East, 
the arrival of the French and the British 
hastened the decline of Islamic civilization 
which had begun to decay after the Ottoman 
conquest. In contrast, South Korea remained 
isolated from the influence of the West until 
the end of the 19th century. 
The subsequent evolution-ofsCienceand 
technology in the colonies was tied to the 
conditions prevailing in the colonial powers. 
Spain and Portugal remained isolated from the 
scientific advances in Europe during the 17th 
century, the crucial period for the emergence 
of Western science, and their colonies in Latin 
America also were at the margin of the new 
currents of thought. Not until the last third of 
the 18th century, when the Enlightenment 
reached the Iberian peninsula, did new ideas 
begin to filter down to Latin America. Shortly 
thereafter, as a result of the wars of 
independence during the first 2 decades of the 
18th century and the political and economic 
instability until the 1850s, much intellectual 
ground was lost, and it would take another 
half-century for the establishment of an 
incipient scientific community in Latin 
America. This new beginning for science in 
Latin America was closely associated with the 
spread of positivism, which had an impact on 
education, politics, and social organization in 
general. 
In India, the United Kingdom's economic 
interest spurred a variety of scientific activities, 
ranging from geologic and geodesic surveys to 
the study of indigenous plants. Indians were 
excluded systematically from the activities, 
and Indian science took a definite colonial 
flavour: it was performed by British scientists 
and put at the service of the Empire. 
Nevertheless, at the turn of the 20th century, 
there were several nuclei of scientific activity 
throughout the subcontinent and an incipient 
Indian scientific community. 
In Egypt, after the arrival of Napoleon, :Vho 
sponsored the creation of the "I nstitut 
d'Egypte", Muhammad Ali focused efforts on 
transforming Islamic culture and absorbing 
and adapting the advances of Western 
science. After his demise, his reforms soon 
lapsed into oblivion, and by the end of the 
19th century there was almost nothing left to 
show his modernization efforts. 
The colonial expansion of Western Europe 
and the consequent spread of new industrial 
technologies led to a disappearance of many 
traditional crafts. Often modern and 
traditional technologies intermingled, with 
the latter sustaining the marginal economic 
activities. When modern industrial activities 
began to grow during the late 19th century 
and the beginning of the 20th century, the 
technology to sustain them was imported be-
cause the indigenous scientific and techno-
logical infrastructure had not been developed 
sufficiently. Thus, the conduct of science and 
the performance of modern productive 
activities were divorced early in 
industrialization, and there was never even a 
marriage between Western science and the 
traditional technological base in the colonies. 
When the drive toward industrialization 
started in the STPI countries at the beginning 
of the 20th century, science had not 
developed into a well-established activity. It 
did not enjoy the steady support of 
government institutions and had not made 
any significant contributions to world 
knowledge or to local productive activities. 
There was no social demand for science 
because of the inc1p1ent level of 
economic development; the predominance 
of imported Western productive techniques; 
the existence of values and attitudes that did 
not foster the pursuit of science; social and 
political instability, which precluded the 
growth of an indigenous scientific tradition; 
and the lack of cultural identity that could 
absorb and fully integrate Western science. 
Science and technology in the STPI 
countries during the 20th century followed a 
more regular path and was tied more closely to 
industry. Industrialization created a demand 
for scientific and technological activities, 
particularly those of an applied and service 
nature. For example, the engineering 
profession emerged as a result of pressures 
exerted by infrastructure development 
(railroads, ports, roads) and m1n1ng, 
manufacturing, and some modern agricultural 
activities. 
The technical difficu I ties at different 
stages of import substitution industrialization 
in Latin America conditioned the growth of 
industrial science and technology activities. 
Technical norms and standards institutions 
were created first to put order into the chaos 
resulting from importing machinery and 
equipment from various European countries 
and the USA. Then centres to increase and 
rationalize productivity were created to offset 
sagging demand, overcapacity, and the 
inability to substitute more complex products. 
Technological research institutes appeared on 
the scene about the same time as productivity 
centres, particularly in the countries that had 
gone furthest in substituting imports of 
intermediate and capital goods. Although 
Egypt was behind Latin America in the import 
su bstitu ti on process, the emergence of 
industrial science and tech no logy activities 
followed a similar pattern. 
In India, the two world wars stimulated the 
development of industrial scientific and 
technological activities, although it was not 
until World War II that a network of industrial 
research institutes was set up. In South Korea, 
whatever S& T facilities existed were destroyed 
during the 1950-53 war and had to be recon-
structed. The same can be said of the Republic 
of Macedonia, which was engaged in 
reconstruction after the Second World War. 
Even though scientific and technological 
activities in STPI countries were more in line 
with industrial growth during the 20th 
century, in no way did they become a 
significant source of innovations for industrial 
growth: STPI countries continued depending 
on imports of technology from the 
industrialized nations. The scientific and 
technological base lagged behind the 
requirements of modern industry and could 
not provide industry with the steady flow of 
technical knowledge necessary to improve 
efficiency and maintain competitiveness. 
Only recently has this situation changed. 
Argentina, Brazil, India, and Mexico, which 
began their industrialization earlier than the 
other STPI countries, have absorbed and 
complemented imported technologies in 
some areas of industrial activity and have 
begun exporting them to developing 
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countries with a lower level of 
industrialization. 
The STPI countries have several S& T 
features in common because the pursuit of 
science is strongly conditioned by the 
scientific centres of the advanced countries 
and because technologies for modern 
productive activities have been mostly 
imported from the industrialized nations. 
However, there are also some important 
differences among the STPI countries, 
resulting primarily from the degree of 
development of the local scientific com-
munity and the context for the performance of 
research and other scientific and technologi-
cal activities. 
Two different stages can be identified in the 
development of science and technology in the 
STPI countries, although there is no automatic 
transition from one to the other. In some of 
the STPI countries - Colombia, Peru, 
Venezuela, Egypt, and Macedonia - science 
and technology are still in the formative stage 
in the sense that they are just beginning to 
emerge as significant and recognized activities 
with an identity of their own. In the other 
countries - Brazil, Argentina, India, Mexico, 
and South Korea - science and technology 
are undergoing consolidation in the sense that 
they have reached a significant level of 
development, have acquired legitimacy, and 
are recognized, although not universally, as 
important social activities. The two categories 
are not clearly differentiated, but there are 
indicators, such as size of the scientific 
community and the qualified human 
resources base; degree of development of the 
institutional infrastructure and its internal 
coherence; legitimacy of the activities of 
scientists; results obtained from scientific 
research and other scientific and 
technological activities; and degree of 
development of industry and importance of 
the demand pressure exerted on the local 
scientific and technological community. 
Modern science is relatively young in all 
STPI countries. There has not been sufficient 
time to develop a well-established scientific 
tradition and to disseminate through society 
the attitudes, points of view, and values 
associated with the conduct of scientific 
inquiry. The performance of scientific 
research in a systematic and continuous way 
did not begin until the 1st decades of the 20th 
century, and in the countries where science 
and technology are at the formative stage, a 
significant level of scientific activity emerged 
only after World War II. Thus, science is still in 
its infancy in the STPI countries, and it is likely 
to take several decades of continuous growth 
before it can contribute significantly to 
development. But scientific inquiry in the 
industrialized world will continue to move 
ahead and will likely stay beyond the grasp of 
the STPI countries - with the possible 
exception of India - at least until the end of 
the 20th century. 
The Formative Years for S&T 
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Countries whose science and technology 
are at the formative stage have stressed that 
S& T activities are on the margin of social and 
economic life. Marginality is a complex 
concept comprising features such as the 
limited size of the scientific community, the 
excessive fragmentation of the science and 
technology effort, the lack of correspondence 
between development aims and local science 
and technology, and the inability to 
incorporate the results of research activities 
into productive and social processes. 
For example, in the mid-70s, Colombia, 
Peru, Venezuela, and Macedonia each had 
less than 1000 full-time researchers, most of 
whom were also involved in other activities, 
primarily teaching and advising. Funds 
allocated for scientific and technological 
activities were rather limited, representing 
around 0.2% of GNP, and, on average, fewer 
than 10 persons work in any given research 
institute in Peru, Venezuela, and Colombia. 
Figures for researchers, rather than total 
personnel, are on average less than five in 
these countries, and the average number of 
researchers per project was fewer than two. 
The average funds allocated in Venezuela and 
Peru amounted to about U.S. $5000 per project 
in 1970, an indication of the research 
fragmentation. 
The majority of research funds in the 
countries with science and technology at the 
formative stage have been directed toward 
basic research, with relatively smaller amounts 
left for applied research and development. 
(Even in the countries such as Peru, where 
researchers report to be doing mainly applied 
research, it was observed that the real 
applicability of research results was much 
lower than that reported by the researchers 
themselves.) A larger amount is spent on 
service and support activities and on 
educational activities related to science and 
technology, but the proportion of funds and 
personnel allocated to research and service 
activities in the engineering and industrial 
fields has been very small in all the countries 
with science and technology at the formative 
stage. For example, in Colombia, Peru, and 
Venezuela, less than 10% of the total number 
of researchers were engaged in these fields 
and even a smaller proportion of research 
funds was allocated to them. 
The consulting and engineering design 
activities are weak, indicating the difficulties 
involved in transferring research results to the 
productive sector. In Peru, for example, there 
are only 10 professionals per research centre, 
and they mostly consult on investments rather 
than engineering design. Rarely do research 
institutions provide consulting firms with their 
results to be incorporated into productive 
activities. Exceptions were found where 
government organizations intervened actively 
in promoting the use of research results, as in 
Colombia with its food and nutrition plan in 
the early 1970s. 
In the countries where science and 
technology is undergoing consolidation, the 
isolation of scientific and technological 
communities and the lack of connection 
between science/technology and production 
are the major problem. There is a fine line 
separating the concepts of "isolation" and 
"marginality," although the former implies 
the existence of a relatively well-structured 
S& T community that is not integrated with 
productive and social activities, whereas the 
latter implies that the S& T community is not 
even structured in a coherent way on its own. 
For example, in Argentina, India, Brazil, 
Mexico, and Korea, the scientific and 
technological community is not marginal to 
the social and economic life; instead, it is not 
effectively utilized and is not linked with the 
productive sector. During consolidation, the 
coordination of research activities, their 
productivity, and the allocation of 
funds are major concerns. There are a 
relatively small number of very large 
institutions that dominate research activities, 
and the rest of the research activities are 
fragmented. Basic research predominates, but 
a variety of applied research activities, 
primarily of the adaptive type, emerge in the 
industrial sector. Many organizations perform 
research under contract from industrial firms, 
and attention focuses on solving a variety of 
problems specific to the country. 
Whether the STPI countries have reached 
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the formative or the consolidation stage in 
science and technology, they all rely on 
imports as the main source of productive 
techniques for modern industry, partly 
because they have traditionally done so and 
partly because they can acquire foreign tech-
niques faster, with guarantees, technical 
assistance, and complementary technical 
information. Furthermore, when they deal 
with transnational corporations or foreign 
financing, they often have no choice. 
However, in the STPI countries undergoing 
consolidation, there is some interaction 
between technology imports and the local 
research and engineering institutions, and 
many industrial firms have built up their own 
negotiation, information, and evaluation 
capabilities on alternative technology 
suppliers. As a result, they suffer less from the 
restrictions that usually accompany the 
imports of technology and pay less for the 
knowledge than do firms in countries where 
these capabilities have not been developed. 
In STPI countries, the scientific and 
technological activities performed by 
industrial enterprises are relatively weak when 
compared with those performed by 
enterprises in the industrialized nations. 
Nevertheless, a substantial base of 
technological activities, primarily of the 
adaptive type, has been developed by industry 
in Argentina, Brazil, India, Mexico, and South 
Korea to assimilate and elaborate imported 
technology. Also during the last 2decades, the 
STPI countries with a larger industrial base and 
with science and technology at the 
consolidation stage have been able to export 
technologically complex products and even to 
ex port tech no logical services to other 
less-developed countries. 
A common characteristic of all STPI 
countries is that very little contract research is 
undertaken. First of all, research organizations 
have not developed aggressive strategies to 
sell their services to industry, and industrial 
firms are seldom willing to pay for research or 
other technological services provided by local 
organizations. They are not familiar with the 
process of defining technical problems in a 
manner suitable for contract research, of 
monitoring the performance of the 
contractor, of evaluating the results, or of 
incorporating the results into their productive 
activities. In general, they have obtained 
information and other technical services as 
part of a package deal for technology imports 
or have gained access to them free from 
government organizations. 
Lack of scientific and technological support 
services and the weakness of higher education 
are also common to all STPI countries, but they 
are more acute in countries with science and 
technology at the formative stage. Argentina, 
Brazil, India, Mexico, and South Korea have a 
relatively larger number of higher education 
institutions and of professionals in 
engineering and scientific careers than do the 
smaller STPI countries. However, even in the 
first group of countries, there has not been a 
sustained and significant interaction between 
the technical higher education institutions 
and the productive sector. 
Scientists and the State 
In all STPI countries, scientists have shown a 
certain ambivalence with regards to state 
intervention in scientific and technological 
activities, and particularly in research. This 
ambivalence results, on the one hand, from 
their allegiance to the principle of total 
freedom of research and to the international 
character of science and, on the other, to the 
incipient stage of science development and 
the need to respond to local socioeconomic 
problems. This ambivalence is more manifest 
in the exact and natural sciences, in which 
scientists demand support from the 
government but are reluctant to accept any 
intervention in their activities. For example, 
the members of the mathematical and 
biological sciences committees of ~he 
Mexican science and technology plan publicly 
expressed their concern about possi.ble 
government intervention, condemning 1t a 
year before the plan was completed. The 
statements of leaders from the Venezuelan 
association for the advancement of science 
show the change in attitude of the scientific 
community during the last 30 years - the 
move from doggedly opposing any state 
intervention to accepting broad directions for 
research derived from socioeconomic 
development priorities. The change has taken 
place partly as a result of the increasing 
intervention of the state in support of science 
and technology; for example, in Venezuela in 
1970 more than 90% of all resources allocated 
to science and technology were provided by 
the state. 
The predominance of the state in the 
financing, coordination, and even the 
performance of scientific and technological 
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activities is a characteristic common to all STPI 
countries. In the absence of a strong tradition 
of research in industry and of a weakness in 
the university research system, government 
organizations have dominated most areas of 
science and technology, and particularly those 
of an applied nature. The lack of independent 
industrial or educational sources of financing 
for science and technology forced the 
intervention of the state from the very first. 
However, the state's intervention in the STPI 
countries has not been totally coherent, and a 
multiplicity of channels has been established 
to finance the performance of science and 
technology activities. The diversity of 
channels, set up as responses to pressures 
from scientists, engineers, government 
officials, university authorities, research 
administrators, and industrialists, is largely 
accountable for the lack of coordination 
among the different government agencies in 
charge of supporting science and technology 
in the STPI countries. 
In the STPI countries at the consolidation 
stage, research institutes, service 
organizations, university centres, consulting 
and engineering design firms, research groups 
within enterprises, and other similar 
organizations are capable of responding to the 
limited demands that emerge from industry 
and in many cases could respond to increased 
demands. For example, a detailed 
examination of the scientific and technologi-
cal infrastructure and capabilities in the 
chemical process industries of Argentina 
showed that in 1973 there were sufficient 
qualified researchers, professionals, and 
technicians, as well as research centres, 
consulting firms, and other organizations, to 
fill the technical needs of industrial firms. They 
were providing substantial technical inputs 
but had the capacity to increase significantly 
their contributions without strain. However, 
the response capacity of industrial research 
centres in countries such as Argentina, Brazil, 
South Korea, and Mexico was mainly general, 
covering a variety of techniques common to 
many industrial activities, unsuited to the 
specific demands of industrial firms. 
Within industrial firms, also, there are 
technical capabilities that have not been used 
fully. For example, a detailed study of research 
centres in Brazilian state enterprises in 1975 
showed that they were capable of providing 
more substantial scientific and technical 
inputs to the enterprises they were par! of. 
Also, a program started in 1970 in Peru to 
induce industrial firms to perform scientific 
and technological activities met with a 
significant response, and a number of research 
projects, albeit of limited technical scope, 
were started by industrial enterprises in a 
relatively short time. 
The obstacles to the increased use of local 
scientific and technological inputs by industry 
may not exclusively result from deficiencies in 
the performance of scientific and 
technological activities but may be due to 
factors limiting the demand for indigenous 
science and technology. 
The common characteristics of science and 
technology in STPI countries all have their 
roots in the countries' history. The lack of 
demand for indigenous scientific and 
technological activity results from the patterns 
of industrialization; the marginality and 
isolation of the scientific communities are a 
consequence of the lack of demand and the 
attitudes of the scientists; and the lack of an 
appropriate climate for science and 
technology resu Its from the deficiencies of the 
educational system, the inadequacy of the 
human resources base, and the prevalence of 
cultural factors that are not conducive to the 
growth of science. 
From an historical perspective, it is possible 
to discern a connection between the patterns 
of industrial growth of STPI countries and the 
stage of development of their science and 
technology. Those countries that started 
import substitution early and had a large 
internal market (Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, 
India) were undergoing a process of 
consolidation in the mid-1970s, whereas the 
STPI countries that started their 
industrialization later and had a relatively 
smaller internal market (Colombia, Peru, 
Macedonia, and Venezuela) were at a 
formative stage. South Korea, which followed 
an industrialization strategy combining 
export promotion with import substitution, 
managed in a short time to develop its science 
and technology to the consolidation stage. 
From the beginning, South Korea focused on 
scientific and technological considerations. 
At present, Brazil, South Korea, Mexico, and 
India are expanding their scientific and 
technological base. Brazil expects to increase 
resource allocations for science and 
technology by 10-fold between 1970 and 1980, 
and South Korea is expanding its network of 
research institutes, creating 10 new 
specialized research centres. Mexico has 
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decided to increase financial contributions to 
research activities and to reformulate the 
science and technology plan that was 
prepared in 1974-76. India is in the process of 
implementing its science and technology plan 
and is contemplating substantial increases in 
resources for key areas of scientific and 
technological activities. 
Efforts to regulate imports of tech no logy 
have begun in the STPI countries belonging to 
the Andean Pact (Colombia, Peru, and 
Venezuela), as well as in the larger countries 
such as Brazil, India, and Mexico. The liberal 
policy of South Korea with regards to 
technology imports in the late 1960s was 
followed by a more strict regulation of imports 
of foreign technology in the mid-1970s, and 
shifted again to a liberal position in the late 
1970s. This was done in response to changing 
circumstances, particularly with regards to the 
capacity of private industry to negotiate better 
technology import agreements. There have 
also been programs to enhance the 
technological capabilities of industry, notably 
the efforts of the sectorial plans for science 
and technology in India, and the attempts of 
the Industrial Institute (ITINTEC) in Peru. 
All the STPI countries have an exogenous 
scientific and technological base, having to 
confront the scientific and technological 
advances of the industrialized nations and 
relying massively on technology imports, but 
the countries with science and technology 
undergoing a process of consolidation are in a 
much better position to absorb, modify, and 
improve imported technology. They have an 
advantage over the countries with science and 
technology at the formative stage. The 
transition between the formative and 
consolidation stages is not automatic; it is 
closely linked to the nature of the 
industrialization process. It changes 
constantly as the environmental conditions 
change. The smaller STPI countries where 
science is still at the formative stage will have 
to confront not only the scientific and 
technological competition of the advanced 
industrial nations but also that from countries 
that are just undergoing consolidation. 
Some Implications 
The evolution of industry and of science and 
technology in STPI countries is the backdrop 
for examining ways of modifying the existing 
situation; it determines the "room for 
maneuver" in the development of indigenous 
scientific and technological capabilities and 
the use of foreign technology. It places in 
perspective the possible role of the state, and 
more precisely, that of the policy instruments 
required to develop such capabilities. But the 
scope for action in science and technology 
development is conditioned not only by the 
S& T dynamics within the STPI countries but 
also by the international setting and the 
changes in the international distribution of 
industrial production. 
The present distribution of world industrial 
production concentrates more than 90% of 
industry in the developed countries and is not 
likely to change significantly in the next 
decade or so. The distribution of international 
scientific and technological effort is even less 
likely to change, and at present Third World 
countries account for less than 5% of the 
personnel and financial resources. Some of 
the larger STPI countries, notably Brazil and 
India, may reach substantial levels of 
development in industry and in science and 
technology toward the end of the century, but 
even they will continue to be dependent on 
technology transfers from the developed 
countries for a large part of their modern 
industry. 
The 1975 UNIDO General Conference in 
Lima, Peru, suggested that less-developed 
countries should aim for 25% of world 
industrial production by the year 2000, a 
cumulative annual rate of industrial growth 
well in excess of 8%. The early 70s saw a rate 
that hovered around 6% so the target 
proposed by UNIDO may be only a dream. 
The possibility that the less-developed 
countries may reach the level of scientific and 
technological development of the 
industrialized nations is even further off.s In 
fact, it has been suggested that the 
less-developed countries will never be able to 
close the gap that separates them from the 
advanced industrial nations.6 For this reason, 
the efforts to develop indigenous scientific 
and technological capabilities in the 
less-developed countries will take place 
within the overall framework of an uneven 
distribution of industrial production and of 
scientific and technological activities. 
The overall framework is relatively 
stationary, but within it, there is scope for 
improvement of industrial, scientific, and 
technological capabilities in the 
less-developed countries. The Western 
industrialized nations are undergoing a crisis, 
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often referred to as the crisis of capitalism, and 
the less-developed world has new 
opportunities to alter in some measure the 
existing international distribution of industrial 
production, and, to a lesser extent, that of the 
scientific and tech no logical effort. The 
slowdown in economic growth, the problems 
associated with unemployment and the rising 
cost of labour, the problems of environmental 
disruption, and the uncertainties associated 
with the supply and price of raw materials and 
energy are inducing the developed countries 
to move their industrial activities to 
less-developed nations, retaining only the 
most advanced ones. Although the 
orientation and pace of technical change, 
particularly in the branches employing 
advanced technology, will continue under the 
control of the developed countries, some new 
opportunities wi II increasingly emerge for the 
less-developed countries. 
The larger STPI countries with a relatively 
well-developed industria.1 structure and with 
science and technology undergoing a process 
of consolidation could take (and are taking) 
better advantage of the opportunities in the 
world redistribution of industry. The smaller 
STPI countries, having a less-developed 
industrial structure, with science and 
technology at the formative stage, will not be 
able to profit as much because the 
development of industrial science and 
technology is limited by the development of 
industry itself. A new stratification of the 
less-developed world is likely to emerge; in 
fact there are already signs of it as countries 
such as India, Brazil, Argentina, and South 
Korea export technologically complex 
industrial goods and even disembodied 
technology to other less-developed countries 
and, in a few cases, to industrially advanced 
countries. 
s For example, Schenkel considers that Latin 
American countries will take at least another 
century to reach the levels of scientific output of the 
industrialized nations of today. See P. Schenkel. "El 
replanteo de la politica cientifica en los paises de la 
OECD y sus implicancias para el desarrollo de la 
ciencia y la tecnologia en America Latina" in K. 
Stanzick and P. Schenkel, eds. 1974, Ensayos sabre 
Politica Tecnologica en America Latina, 1974. Quito, 
ILDIS, 162-163. 
6 See, among others, R. Richta. La Civilizacion en 
la Encrucijada, Mexico, Siglo XXI, 68-71. For a 
contrary, and wildly optimistic view, see D. de Solla 
Price. 1965. Little Science, Big Science, New York, 
Columbia University Press. 
The scope for state intervention in countries 
at different stages of development varies, and 
consequently the impact of policy instruments 
on the development of scientific and 
technological capabilities also changes. At 
present, it seems that full exploration of the 
room for maneuver open to the less-
developed countries requires that the 
interests of the local industrial bourgeoisie 
coincide with those of the state. Given the 
present constraints imposed on the develop-
ment of industrial science, this means broad 
and sustained government support to private 
industry (both foreign and local) and to 
research institutes, consulting firms, quality 
control agencies, and other science and 
technology infrastructure organizations, 
while measures are being taken to link the 
infrastructure with the industrial firms. The 
local private sector needs the S& T support that 
can be provided by the state to compete with 
foreign firms that have a technological 
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superiority, although this is not frequently 
realized or acknowledged by the local 
industrial bourgeoisie. 
These remarks are by no means a value 
statement but rather an appreciation of the 
existing trends, constraints, and of the 
conditions under which scientific and 
technological capabilities for industry have 
developed and are likely to develop further in 
countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, 
South Korea, Mexico, and Venezuela. The 
situatio~ faced by India, Macedonia, Egypt, 
and Peru has been somewhat different, but in 
Peru and Egypt the social and political changes 
in 1976-77 point in the same direction as the 
first group of countries. The only way to 
modify this situation radically would be 
through major transformations in the existing 
international economic order, and also in the 
social, economic, and political organization of 
the STPI countries, both of which do not 
appear Ii kely in the near future. 
Chapter 3 
Implementing Science and 
Technology Policy 
The development of scientific and 
technological capabilities for industry in the 
STPI countries will take place only as a result of 
determined government intervention. The 
different ways and means through which the 
state exerts its influence to shape 
industrialization and the development of 
industrial science and technology deserve 
special attention. State intervention takes 
place through a series of "policy instruments" 
whose general and conceptual characteristics 
have been spelled out in the methods 
guidelines of the STPI project (summarized on 
page 27). The guidelines are the starting point 
for identifying, describing, and evaluating the 
array of policy instruments employed by 
governments; they were adapted by the STPI 
teams to suit the situation. 
There have been several previous attempts 
at examining and evaluating the impact of 
government policy instruments, particularly in 
the economic field. From a theoretical 
standpoint, Tinbergen (1964) studied the 
variety of policy instruments that could be 
used to achieve certain policy aims in several 
different economic models. His analysis was 
mainly concerned with economic policy 
formulation, the evaluation of the consistency 
between aims and means, and the suggestion 
of optimal policies to pursue certain aims. 
Taking a more programatic view, Chenery 
(1958) proposed several development policies 
and a classification of the policy instruments 
available to pursue them. Sierra (1966), 
expanding on the concepts put forward by 
Chenery, emphasized the institutional 
character of the instruments of economic 
policy, focusing on the role of the state and on 
the conflicts that are likely to emerge because 
of the diverging interest groups struggling for 
control of the governmental apparatus. Based 
on a mass of empirical evidence and on very 
explicit value premises, Myrdal (1968) 
developed a conceptual framework for the 
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analysis of "operational controls" -the policy 
instruments of the STPI project - and reached 
many important conclusions about their 
economic impact, particularly on the private 
sector. 
Another study described the aims and 
instruments of industrial policy in the 
developed countries (OECD 1975) and two 
other studies have dealt explicitly with the 
nature and impact of policy instruments to 
stimulate technological innovations in the 
industrialized nations. The first of these, 
conducted by national teams led by K. Pavitt at 
Sussex University (1974), was an exploratory 
study to examine the kinds of government 
intervention used to promote industrial 
innovation in Germany, France, the 
Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. The 
second was an extensive study of Western 
European and Japanese experiences on the 
promotion of technological innovation, 
conducted by a team led by H. Hollomon at 
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
(1976), with the aim of providing information 
for policy purposes to U.S. government 
agencies. 
The difficulties in attempting an assessment 
of the nature and characteristics of 
government policy instruments have been 
highlighted by these studies. For example, 
Sierra (1966) cautions against attempts at 
evaluating any particular policy instrument in 
isolation, whereas Ashford et al (Center for 
Policy Alternatives 1976, p. 111-41) warn that ... 
it is impossible in most cases to separate the 
role played by government actions from the 
multitude of other causal and intervening 
factors. This is not to cast doubt on the 
influence of government mechanisms ... but 
merely to cite the futility of trying to draw clear 
causal connections. 
Focusing specifically on policies to stimulate 
innovation, Pavitt (1974) mentions the 
following difficulties: the lack of an easy, 
universal way of measuring the output of 
government measures to promote 
innovations; the problems involved in 
attributing causality when examining 
relationships between specific government 
policy instrument "inputs," and the"outputs" 
of knowledge, innovations, etc.; and the fact 
that the general economic, social, and political 
climate - the contextual factors of the STPI 
project - may have a bigger influence on 
some aspects of innovation performance than 
any specific government measures. For this 
re~son, as Freeman (cited in Pavitt 1974, p. 96) 
points out, the assessment of government 
measures for technological innovation is a 
rather complex task: 
We must not ... expect too much from 
attempts to assess the merits ... of 
systems used by government to 
stimulate industrial invention and 
innovation. The inherent difficulties of 
assessment are considerable, 
information is often scanty, interest 
groups are often heavily involved, and 
the possibilities of experimental 
verification severely limited. 
Nevertheless, if we approach the 
subject with the skeptical spirit of the 
natural sciences, and the historical 
sense of the social sciences, it may 
often be possible to raise the level of 
debate, understanding and research. 
The guidelines for the STPI project 
proposed several classification schemes, 
which were used by the country teams at 
different stages of the research but which 
were not suitable for comparative analysis. 
Based on the impact of policy instruments on 
science and technology functions and 
activities, the material on policy instruments 
that was produced by the country teams is 
examined here according to the following 
categories: 
• Policy instruments to build up an S&T 
infrastructure for the generation of 
technology; 
• Policy instruments for the regulation of 
technology imports; 
• Policy instruments to define the pattern of 
demand for technology; 
• Policy instruments for the performance of 
S&T activities in enterprises; 
• Policy instruments related to the support 
of S& T activities. 
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Most policy instruments overlap; there are 
many instruments that belong to two or even 
more of the categories. Nevertheless, the 
categories order the material and simplify 
comparisons. The frequent changes that 
government policies and their associated 
policy instruments undergo have made it 
necessary to limit analysis mainly to the 
mid-1970s and after. 
Style of Implementation 
The "style" of policy implementation in the 
STPI countries is based on the role of the state 
in orienting industrialization, and the way in 
which it intervenes to shape industry.7 In the 
STPI countries, with the exceptions of Peru 
and South Korea, the state has provided 
general support for industry, across a wide 
front, without attempting to define clearly the 
direction of industrial growth, leaving the 
structuring _of industry primarily to market 
forces. Peru has adopted an authoritative 
style, with laws providing the framework for 
industrial growth with a clear definition of 
industrial priorities. South Korea has adopted 
a style of selective but intensive support of a 
few key industries (mainly the export-oriented 
branches) through close interaction of the 
state with private industry. Nevertheless, even 
in the countries that have left their industry to 
be shaped by market forces, there have been 
some efforts to stimulate specific branches, 
such as the capital goods industry in Brazil and 
Mexico, and the recent emphasis on industries 
that have an exporting potential in Colombia. 
Another dimension of style refers to 
whether the state relies on "control" or 
"promotion" measures to support 
industrialization and the growth of S& T 
capabilities, that is, whether it relies more on 
restrictive and compulsory measures or on 
inducements and incentives to motivate 
entrepreneurs to behave in a desired way. 
Although the two options are not exclusive 
and in fact several countries have a combina-
tion of both, the majority of STPI countries, 
with the exception of Colombia and Peru, rely 
mostly on promotional measures that indis-
criminately provide incentives to industry. All 
industrial enterprises equally benefit from the 
incentives, particularly in Mexico, Brazil, and 
Venezuela. In South Korea, promotional 
7 Because of insufficient data, India, Egypt, and 
Macedonia are excluded from the analysis in this 
section. 
measures have been geared to specific indus-
tries awarded priority by the government. 
Colombia and Peru are different because they 
both rely to a large extent on control measures 
and on restrictions imposed to guide industrial 
behaviour. In Colombia the control measures 
are a legacy of the import substitution policies 
followed for a long time within the framework 
of acute foreign exchange shortages and are 
complemented by a limited set of promotional 
measures offering credit and tax exemptions. 
In Peru, the restrictions emerged from the 
industrialization strategy adopted in the 1970s, 
which sought to strengthen the role of the 
state as the main force orienting industry and 
as a participant in direct productive activities. 
All the control measures have concerned: 
foreign exchange (with the exception of 
oi I-rich Venezuela); registration of foreign 
investments; and registration and negotiation 
of licencing agreements for technology 
transfer. The relative weight of the control 
measures has been conditioned by the 
number and weight of promotional measures, 
and in the countries that rely mostly on 
promotional measures their real impact is 
rather limited and circumscribed to formal 
registering procedures. 
A third dimension of style is coherence in 
S& T policies. The outstanding case in this 
regard is South Korea, although Brazil follows 
closely. In Argentina, the S& T policies are not 
coherent, and they are divorced from 
industrialization policies. Mexico and 
Colombia would also fall in this category, were 
it not for recent efforts. The third situation, 
which includes Venezuela and Peru, is one in 
which the S& T policies are coherent but not 
integrated with industrialization policies. For 
example, Venezuela formulated a rather 
comprehensive and coherent S& T policy as 
part of the First Plan for Scientific and 
Technological Development and the Fifth 
National Development Plan but has not 
managed to develop the policy instruments 
necessary to put these policies into effect nor 
to integrate S& T policy with industrialization 
policies. Peru developed a highly 
sophisticated industrial S& T policy, but its 
industrialization policy and the overall S& T 
policy remained uncoordinated. 
A fourth dimension of style refers to state 
intervention in implementing policies. The 
state may range from passive, simply setting 
the conditions for growth in private industry 
to interventionist, directly participating in key 
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productive act1v1t1es, replacing private 
initiative in these areas, and establishing and 
enforcing regulations to guide the private 
sector. In all the STPI countries except 
Colombia, there are large state enterprises 
that supply industrial services (electricity, 
industrial parks) and basic industrial products 
(oil and steel). They are supposed to provide 
basic industrial inputs at a low price to 
stimulate the growth of industry while paying 
their own way. The extreme case of state 
intervention in productive activities among 
STPI countries is in Peru, where the state has 
been the major source of industrial 
investment during the 1970s and where state 
enterprises have extended to a variety of 
industrial activities, severely limiting the scope 
of private industry. In the late 1970s, 
Venezuela has also adopted a rather 
aggressive stance, intervening in basic 
productive activities with massive 
infrastructure investments and the creation of 
very large state enterprises in the fields of 
steel, oil, and gas. 
The state may intervene by setting policies 
in its development plan. In Peru, the plan has 
become a major instrument of economic and 
industrial policy, and in Venezuela, where the 
plans to invest the revenues obtained from oil 
exports have become very important, the 
overall plan has also acquired greater 
importance, particularly with reference to the 
large industrial complexes. The development 
plan in South Korea is also very important, 
although the close interaction between the 
government and private industry in the 
planning process give it a special character. In 
Brazil, development plans are almost a 
collection of investment projects of the 
various ministries and state enterprises, and 
the planning mechanism is rather loose. For all 
practical purposes, Argentina, Colombia, and 
Mexico do not engage actively in planning the 
development of industry. 
Argentina, Colombia, Mexico, and 
Venezuela intervene very little in the direct 
regulation of industrial activity, preferring to 
rely on promotional instruments that leave the 
initiative to the private entrepreneur. 
However, in Mexico, and to a lesser extent in 
Colombia and Venezuela, state financing of 
industry is extremely important and could 
have a great impact on the regulation and 
orientation of industrial activities. Brazil, 
South Korea, and Peru intervene extensively 
in the regulation of industry employing a 
variety of legislative measures and operational 
controls. In these three countries, one of the 
main mechanisms for the regulation of 
industrial activities has been government 
financing through development banks. 
The array of policy instruments employed to 
orient the development of industry and the 
growth of scientific and technological 
capabilities has been characterized in 
different ways by the various country teams in 
the STPI project. However, there are a few 
common characteristics that are worth 
highlighting before they are examined on a 
country-by-country basis. 
In most countries, policy instruments are 
rather general; in other words, they lack 
selectivity, applying across the board to all 
types of industries. A large number are also 
dependent on the discretion of a particular 
government agency in charge of applying 
them. Although, in theory, the agency can 
focus them in a precise way, the lack of 
selectivity of the instruments does not provide 
a good basis to exercise discretionary power, 
and the lack of qualified personnel and of 
administrative capabilities makes the 
discretionary qualities of policy instruments a 
rather neutral (and in the case of corruption, 
even negative) characteristic. For the most 
part, the instruments designed as incentives 
are passive - the beneficiaries are supposed 
to take the initiative with respect to their 
application. 
The common features in the style of policy 
implementation of STPI countries are a good 
introduction to a more detailed look at the 
individual styles. 
Argentina 
In Argentina, one of the most outstanding 
features of the evolution of scientific and 
technological activities during the last 20 years 
has been the lack of an explicit and coherent 
frame of reference, with sufficient continuity 
and strength to orient the development of 
scientific and technological capabilities and 
induce changes in the behaviour of 
entrepreneurs. For example, since 1960 
Argentina has had six different development 
plans that have been in effect for periods that 
range from 6 months to 2 years. There have 
been some attempts at formulating 
"operational plans" for science and 
technology, but they have not had any impact. 
The agency in charge of formulating and 
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implementing S& T policy has suffered a 
variety of institutional transformations, 
fluctuating from a National Council, to a 
subsecretariat of the Secretariat for Education, 
and finally becoming a Secretariat. The 
frequent institutional and policy changes have 
made S& T policies and policy instruments 
ambiguous and even contradictory. 
The main characteristics of Argentina's S& T 
policy instruments are their heterogeneity, 
passivity, and marginality. There is a 
heterogeneous set of policy instruments in 
operation, with several identifiable "vintages" 
corresponding to the periods in which 
different groups were in power in Argentina. 
The instruments act in a variety of ways and 
even contradict each other. Furthermore, the 
government's administrative decisions, lack-
ing overall guidelines, accentuate the ambigu-
ous and contradictory character of the policy 
instruments. 
All the policy instruments are passive, 
leaving the initiative in the hands of the private 
sector. There is not a single policy instrument 
that operates in a coercive way. With the sole 
exception of the registry of Ii cenci ng 
agreements, all policy instruments offer the 
private sector a series of incentives and 
benefits that are available to private 
enterprises at their convenience. The state has 
no means to differentiate in the treatment of 
enterprises nor any mechanisms to define 
priorities for the development of 
technological capabilities. 
S&T policy instruments in Argentina exhibit 
marginality. For example, technology is 
declared as one of the criteria for the 
application of an instrument of industrial 
policy but is not actually employed. Policy 
instruments are marginal also in the sense that 
they do not affect the key technological 
decisions of industry. 
The heterogeneity, passivity, and 
marginality of policy instruments in Argentina 
combine to cancel any impact on 
technological behaviour and technical change 
in industry. Special credit lines for pilot plants 
and prototypes, tax incentives for R&D, 
promotion laws, and other policy instruments 
have had little impact and have been applied 
in few occasions. This fact became evident 
when the country team studied the machine 
tool and petrochemical industries. It was 
underlined in the studies of engineering firms 
and a detailed analysis of 18 policy 
instruments. 
Brazil 
In Brazil, during the last 20 years policy 
instruments have gradually evolved in two 
main directions: toward increasing 
sophistication in their design and use and 
toward fragmentation due to several of the 
government's sectorial development 
programs. Together with these two trends, a 
basic characteristic emerges clearly: 
pragmatism, which has marked the adoption 
of a large part of the measures of economic 
and industrial policy. This pragmatism should 
not be considered as a response to the lack of 
global planning but rather as a reaction on the 
part of policymakers to unforeseen 
circumstances and problems, which, to a large 
extent, escape the sphere of government 
action and are the result of a sum of short-term 
actions in the process of industrial 
development. 
The increasing participation of the state in 
the economy as a whole - both as a 
productive agent and as a regulator of 
productive activities - far from being the 
result of explicit decisions, has originated from 
circumstances beyond the control of the state. 
International crises, insufficiencies in 
infrastructure, bottlenecks in services, the 
need for foreign capital, and also the inability 
of the Brazilian private sector to provide the 
large sums required for investments with a 
long period of maturation have pressured the 
state to intervene directly as a productive 
agent. However, state intervention has not 
progressed linearly and continuously but 
rather in an uneven way with advances and 
retreats and with changes in emphasis in its 
role as entrepreneur and regulator of 
economic activity. 
Within the framework of increasing, if not 
oscillating, state intervention, policies for 
science and technology, as far as they can be 
extracted from the development plans, have 
alternated between two goals. Either they 
have been reactive, catering to the needs of 
industrial growth or they have attempted to 
reorient the demand for technology. The first 
aims at satisfying the technological require-
ments of industry by speeding up the incorp-
oration and diffusion of innovations, be they 
foreign or local, and the second aims at reduc-
ing the use of imported technology and 
expanding local capabilities for 
generating, adopting, and incorporating 
technical knowledge. The different plans put 
into effect during the last 20 years in Brazil 
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have carried implicitly one or the other goal, 
and the policy instruments have also reflected 
them. 
Brazil has emphasized financial mechanisms 
to foster local scientific and technological 
capabilities, primarily funding institutions for 
the supply of knowledge. In fact, at times, 
some institutions have had difficulties in 
absorbing the financial resources. As an 
illustration, the Second Basic Plan for Scientific 
and Technological Development considered 
an ambitious program that sought to expand 
the scientific and technological infrastructure 
in the second half of the 1970s and implied 
almost a 10-fold increase in funds over the 
allocations made in the late 1960s. 
Colombia 
In general, Colombia's S& T policy and 
policy instruments have been characterized 
by a restrictive or defensive approach, in 
which the state has been interested primarily 
in preventing situations that could hamper the 
country's scientific and technological 
development. This approach is closely related 
to import substitution and the protectionist 
measures to deal with shortages of foreign 
exchange. 
The defensive approach emphasizes 
regulations to reduce costs and to control the 
conditions under which foreign technology is 
transferred. In fact, the system for regulating 
technology imports was originally conceived 
as an instrument for solving balance of 
payments problems in the face of scarcities of 
foreign exchange. 
The adoption of a restrictive or defensive 
approach, with emphasis on control measures, 
has not meant that promotional instruments 
have been nonexistent. Research and 
development activities have been actively 
promoted through the creation of 
government institutions and through financial 
mechanisms, even though there have been no 
policy instruments designed either to 
encourage the performance of S& T activities 
in enterprises or to diminish the risks of 
innovation. 
As a consequence of the defensive 
approach, Colombia's degree and mode of 
state intervention has been rather ambiguous. 
Whereas the state has actively used control or 
regulatory policy instruments, granting 
permits and approvals, it has only passively 
used promotional policy instruments, 
providing incentives for private enterprises 
without directing them. 
An examination of 19 key S&T policy 
instruments in Colombia showed that the 
majority lacked selectivity, were applied 
across the board, and could not be used to 
promote the development of S& T capabilities 
in specific areas of potential interest. 
Furthermore, most policy instruments tended 
to be nondiscretionary and general. There 
were even a few instances where policy 
instruments lacked a set of policies to guide 
their operation. 
Recent changes in Colombian policies and 
increases in foreign exchange due to high 
coffee prices and other exports have led to a 
shift from the protectionist measures of the 
import substitution strategy to liberal trade 
and increased promotional measures. This 
shift has implied a gradual move from the 
restrictive or defensive approach to a more 
promotional and liberal one. 
South Korea 
In South Korea, the approach to S& T policy 
design and implementation has been strongly 
conditioned by the industrialization policy 
which is aimed at developing selected 
strategic industries considered essential for 
rapid industrialization and for the expansion 
of exports. In this context, promotional laws 
have been drawn up to provide strong 
incentives in selected fields and to encourage 
foreign investment. In addition, the state has 
directly assisted industry by developing 
industrial sites and harbours and by reducing 
tariffs on imports of capital goods and raw 
materials. 
The style of policy implementation in Korea 
has been mainly promotional, focusing on 
rapid development of selected strategic 
branches of industry. There has been a heavy 
reliance on foreign technology and 
investment to speed development. This 
reliance on foreign sources has been 
strengthened by the country's export policy. 
expansion of which has been based on the 
production of goods manufactured in the 
industrialized countries and suited to their 
consumer tastes. The need for foreign capital 
and technology for rapid industrialization has 
inhibited strong regulation of technology 
imports, and, likewise, the efforts to absorb 
foreign technology. 
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Some of the promotional measures, 
however, have been directed toward 
expanding the infrastructure for the 
performance of S& T activities. A large number 
of research centres and educational 
institutions have been established, particularly 
around the Seoul Science Park, and the 
creation of 10 new research centres is under 
way. 
The extensive use of financial pol icy 
instruments by the state and the active role 
played by government agencies in the 
coordination and promotion of S&T policy are 
two additional characteristics of the Korean 
style. A characteristic of policy instruments is 
redundancy, particularly in promotional 
measures directed toward export-oriented 
industries. 
The extensive intervention of government 
agencies into industrial activities has brought 
about a certain lack of flexibility, which is 
increased by the budgetary controls that 
government agencies have to go through. The 
promulgation of legal devices is one of the 
most important mechanisms for the 
promotion of S& T activities, and there is an 
array of formal laws or regulations that 
constitute an extensive legal system for the 
promotion of science and technology. Many 
of the measures have not proven their 
effectiveness and have not been widely 
implemented partly because of their short 
history. It may be too early yet to evaluate the 
results of the various policies put into effect 
through the legal devices. 
Recent trends in South Korean S& T policy 
indicate that technological factors are to be 
given greater importance in the late 1970s and 
the 1980s. The move has been toward 
replacing labour-intensive industry by 
technology or "brain" -intensive industries 
and depending less on foreign capital. There 
is a recognition that, with a lack 
of natural resources, South Korea has to 
depend on technology as the key factor in 
future development. In the 5-year plan that 
began in 1977, technological development 
was one of the three main targets to be 
achieved. 
There has also been a recognition that past 
policies have not been effectively coordinated 
and have not been supported by effective pol-
icy instruments. Thus, emphasis has been 
placed on attaining coherence among various 
policies and on providing effective 
promotional measures. The underlying 
philosophy is that technology will develop in 
an environment where there is strong 
motivation to increase industrial efficiency. 
The motivation will create a demand for 
technology, the supply of which will be 
possible because of positive measures such as 
financing. Therefore, trends in Korean S& T 
policy point in the direction of continuing 
reliance on promotional measures but moving 
toward overall coherence and better 
implementation. 
Mexico 
In general, the state in Mexico has adopted a 
promotional style of S& T policy design and 
implementation, using incentives and positive 
stimuli to influence industrial enterprises. The 
incentives include providing a protected 
market, ensuring low prices in raw materials 
and services for industry, and offering fiscal 
inducements and tax rebates. The measures 
are geared mainly to reducing costs and 
increasing liquidity in industrial firms. Closely 
related to their positive or promotional 
character is their passivity, the initiative for 
their application coming from the 
beneficiaries. 
The decisions on investment, goods to be 
produced, and techniques to be employed are 
based on the whims of the local market for 
manufactured products (and consequently 
the pattern of concentration of income). The 
strategy of industrialization has consisted in 
ignoring sectorial priorities, encouraging 
capital formation in any industry, and 
supporting indiscriminate expansion in any 
industrial branch. The lack of selectivity is one 
of the main characteristics in the Mexican 
style. 
S&T policy instruments in Mexico are quite 
heterogeneous and defy attempts to 
categorize them. For example, a large number 
of policy instruments could be classified 
simultaneously as promotional and control 
instruments, mainly because of the dual 
character of their legal and operational 
mechanisms and because of the different 
perceptions of the various actors involved: 
what local industry may consider as an 
encouragement, a transnational corporation 
may see as a control. 
Another characteristic of Mexican S& T 
policy instruments is that, for the most part, 
they act indirectly, modifying the conditions 
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under which private firms operate. Several 
involve a large amount of discretion on the 
part of the agencies that apply them. At times, 
the administrative authorities even assume 
legislative powers and, by exerting their 
discretion go beyond the terms of the law that 
gave them authority in the first place. 
Another characteristic of the array of pol icy 
instruments is redundancy. The promotional 
measures concede benefit after benefit on top 
of each other and concentrate benefits in the 
few enterprises that apply for them (p. 81). 
Until recently in Mexico, a firm was 
considered "national" if it were constituted in 
accordance with Mexican law and had an 
address in the country. In other words, foreign 
and local enterprises were on equal footing. 
Recent legislation on foreign investment, 
however, has introduced means to 
differentiate in the treatment of local and 
foreign enterprises. 
In short, the overall style of policy 
implementation in Mexico is promotional. A 
large number of passive policy instruments 
give benefits to private enterprise, and market 
forces determine the main technological 
decisions, the state taking a rather passive role. 
Peru 
The style of industrial and S&T policy 
implementation in Peru has been different 
from that of tne other STPI countries. The 
series of accelerated socioeconomic 
transformations instituted in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s involved a larger role of the state in 
the regulation and conduct of productive 
activities, stringent regulations for private 
industry, a system of compulsory worker's 
participation in ownership and management 
of industrial enterprises, and a detailed 
definition of industrial priorities. However, 
the changes were put into effect mainly 
through legislation, the lack of organization 
and operational mechanisms severely limiting 
their application. 
The Peruvian style of policy implementation 
is oriented toward control and regulation of 
industrial and S& T activities; the promotional 
measures are embedded within a system of 
compulsory laws and regulations. However, 
the excessively legalistic character of the 
policy instruments has meant that they have 
been mainly formal and have had limited 
impact on industrial activities; even the 
promotional measures contained in the laws 
have had little impact. Indeed, it has been 
reported that industrial entrepreneurs make 
their decisions and then look for ways to 
capitalize on the legal benefits. 
Many government agencies are involved in 
policy implementation in Peru, and, because 
of the generality of the laws, the agencies have 
been vested with exceptional discretionary 
power, which they frequently abuse. 
State enterprises play an extended role in 
Peruvian industry but, to date, have not been 
considered as tools for S& T policies. Emphasis 
has been placed on their rapid growth rather 
than on the development of local S& T 
capabilities. 
The state has intervened more effectively to 
promote S& T research. In the early 1970s, the 
Peruvian government created a network of 
sectorial research funds and institutions and 
compelled all enterprises (local, private, for-
eign, state) to devote a certain percentage of 
their net income before taxes to S& T activities, 
under the supervision of the pertinent sectori-
al agency. Thus, since the late 1960s, the funds 
available for industrial technological research 
have increased 10-fold, a sizable, but not 
phenomenal, improvement over the neglig-
ible investment throughout the 60s. 
Recent changes in government policy, 
brought about mainly by the financial crisis of 
1974-76, have reduced the scope for state 
intervention in the conduct and regulation of 
productive activities and have modified some 
of the reforms introduced in the early 1970s. 
Also, considerations regarding the 
development of industrial technological 
capabilities have been pushed into the 
background, with a new emphasis placed on 
attracting foreign investment, liberalizing 
technology imports, and achieving rapid 
industrial growth. As a consequence, the style 
of S& T policy design and implementation has 
undergone changes, shifting noticeably 
toward promotion. 
Venezuela 
The set of industrial and S& T policy 
instruments in Venezuela provides a large 
number of incentives to industrial enterprises 
and includes few control measures. Until 
recently, it has not particularly encouraged 
the development of local S& T capabilities. 
Instead, it fostered technology imports, 
relying on foreign exchange from oil exports. 
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The policy instruments reflected the 
industrialization strategy, which emphasized 
the indiscriminate import of foreign 
tech no logy and of technology-intensive 
capital goods and intermediate products 
required for the production of consumer 
goods. 
During the mid-1970s, however, a series of 
"explicit" policy statements contained in the 
First Plan for Scientific and Technological 
Development and the Fifth National 
Development Plan acquired importance, and 
explicit policy instruments to expand local S& T 
capabilities were given greater play. New 
institutions were created; regulations 
controlling foreign investment and 
technology were put into effect; and several 
legislative initiatives were undertaken to 
increase the availability of funds for S& T, to 
deal with industrial property, and to establish a 
system of quality control and standards. 
Unfortunately, the "implicit" policy 
instruments associated with the 
industrialization strategy have subverted the 
possible impact of the new instruments, and 
the inherent deficiencies of "explicit" S& T 
instruments, along with the diverging interests 
of power groups that are involved in their 
application have acted against them. 
Explicit policy instruments do not form a 
coherent and powerful influence, for they 
lack selectivity, are highly general, and involve 
a high degree of discretionary power. 
Furthermore, there are key gaps in their 
design and operation so that their combined 
effect is rather weak. In Venezuela, they are 
particularly ineffective because of the 
frequent changes and inherent instability of 
the government agencies that apply them. 
The government has recently focused on 
rapid growth and industrial modernization, 
investing massive amounts in industry and 
indirectly fostering technology imports. It 
appears that the aim is to develop limited local 
S& T capabilities geared to absorbing some 
foreign technology, but the chances are slim 
for mastering the highly sophisticated and 
advanced technologies that are being 
imported for the large investment projects. 
In brief, although Venezuela tacitly 
supports the development of local S& T capa-
bilities, the country's industrial strategies 
place emphasis on the acquisition of foreign 
technology, with few controls to regulate the 
flow of imported technology and with a 
limited effort at developing the local 
infrastructure for the performance of S& T 
activities. 
Other STPI Countries 
Because of the scarcity of information 
available on Egypt, India, and the Federal 
Republic of Macedonia in Yugoslavia, only a 
few comments are presented here to convey a 
glimpse of their style of policy implementa-
tion. 
In Egypt, where state enterprises 
predominate in industry, the state regulates 
arid controls policy implementation and 
devotes little attention to promotional 
measures. In India, the electronics sector, the 
only one for which information was available, 
is characterized by heavy state involve-
ment in designing policies, planning 
industrial activities, and even producing 
goods, although the existing regulations 
include a framework of incentives for private 
industry and foreign investment, particularly 
in the manufacture of electronic products for 
export. 
The special character of the Yugoslav 
economy, with the dominant role of 
self-managed enterprises in industrial 
activities, makes comparisons with other STPI 
countries difficult. It may be said that the 
federal and state regulations provide the 
framework within which self-managed 
enterprises operate. There are some 
promotional measures within the extensive 
regulations, combining with a system of 
controls to characterize the style of policy 
implementation in the Republic of 
Macedonia. 
Among the STPI countries, there is great 
diversity in policy implementation, and it is 
almost impossible to define a model (or 
models) of policy implementation. Each 
country must be analyzed separately, even 
though it may be traveling in the same general 
direction as another country. The different 
ways in which measures are devised, 
combined, and modified over time make 
simple generalizations impossible. 
In fact, the choice of a particular 
industrialization strategy and of a particular 
approach to S& T development still leaves 
ample room to tailor the set of policy 
instruments in accordance to the specific 
conditions of the country and the 
administrative style of the government. The 
key to the variety of styles is the state and the 
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conflicting interests of those involved in the 
struggle for control of the state apparatus. 
In effect, the specific characteristics of 
industrial and S& T policies and of the array of 
policy instruments used to implement them 
depend on the degree of influence of the 
various interest groups within the state 
machinery. When there are frequent shifts in 
the hegemony of different interest groups (as 
has been the case in Argentina), the style of 
policy implementation becomes heteroge-
neous and acquires very peculiar 
characteristics. 
The pervasive influence of the state means 
that great care must be exercised in 
extrapolating the analysis that follows. 
Variations in the industrialization strategies, in 
the evolution of scientific and technological 
capabilities, and in the styles of policy 
implementation constitute the specific 
context within which policy instruments 
operate and are the bane of pol icy 
prescriptions. 
Building Infrastructure 
One cluster of policy instruments is 
concerned with the development of 
indigenous capabilities for the supply of 
scientific and technological knowledge. It 
comprises the measures to establish, develop, 
and orient the growth of institutions involved 
in the performance of S& T activities and of 
programs and projects within these 
institutions. The traditional concept of 
"science policy," which gained acceptance 
during the 1950s and 1960s, focused almost 
exclusively on this aspect of S& T development 
and emphasized the creation not only of R&D 
and supporting organizations, but also of 
science policy bodies. 
Building an infrastructure for the 
generation of technology is especially 
important in the formative stage of S& T 
capabilities; it becomes less paramount during 
the consolidation stage and later. The three 
main policy instruments in this cluster are 
institution building, science and technology 
planning, and financing of S&T activities. 
During the formative stage, institution 
building is more important than the other two, 
although planning for the creation of S&T 
capabilities in selected areas is also important. 
During the consolidation stage, institution 
building takes a back seat, filling in gaps in the 
S& T capacity; and S& T planning is focused on 
the use of existing capabilities and the 
rationalization of S& T activities. Financial 
measures are equally important in the two 
stages, although in the latter they focus on 
specific programs and projects rather than on 
the general financing of institutions. These 
three policy instruments are complemented 
by government administrative measures for 
the import of equipment and inputs, 
exemptions from government budgetary 
regulations, and so on. 
The combined effect of institution building, 
S&T planning, S&T financing, and administra-
tive facilities takes time to surface. Frequent 
institutional and other changes observed in 
several of the STPI countries work against it 
and slow the development of an adequate S& T 
infrastructure. 
One of the crucial components in building 
an infrastructure is personnel training because 
institutions are made of people. However, this 
aspect was covered only marginally in the STPI 
project and receives only passing reference in 
this report. 
Institution Building 
S& T institutions in the STPI countries range 
from those impelled spontaneously by 
scientific groups, government agencies, and 
industrial enterprises, to those planted firmly 
within national development policies and 
included in the science and technology 
development plans. As a purposeful policy 
instrument, institution building is of relatively 
recent origin and has not yet crystallized into a 
recognizable set of procedures, guidelines, 
and methods. 
The institutions that comprise an S& T 
infrastructure may be classified in many ways, 
encompassing R&D, service, education, 
training, policymaking, etc. activities; they are 
not created in a vacuum but rather in the 
context of the economic and social 
development of a given country. For example, 
to a large extent, the institutions concerned 
with industrial science and technology in STPI 
countries have emerged during the last 30 
s See page 47 for more detailed discussion. 
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years as a result of pressures from the 
industrialization process itself.a 
Although institution building is an 
instrument to develop the S& T infrastructure, 
few government officials explore its potential. 
Most policymakers are not even aware of the 
importance of the S&T infrastructure for 
development. Whereas institution building is 
not controversial and is not likely to generate 
determined opposition, there are constraints 
imposed by the lack of financial and qualified 
human resources. There are also pitfalls: 
indefinite institution building. When a large 
number of S& T institutions are created and the 
institutional infrastructure expands without a 
corresponding increase in the demand for its 
services, institutions become self-centred, 
paying little or no attention to the 
requirements of industrialization and isolat-
ing themselves. 
In Argentina, the network of institutions 
involved in S& T activities has grown in a 
piecemeal fashion over the years, but the lack 
of coordination has not precluded notable 
achievements in several areas of industry, 
agriculture, basic research, and even military 
S& T activities. At the centre of the industrial 
efforts is the National Institute of Industrial 
Technology (INTI), which emerged from a 
joint effort of the state and the industrial 
sector. The institute has been structured to 
respond to industry's demands, creating new 
centres and laboratories as the need for their 
services arises. 
Like Argentina, India has experienced 
piecemeal institutional development in 
science and technology, mainly resulting from 
sectorial initiatives with little overall 
coordination. Since independence, institution 
building has been considerable, and the 1974-
77 S& T plan was mainly concerned with how to 
put the existing S& T institutions more into the 
service of development objectives. Although 
the plan also proposed incremental expansion 
of existing organizations to undertake new 
programs, it did not represent a tightly 
integrated program for institution building 
but rather an aggregate of initiatives from 
various government S& T agencies. 
The Indian S&T plan is in some ways similar 
to Brazil's Second Basic Plan for Scientific and 
Technological Development; they both call 
for additions and modifications to existing 
institutions, but the latter also advances the 
creation of new institutions around several 
"technological complexes" that would 
integrate research centres, engineering firms, 
and high-technology industries. This notion of 
concentrating several research centres, S& T 
service institutions, engineering firms, and 
industrial firms to provide a critical mass of 
S& T activities is also present in the Korean 
concept of a "science park" or a "science 
town." 
South Korea is the one STPI country that has 
used institution building as a major instrument 
of S& T policy; it has, thus, produced a tightly 
knit network of S& T institutions that include a 
Ministry of Science and Technology, a 
graduate science school (KAIS), an 
information centre (KORSTIC), and an 
expanding group of research institutes. 
Several of these organizations are located in 
the Seoul Science Park where the idea has 
been to create the conditions for efficient 
scientific and technological work. The South 
Korean S& T institutions are a product of very 
special conditions. The support of the United 
States has been crucial in building key 
institutions, such as the Korean Institute of 
Science and Technology (KIST), and there has 
been a large pool of highly trained South 
Korean scientists working abroad who have 
returned to work in the new S& T institutions. 
In Peru, institutions for science and 
technology have evolved along sectorial 
lines, with a network of research centres and 
independent funds being created for industry, 
agriculture, mining, and fisheries. There has 
been a lack of overall coordination, but the 
main bottleneck has been the lack of qualified 
human resources. After a good start in the 
early 1970s, the ne~work of institutions 
reached a crisis in personnel in the late 1970s. 
In summary, institution building as a policy 
instrument has been used explicitly at the 
national level in just a few cases, notably in 
South Korea where it has been rather 
successful. In Peru, general sectorial 
institutions have been established, but no 
overall policy in institution building can be 
discerned. In Argentina, India, and Brazil, S& T 
institutions have not been built as a result of 
determined government policy but rather as 
expressions of certain interest groups; thus, 
they represent not the means to an end but the 
end itself. The lack of coordination and 
direction has meant that the infrastructure has 
grown in a gradual way. Nevertheless, the 
infrastructure does exist, and, thus, institution 
building is no longer the most important 
policy instrument; it has been superseded in 
these countries by planning. 
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S& T Planning 
Development planning, which aims at 
orienting and regulating activities and the 
services necessary for them, implies 
technological needs that, in turn, imply 
scientific and technological activities. 
Development planning is an instrument for 
both explicit introduction of science and 
technology issues and implicit introduction of 
technology policies. 
Science and technology planning is a policy 
instrument in itself; it consists of the 
procedures, organization al arrangements, 
methods, etc. to tackle the development of 
scientific and tech no logical capabilities, 
determining priorities for S& T, allocating 
resources, and defining S& T activities. 
To take planning seriously, governments 
cannot plan science and technology without 
considering the demand for S&T activities 
derived from the development plan. Every 
development strategy - and particularly an 
industrial one - embeds technological needs 
and defines S& T requirements. 
In S& T planning, the first task is to spell out 
the technological implications of the 
development plan, isolating the technology 
required, the constraints imposed by the 
projects, the natural resources needed, the 
targets, and so on. The next step is to introduce 
science and technology as a strategic variable, 
such as employment and financing, into the 
plan. 
The final plan then reflects the stage of S& T 
development, i.e., whether it is necessary to 
create an S& T capacity and develop it in a 
major way or mainly to reorient the existing 
S& T capacity and complement it in strategic 
areas. For this reason, the experience of S& T 
planning in the developed countries is of little 
relevance to countries such as those of the 
STPI project. 
The organizational structures for S& T 
planning in STPI countries are similar. The 
scientific community participates through a 
number of committees that correspond to a 
central coordinating body. There are differ-
ences in the composition of the committees, 
in their number and size, and in their relative 
autonomy and power, but their objective is 
the same. 
The 1974-77 Argentine development plan 
exemplifies some of the inconsistencies that 
result when technological implications are not 
linked with the declared aims of S& T 
development. In the end, technological 
considerations were pushed into the 
background, and the plan was not put into 
effect. 
Analysis of Brazilian development plans 
1953-73 tells a different story: implicit 
technological considerations were in 
agreement with S& T policies, the strategy for 
S&T development following the path 
established by the economic development 
strategy. In addition, the first and second basic 
plans for scientific and technological 
development attempted to consolidate and 
order the S& T activities performed and 
supported by the state. The first one was 
mainly a collection of projects presented and 
financed by the various government agencies, 
whereas the second moved ahead in the 
definition of S& T strategy and proposed 
several new programs that responded to the 
main objectives of Brazilian development 
policies. Furthermore, the S& T planning 
process was closely associated with the 
allocation of financial resources, and the plans 
contemplated large increases in funding for 
S& T activities. 
Colombia has put emphasis on the 
preparation and implementation of sectorial 
S&T plans, and planning has revolved around 
food and nutrition (following closely the food 
,and nutrition plan of the national planning 
department), housing development, and the 
marine sciences. 
Egypt has experienced a large number of 
changes in the institutions responsible for S& T 
planning during the last 25 years, and, as a 
consequence, most of the plans have not been 
implemented. To date, S& T planning in Egypt 
has been almost exclusively concerned with 
the planning of R&D under the aegis of the 
Academy for Scientific Research and 
Technology. 
S&T planning is most sophisticated in India, 
where a series of sectorial plans have been 
developed within a common framework that 
enables decisions on resource allocation and 
priorities for S& T among the different sectors. 
The existing plan was a rather large exercise in 
which several hundred scientists, engineers, 
industrialists, and government officials 
participated actively. Priorities and strategies 
for S& T development were closely associated 
with India's development plan. 
The Mexican Science and Technology 
Council engaged in a planning exercise similar 
to the one in India. Around 20 committees 
were formed to deal with scientific disciplines 
and technological problems, as well as a 
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number of issues common to both science and 
technology, such as human resources, S&T 
services, and policy instruments. Mexican 
planners faced the determined opposition of 
some sectors of the scientific community (as 
did the Indian planners) but were able to gain 
a concensus on the plan's application. 
However, a change in government in late 1976 
brought in new authorities who left the plan 
aside and, for the most part, still have not 
implemented it. 
The Venezuelan plan for science and 
tech no logy was also prepared through a 
participatory exercise, and like the Mexican 
plan, has not been fully implemented. Some of 
the programs have suffered several delays, and 
institutional changes in the agency in charge 
of putting the plan into practice have 
hampered progress. Another obstacle to 
implementation has been the determined 
effort made by the government to expand 
industry very rapidly, relying mainly on 
massive technology transfers. 
South Korea represents a special case, 
primarily because its economic development 
plans fully integrate technological 
considerations; in fact technological 
development is one of the three main targets 
of the development plan that began in 1977. 
South Korea is unique also because it has 
made a determined effort to link economic 
and S&T planning. This has led to the 
identification of a number of "key 
technologies" that need to be mastered in 
order for the economic plan to achieve its 
objectives. Scientific and technological efforts 
are organized and promoted around these key 
areas, and 10 new research institutes are being 
established in the late 1970s to provide S& T 
support. Furthermore, planning has been 
closely associated with the allocation of 
financial resources for science and technology 
and with a series of incentives for private 
industries to master the "key technologies." 
Financing S&T Activities 
The link with financial resources is crucial, 
and a set of financial mechanisms is essential, 
for building up an S&T infrastructure as well as 
for implementing S& T plans. It is one that takes 
a long time to consolidate. 
In general, the allocation of financial 
resources is bounded from below by the 
minimum amount of funds necessary to 
sustain S& T activities and from above by the 
absorption capacity of the institutions 
engaged in the performance of S& T activities. 
The two limits are difficult, but essential, to 
define, according to the experience of STPI 
countries; otherwise, the proper handling of 
S& T financial mechanisms is impossible, and 
some S& T activities will be allocated too little 
and others, too much. 
A country's financial resources during its 
formative stage are allocated primarily to 
institution building whereas later they are 
often devoted to well-defined programs and 
projects for the performance of S& T activities. 
In the latter case, greater emphasis can be 
placed on contract research, which forces 
R&D institutions to deliver results in a 
systematic manner. 
There are three basic ways to acquire funds 
for science and technology. The first involves 
legal measures stipulating automatic 
contributions to an S& T fund that is not subject 
to budgetary negotiations at the government 
level. This is exemplified in the research fund 
managed by ITINTEC in Peru, to which all 
industrial enterprises are obliged to 
contribute 2% of their net income before 
taxes. Another example is the Argentine fund 
for INTI, which receives 0.25% of the credits 
awarded to industry by the National 
Development Bank. The second method is to 
secure intersectorial transfers from 
government agencies and institutions. The 
National Fund for Scientific and Technological 
Development and the Fund for Technological 
Development in Brazil are examples. The third 
is a form of marketing, in which the institu-
tions performing S& T activities work under 
contract to a client. Of the three, the first 
guarantees the most steady flow of funds. 
No matter how the funds are acquired, they 
may be disbursed either through a central 
agency or through a variety of decentralized 
authorities. At present, the general trend is 
toward establishing a variety of research funds 
that respond to initiatives in specific sectors 
and that are not subject to the dangers of 
excessive bureaucracy common to centralized 
funds. 
For instance, Argentina has developed 
several funds for the support of S& T activities. 
It heavily funds research institutions and 
individual researchers, the latter through a 
direct subsidy associated with the 
"professional researcher career" -a mecha-
nism to ensure researchers receive sufficient 
financial support to devote their time fully to 
research. 
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Brazil has also developed several multi-
purpose funds that cover a wide range of 
activities and possible beneficiaries; in 
addition, it has relied on extensive budget 
transfers to state-supported S& T institutions. 
These mechanisms aim at increasing the 
availability of financial resources for S& T to the 
level of around U.S. $800 million annually by 
the end of the 1970s, a 10-fold increase since 
the late 1960s. Colombia has financed S& T 
activities mainly through a central fund of 
rather modest proportions and through 
budgetary transfers to state research institutes. 
In India, allocations for S& T activities are 
handled mainly by the various ministries, 
although there are also several sectorial funds 
of lesser importance, and the use of S& T 
funding mechanisms is closely associated with 
the process of S& T planning. In Mexico, 
financial allocations for S& T are handled 
primarily by the various ministries, although a 
central fund, amounting to about 15% of total 
S& T allocations, is managed by the National 
Council for Science and Technology. South 
Korea attaches great importance to S& T 
funding, and the government intervenes very 
actively through a variety of funds and 
mechanisms under the general coordination 
of the Ministry of Science and Technology. 
In Peru, there is a network of compulsory 
sectorial funds for research, but contributions 
are based on percentages of gross profits of 
the firms in the various sectors and are 
threatened by economic crisis. Venezuela has 
increased substantially the allocations for S& T 
as part of the government budget; in fact its 
financing has at times outstripped the 
absorption capacity of research centres 
and institutions. The Venezuelan govern-
ment is studying the establishment of a 
central fund with contributions obtained from 
a certain percentage of the turnover of 
industrial firms. 
Regulating Technology Imports 
Another cluster of policy instruments aims 
at regulating the flow of technology into a 
country, both embodied technology 
(machinery, equipment, or intermediate 
products) and disembodied technology (tech-
nical know-how, patents, technical assistance, 
management procedures, etc.). 
The regulation of technology imports is 
particularly important in less-developed 
countries because imports often determine 
the technological structure of industry, 
defining the level and characteristics of the 
technological base. Indiscriminate importing 
usually stunts the growth of domestic 
technological capabilities, and although 
technology imports should not be eliminated, 
they should be carefully regulated. 
Regulating imports became popular in the 
late 1960s and early 1970s in the less-
developed countries, mainly as a reaction 
against the abuses of foreign technology 
suppliers (overpricing of intermediate inputs, 
imposition of restrictions to the technology 
buyer, excessive royalty payments, etc.). In 
some of the STPI countries, such as Colombia, 
the initial drive for controlling the import of 
technology was prompted by financial or 
balance of payments considerations, and 
technological issues were introduced at a later 
stage. 
The regulation of technology imports 
involves conflicting interests, several 
government agencies, and a variety of 
different policy instruments. It is almost 
impossible to use all the policy instruments 
available for this purpose and combine them 
in a coherent and effective way. None of the 
STPI countries have managed to do this. 
All the policy instruments in this cluster 
have more than one objective or function to 
fulfill. For example, import controls are aimed 
at protecting local industry, at reducing 
balance of payments problems, at generating 
revenues for the state, and also at fostering 
growth in selected technological capabilities. 
Foreign investment controls and regulations 
aim at setting the conditions under which 
foreign capital is allowed in the country to 
accelerate industrial growth, to promote 
exports, or to encourage the establishment of 
selected industries that may contribute to 
local S& T development. The patent system is 
supposed to encourage local invention and 
innovation, but its effect has been felt mainly 
in the grants to foreign technology suppliers. 
Similar remarks apply to joint ventures and the 
registries of licencing agreements. The fact is 
that this constellation of multiple objectives 
makes the coherent application of this cluster 
of policy instruments rather difficult. 
The conflicts that emerge when import 
regulations are strictly applied include slower 
industrial growth (by controlling the 
introduction of new products and 
techniques); increased prices (because 
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domestic production is likely to be initially less 
efficient and local costs higher); poorer 
product quality (because of the lack of 
experience in local manufacturing); and 
scarcities of certain goods (because of 
insufficiencies in domestic production). 
Furthermore, foreign technology suppliers 
and investors may be driven away by increased 
controls. In the face of these possible effects, 
many interest groups - local entrepreneurs, 
foreign investors, traders frequently 
oppose import regulations. 
However, the regulation of technology 
imports may protect infant industries and 
stimulate their development, lead to a better 
balance of payments, generate increases in 
employment, and promote the development 
of local S& T capabilities. In effect, new 
industries may be given the opportunity to 
become more efficient before facing 
competition from imported products; 
industrial balance of payments problems may 
be ameliorated by import controls and the 
regulation of foreign investment; limitations 
on machinery imports may encourage more 
intensive use of domestic resources, 
particularly labour; and local scientists, 
engineers, and technicians may expand their 
problem-solving capacity. 
In other words, the regulation of 
technology imports provides the opportunity 
for local S& T capabilities to develop but 
produces conflicts that limit its application. 
The technological aims must be weighed 
against nontechnological objectives to reach a 
balance, a condition that is rarely found when 
this cluster of policy instruments is enforced. 
Import Controls 
All less-developed countries employ a 
number of policy instruments to control 
incoming goods from foreign countries. Their 
main goals are to protect local industry and to 
stabilize the balance of payments. The array of 
import controls is vast: tariffs, customs 
exemptions, import permits, import 
prohibitions, import lists, import quotas, 
foreign exchange control and restrictions, 
differential exchange rates, import 
committees, state import monopolies, etc., are 
all used for the purpose of discouraging and 
restricting certain kinds of imports. 
Import controls have an indirect or implicit 
effect on the technological structure of 
industry, for they determine the types of 
capital goods and intermediate products -
both of which embody technology - that will 
be allowed into a country and incorporated 
into production. They are also a means of 
promoting local technology in manufacturing 
specific goods. 
In the STPI countries, import controls have 
usually been applied to further import 
substitution; hence, their application should 
be viewed in the context of industrialization 
strategies. Of particular interest is the fact that 
import controls have been applied mainly to 
consumer goods and to a lesser extent to 
capital goods and manufacturing inputs. This 
has affected and distorted the internal 
productive structure and has not provided 
incentives for the development of capital 
goods industries. 
Import controls have both short and long-
term effects upon industrial activities and the 
development of domestic S& T capabilities. On 
the one hand, they almost immediately curtail 
the flow of imports, are relatively easy to 
apply, and influence local production within a 
short time. Decrees concerning tariffs, import 
prohibitions, and so on are easy for 
government to impose and - if need be - to 
change from day to day. Thus, governments 
may, in principle, fine-tune controls to foreign 
exchange availabilities, promotional policies 
for certain industries, world economic 
conditions, internal crisis, and so on. On the 
other ha.nd, protectionist measures, which 
include import controls, have a long-term 
effect on industrial production and on 
technological capabilities. The protection 
they provide, especially when a particular 
industrial branch is foundering, does not 
encourage industry to attempt technological 
improvements or better efficiency and, thus, 
detracts from the long-term development of 
industrial or S& T capabilities. Import controls 
are a double-edged weapon: they can be a 
powerful stimulus to industrialization in the 
short term but can lead to a distorted industrial 
structure and undermine the development of 
domestic industrial science and technology. 
Custom duties and tariffs are usually 
employed to encourage the import of certain 
lines of products and discourage the import of 
others. In most STPI countries, particularly 
those promoting import substitution, tariffs 
have been higher for consumer goods than for 
intermediate inputs and capital goods. The 
effects, which have been to increase local 
production of consumer goods, have been 
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compounded by contextual factors and other 
policy instruments, and it is unlikely that any 
alterations in tariffs by themselves will have an 
impact on the domestic production of 
machinery and equipment. Although, 
recently, some countries, such as Brazil and 
Mexico, have introduced higher tariffs on 
capital goods, in practice differential custom 
duties are difficult to apply, and their real 
impact can be quite different from what was 
intended. Between the nominal and the 
effective protection of capital goods industries 
there are often large discrepancies, as the 
cases of Mexico and Colombia indicate. 
Import permits are a highly flexible and 
easy-to-apply instrument for import controls. 
They usually regulate specific categories of 
imported goods, whereas tariffs are associated 
with general groups. A large percentage of 
imports are regulated in this way in the STPI 
countries. In Korea, an estimated 50% of all 
imports require permits, and the proportion 
reaches two-thirds in Mexico and even higher 
in Peru. Import permits, and their counterpart 
import prohibitions, are exaggerated custom 
duties and tariffs, i.e., an import prohibition 
can be regarded as an infinite tariff. 
Foreign exchange quotas are another form 
of import controls. They depend less on the 
type of goods being imported than on the 
avai !ability of foreign exchange. They are a 
means for allocating foreign exchange to 
various industrial firms, complementing and 
even superseding tariffs and import permits. 
In Peru and, linked to import permits, in 
Colombia, foreign exchange quotas applied to 
different industrial branches and to 
enterprises within these branches have been 
one of the main policy instruments to control 
imports. 
Because of the multiple influences and the 
complexities in the application of import 
controls and particularly because of the 
interaction between short- and long-term 
effects, their impact can only be studied 
properly from an historical perspective. 
Countries such as Brazi I have found it 
necessary to change their import policies over 
time and, consequently, to change, and even 
develop new, policy instruments for import 
controls, adapting to changing circumstances. 
In Colombia, a technical study of import 
controls identified cases both of technological 
progress and of backwardness that were 
closely associated with the long-term impact 
of import controls. In fact, as part of import 
substitution industrialization policies, import 
controls too often ended up as continuous, 
rather than initial, protection for local 
industries and turned infant industries into 
pampered teenagers that were unable to sell 
their products competitively in the world 
market. In addition when import controls 
have protected industries dominated by 
subsidiaries of multinational corporations, 
they have introduced substantial social 
damage. 
However, it cannot be argued that 
protectionist policies put into effect through 
import controls were, or are, unnecessary; on 
the contrary, they appear essential for the 
growth of domestic industry. They should be 
seen as short-term measures to deal with 
balance of payments problems, foreign 
exchange shortages, etc. 
Control of Foreign Investment 
Like import controls, foreign investment 
regulations have a multiplicity of objectives, 
and they also have strong impact on the 
development of local S& T capabilities. In the 
STPI countries, where a few foreign-owned 
firms can, and often do, dominate several 
industrial branches, investment controls may 
even have a more direct effect on 
technological capabilities than do import 
controls. The industrial branches are 
comparatively small in the STPI countries, and 
the technological choices made by the larger 
- usually foreign-owned - firms have a 
disproportionally large impact. The impact of 
foreign investment on the technological 
profile of industry is, therefore, very large. 
Furthermore, foreign investment tends to 
concentrate in the technologically advanced 
branches of industry (automobiles, domestic 
appliances, petrochemicals, etc.), whose 
indirect effects on in'dustry are larger than 
those of other industrial branches. 
To enter certain branches of industry 
requires very large investments that are 
beyond the reach of local firms, and even of 
some governments. This does not imply that 
foreign firms can provide all the financial 
resources required, but they are usually able 
to obtain financing from commercial banks, 
financing agencies, and international 
organizations. 
Furthermore, foreign firms are often not 
prepared to set up production facilities or to 
supply technology except through direct 
foreign investment that places them in total 
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control of the operation. For example, some 
joint ventures in electronics (or 
petrochemicals) stipulate that a foreign firm 
will provide the technology in exchange for a 
certain proportion of the shares. 
The issues involved in the control of foreign 
investment to further technological objectives 
must be embedded with in a larger set of 
economic and political considerations 
regarding a country's industrial autonomy. 
The policy instruments aiming at controlling 
foreign investment cannot be understood 
without acknowledging that nationalism plays 
a most important role in the definition of 
policies toward direct foreign investment. 
In several of the STPI countries, there is a 
feeling that direct foreign investment 
undermines not only local private firms but 
also the nation as a whole, taking resources 
out of the host nation and diminishing the 
possibilities of local accumulation and 
political autonomy. 
In fact, all the STPI countries including 
those, such as South Korea, that are interested 
in attracting foreign investment, have adopted 
measures to regulate the activities of foreign 
investors. The regulations tend to exclude 
certain industrial branches for foreign 
investment; restrict the use of local capital by 
foreign firms; limit foreign control of certain 
markets; eliminate restrictive business 
practices; reduce payments abroad for profits, 
royalties, and technical assistance; eliminate 
overpricing of intermediate imports and 
underpricing of exports; and stimulate the 
effective transfer of skills and know-how. 
The possibility of creating and effectively 
operating these controls in STPI countries 
depends on the coherence of government 
policies, the relative weight of foreign 
investment in industry, and the history and 
politics behind foreign investment decisions. 
For example a country with a shortage of 
foreign exchange and a large foreign debt 
may liberalize foreign investment policies and 
relax controls. 
The effectiveness of these controls is also 
affected by administrative capabilities and 
access to information on foreign firms. At 
times, a country agrees to foreign investments 
without adequate knowledge of the 
characteristics and operation of foreign 
investors. Furthermore, frequently legislation 
to control foreign investment contains a 
number of exceptions, and government 
agencies and state corporations bend or 
circumvent the established rules. 
In Mexico, foreign capital and its influence 
have been key political issues for more than 50 
years. New legislation approved in 1974 began 
to systematize the piecemeal decisions taken 
over time. The law does not revise past 
investments but concentrates on scrutiny of 
new ones. To date, it has had little impact, 
although it is too early to attempt an 
evaluation. In any case, it provides the 
government with background information 
and the means to intervene actively in the 
regulation of foreign investment. 
The Colombian legislation on foreign 
investment has been related mainly to foreign 
exchange and fiscal controls, deriving impetus 
from Decision 24 of the Andean Pact, which 
established a set of stringent rules for foreign 
investment. In South Korea, the regulation of 
foreign investment is mainly aimed at 
providing a set of stable rules and incentives to 
stimulate the inflow of foreign capital, 
although the connection between foreign 
investment and technology is clearly made 
and investments are encouraged in areas 
where technology transfers have been 
awarded priority. Venezuela, also by virtue of 
its membership in the Andean Pact, has 
established foreign investment regulations 
but has not effectively implemented them 
because of administrative difficulties, 
ambiguity in the law, and the lack of strict 
foreign exchange controls. Recently, 
technical assistance agreements between the 
nationalized Venezuelan oil industry and 
foreign firms appear to contradict some of the 
pact's provisions on foreign investment and 
foreign technology control. 
The experience of the STPI countries with 
foreign investment controls is difficult to 
assess, and the technological implications are 
even harder to evaluate. Nevertheless, invest-
ment controls constitute a source of 
information and a set of bargaining instru-
ments at the disposal of governments in the 
STPI countries. 
Registries of Licencing Agreements 
Another policy instrument to regulate 
imports is the registry of licencing agreements. 
It is a mechanism primarily to control imports 
of know-how, manufacturing procedures and 
specifications, designs and blueprints, 
technical assistance, management experience, 
etc. (disembodied technology). Licencing 
agreements are contracts by which 
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tech no logy suppliers sell firms the rights to use 
their "product." 
In the STPI countries, competition among 
domestic firms is frequently based on their 
differential access to foreign technology 
obtained from licencing agreements. 
Consequently, enterprises are usually eager to 
sign licencing agreements and often are not 
cautious about the terms and conditions. 
Licence rs, on their part, have taken advantage 
of their position and have used the licencing 
agreements to tie the provision of capital 
goods and intermediate products, to restrict 
the sales and marketing operations of the 
firms, to impose controls on productive 
activities, and even to set the basis for 
subsequent takeover of the local firm. There 
are many instances when intermediate 
products have been overpriced in licencing 
agreements. 
The registries of licencing agreements in 
STPI countries were es ta bl ished to control 
some of the licence rs' abuses, focusing initially 
on cost considerations and trying to reduce 
the outflow of foreign exchange associated 
with royalty payments. Their scope was 
subsequently enlarged to deal with the 
technology involved and to protect the 
"national interest." 
Registries of licencing agreements first 
examine the cost of technology imports, 
particularly because many of the STPI 
countries have had, and continue to have, 
balance of payments problems. The 
examination focuses on the amount of royalty 
payments and the basis for calculating them, as 
well as on the pricing of inputs and machinery 
supplied as part of the agreement. Substantial 
foreign exchange savings have been reported 
by the registries' authorities, although the 
apparent savings may have been transferred 
out of the country through other channels. 
Most of the registries insist on the unpackag-
ing of the licencing agreement, separating and 
identifying payments for patents, technical 
assistance, information, know-how, and brand 
names, rather than establishing a global sum. 
The breakdown is a rather difficult task, but it 
has contributed to a greater understanding of 
the process of importing technology. The 
registries also try to assess the rationale and 
convenience of the agreement in terms of the 
"national interest," which is usually defined in 
rather vague terms. This last criterion is the 
most difficult to apply, for it re qui res an 
understanding of the (frequently ill-defined) 
long-term development aims of the country, 
of the place that domestic S& T capabilities 
occupy within the perspective, and of the way 
in which the regulation of technology imports 
can contribute. 
The establishment of registries was opposed 
by both local and foreign firms operating in 
STPI countries, as well as by technology 
suppliers and industrial property lawyers. 
They all argued that the state had no right to 
intervene in the bargaining process between 
suppliers and buyers of technology. Although 
some firms now realize that the registries 
enhance their position at the bargaining table, 
in all the STPI countries, the operation of 
licencing registries has been fraught with 
difficult political battles. 
There are many difficulties in establishing an 
appropriate legislative framework for the 
registries and in devising procedures to guide 
their operations. In Colombia, Venezuela, 
Argentina, Mexico, and Peru, the laws set 
minimum conditions for the approval of 
licencing agreements, but the agency in 
charge of the registry develops the detailed 
rules to be followed during negotiations. 
These internal rules are as important as the 
laws, particularly in view of the many gaps in 
legislation. Needless to say, the administrative 
and technical capabilities within the registries 
are also very important and have consistently 
been one of the main shortcomings of the 
registries in the STPI countries. 
The institutions in charge of the registries 
range from independent agencies associated 
with ministries of industry (Mexico), through 
committees associated with government 
agencies (Colombia), to technology institutes 
(until recently, Peru and Argentina), and 
planning agencies (South Korea). Experience 
suggests that registries under the auspices of a 
technology institute (covering industrial 
research, technical information, norms and 
standards, and other related functions) review 
closely the effects of technology imports on 
the growth of domestic S& T capabilities, 
whereas registries attached to fiscal and 
planning agencies pay more attention to 
financial, foreign exchange, and legal criteria. 
The effectiveness of the registries of 
licencing agreements depends on three 
conditions. First, support must come from 
other government bodies, particularly state 
enterprises. If a registry is marginal to the 
government's decision-making, it cannot 
regulate the inflow of disembodied 
technology. In this regard, administrative 
coherence among different government 
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agencies is also important so the registry does 
not conflict with the aims and actions of other 
bodies. Second, the registry's own technical 
and administrative capabilities need to be 
high, based on highly trained personnel. Too 
often, as is the case in several STPI countries, 
registry authorities and personnel do not 
understand technology transfer; they apply 
approval criteria inconsistently and create 
long administrative delays. Finally, a registry 
must obtain the support and confidence of the 
local business community, for the formal 
criteria and rules may be circumvented by 
covert agreements between technology 
buyers and suppliers. To function effectively, 
the registry must show that it is protecting the 
interests of the local entrepreneurs and can 
act on their behalf if they submit licencing 
agreements for approval. 
The majority of the registries in the STPI 
countries have been operating for less than 5 
years, and their performance is difficult to 
evaluate in terms of their impact on the 
growth of domestic S& T capabilities. One of 
the most important effects of registries has 
been to bring into the open the issues 
associated with technology transfer. In India, 
especially, the issues have become clear: the 
amount and basis for calculating royalty 
payments in different circumstances; the 
choice of foreign technology suppliers; the 
continued interest of the technology suppliers 
in updating and improving their technology; 
the age of the technology supplied; the 
question of tied imports of equipment and 
industrial inputs; the qualifications and 
expertise of foreign technicians; the 
proliferation of licencing agreements for 
similar products; and the connections with the 
use of local S&T capabilities. Like foreign 
investment controls, therefore, they have 
generated a wealth of useful information on 
tech no logy transfer and have provided an 
opportunity for government intervention. 
Now, the question is how best to take 
advantage of them. 
The Patent System 
Patents have always had an ambiguous role 
in less-developed countries. Whereas they 
were originally given as an encouragement or 
reward to individual inventors, they are now 
primarily an instrument of corporate control. 
In consequence, the property rights inherent 
in a patent now defend not the individual but 
the large corporation. This shift, which began 
in the U.S. in the early 1900s and was 
accelerated after World War II, has been 
accompanied by a world-trade expansion that 
increased the importance of multicountry 
patenting. 
Patent rights have been the subject of 
intense debate in STPI countries. The value of 
the international patent system, with its 
explicit monopoly rights, has been questioned 
and considered as a device for maintaining the 
hegemony of developed countries in 
industrial production. As a reaction, changes 
in the patent granting process have been 
suggested, limiting the time available for 
protection, expanding compulsory licencing 
provisions, and restricting product or process 
coverage. The main idea behind these 
modifications has been to redefine the patent 
from an individual to a social right. 
The data from STPI countries show 
consistent trends. The number of patents 
granted have increased, but both individual 
and national patent holders account for a 
decreasing proportion of total patenting. 
Furthermore, the majority of patents in these 
countries are held by foreign corporations and 
are used mainly as devices to impose restric-
tions on local production of certain goods, 
thus protecting the market for possible 
exports from other countries or for eventual 
production by the patent-holding firms or by a 
licencee. 
The major claim in favour of the patent 
system, that it encourages invention, has been 
examined in Mexico. In spite of small numbers 
of patents in the industrial branches of food 
processing, capital goods, and petrochemi-
cals, there was little evidence that patents 
encouraged any inventiveness or industrial 
creativity. A new patent law, which aims at 
correcting some of the abuses, has been put 
into effect in Mexico recently, but it is still too 
new to assess. In Venezuela, a similar analysis 
showed little theoretical or empirical 
evidence to support the most ambitious claims 
in favour of the international patent system. 
From the perspective of regulating 
technology imports, the patent system is a 
failure and can be considered a device for 
foreign patent holders to achieve their 
objectives in terms of trade flows and 
productive activities in less-developed 
countries. Furthermore, there is evidence that 
patent registration by itself does not constitute 
a vehicle for the transfer of technology. 
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Joint Ventures 
Joint ventures are an alternative to direct 
foreign investment and the resultant foreign 
control over productive activities. They are 
partnerships between governments and 
foreign firms and, in some cases, the local 
private sector to set up productive facilities. 
The foreign partner is usually sought because 
of the technology and market it can provide. 
In the STPI project, joint ventures involving 
the petrochemical industry in Brazil and 
Venezuela were analyzed. In Brazil, they took 
the form of tripartite firms with participation 
of foreign firms, local private firms, and the 
Brazilian government. The state has 
intervened to exert some control over the 
operations, thus ensuring that Brazilian 
industry benefits from joint ventures. 
However, an initial appraisal of the existing 
firms suggests that the foreign partners are 
obtaining a disproportionate share of the 
benefits - perhaps as the price for the 
technology - and that joint ventures can 
improve domestic S& T capabilities if they 
encourage and employ them. 
Unlike Brazil, in Venezuela, the local private 
sector does not participate in joint ventures, 
and the state does not intervene appreciably 
in productive activities. The result is an 
exaggerated version of the Brazilian case. 
Although the government has majority 
ownership in joint ventures, the foreign 
partner controls the operations and 
technology. The government lacks the 
technological expertise to participate in the 
activities and has not insisted on links with 
domestic engineering firms and suppliers of 
capital equipment. At any rate the relative 
weakness of the firms in these two fields limits 
their potential contribution. 
In other words, unless the local partner, be 
it the state or private ind us try, has the 
capacity to evaluate the technology being 
supplied and the conditions under which it is 
supplied, then it acts mainly as a financier in 
joint ventures and has little influence on their 
possible impact on local S& T capabilities. 
Creating Demand 
There is a much more effective means for 
influencing local S& T capabilities; it is through 
the cluster of policy instruments that defines 
the pattern of demand. Perhaps one of the 
most important and least understood sources 
of influence, it consists of all those measures of 
industrial and government policy that 
promote an increased demand for S& T, define 
the areas where S& T knowledge wi II be 
required, and decide whether the knowledge 
will be acquired locally or abroad. 
The importance of this cluster of policy 
instruments lies in the fact that, without a 
demand for indigenous S& T knowledge, the 
S& T capabilities developed and protected 
through other policy instruments remain 
unused, divorced from production, and 
impotent in social and economic 
development. Indeed, it has even been 
suggested that local S& T capabilities grow only 
when there is an effective social demand for 
them. This cluster of policy instruments 
constitutes the main vehicle for government 
intervention to promote or stifle such 
demand. 
S& T is Secondary 
The reason that this cluster is misunderstood 
is that none of the policy instruments in it has 
as its main function the development of local 
S& T capabilities. At best, S& T development is a 
secondary objective and at worst, a restriction 
that must be respected to reach 
nontechnological aims. The development of 
S& T capabilities often clashes with other aims 
such as rapid industrial growth, export 
promotion, expansion of state enterprises, 
and so on, producing conflicts that can only be 
solved through hard political choices. 
The policy instruments considered in this 
cluster - industrial programing, industrial 
financing, state purchasing power, fiscal 
measures, price controls, export promotion, 
and other administrative measures - are 
closely related to industrialization strategies. 
The industrialization strategy defines the 
potential room for maneuver to increase the 
demand for local S& T knowledge, and the 
policy instruments determine the extent to 
which this potential is used. (Some other 
policy instruments, such as import controls, 
technical norms and standards, etc., also affect 
the pattern of demand and should not be 
disregarded, even though they have been 
examined elsewhere in this report.) 
In the STPI countries, the policy instruments 
in this cluster have seldom been used 
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consciously to promote the demand for 
indigenous S& T knowledge. The industrializa-
tion strategies and government policies have 
paid little attention to local S& T activities, and 
the policy instruments have been used as a 
means to respond to short-term pressures 
without regard to the side effects on the 
creation and use of domestic S& T capabilities. 
Industrial Programing and Priorities 
The first policy instrument in this cluster is 
industrial programing and priority-setting. It 
consists of the legal, administrative, and 
institutional measures used by the state to 
shape the structure of industry and includes 
incentives, prohibitions, etc. 
In the STPI countries, this policy instrument 
has been mainly passive and not very effective. 
Nevertheless, its potential is powerful in terms 
of the changes it can induce in the industrial 
structure, which conditions the pattern of 
demand for technology. 
Four types of industrial programing are 
apparent in the STPI countries. The first, which 
is typical of South Korea's programing 
mechanisms, is a system of incentives without 
obligations. It attempts to modify the 
economic environment of industrial firms 
and, thus, to exact a particular response, 
especially in terms of investments. The 
incentives work when the climate is right; 
when it's not, they are disregarded. For 
example, tax incentives are effective tools 
when firms have few options to offset their tax 
burden. Their effectiveness can sometimes be 
increased by behind-the-scenes arm twisting 
by government, but in general, they are only 
one element in the large set of market forces 
that determine investment and, hence, the 
structure of industry. 
The second type of industrial programing is 
a combination of incentives and state 
controls, i.e., industrial entrepreneurs who 
comply with certain requirements are eligible 
for a series of benefits and incentives. The idea 
is to restrict the framework within which 
entrepreneurs can operate and still benefit 
from the incentives. In practice, this approach, 
which is exemplified in Mexico's industrial 
decentralization decree, is limited by the 
willingness and capability of government 
agencies to enforce the controls. 
The third type of programing instruments 
consists mainly of compulsory constraints. 
There may be some incentives associated with 
the controls, but their relative weight is rather 
small in comparison with that of the 
compulsive measures. The constraints are 
used by the state to modify the industrial 
structure in a direct way, without intervention 
in productive activities. The regulations put 
into effect in Argentina for the automotive 
industry are examples as are those contained 
in Peru's General Law of Industries. 
The last type of industrial programing is 
direct state intervention in productive 
activities. In this approach, the state reserves 
certain branches of industry for its own 
enterprises or joint ventures. There are 
examples in Peru and in countries such as 
Brazil and Mexico where the basic industries 
have been reserved for the state. 
None of the STPI countries confines its 
industrial programing to one approach, but 
the majority mainly rely on the first two types. 
In the countries where the other two 
approaches-compulsory policy instruments 
and direct government intervention-are 
apparent, the administrative limitations of 
government agencies have reduced their 
impact. In consequence, most STPI countries 
have had their industrial structures shaped by 
market forces. 
Although industrial programing and 
priority-setting may be used to promote the 
growth of local S& T capabilities, they must first 
have a significant impact on investments and 
on industrial expansion; have their 
technological implications clearly spelled out; 
and have built-in demands for local 
technology. 
Industrial Financing 
In practically all STPI countries, the banking 
system and other financial mechanisms are of 
great importance for industrial development 
and could therefore have a strong impact on 
the development of local S& T capabilities. 
Given the relative weaknesses of industrial 
firms in less-developed countries and the 
difficulties they face in financing their own 
expansion, they largely resort to financing 
agencies, particularly state agencies, implying 
substantial state leverage over industrial firms. 
The leverage could be used to influence 
technological behaviour by establishing 
certain requirements regarding the choice of 
technologies, the process of technology 
imports, and the performance of S& T 
activities. Special credit lines could be 
provided for engineering firms, for the 
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development and testing of new products and 
technologies, and for research and 
development activities. 
Industrial financing in the STPI countries has 
been based on banking criteria and 
technological considerations have seldom 
been included in the evaluation of loan 
applications. The notable exceptions are the 
National Development Bank in Brazil (for 
example, in 1970 it decided to award loans 
only to cement firms that were planning to use 
the dry process in their investment projects) 
and the Korean state-controlled banks. 
The variety of technological criteria that can 
be introduced into loan evaluation makes 
industrial finance one of the most powerful 
policy instruments to promote the demand for 
local S& T knowledge. To harness the potential 
power, the state must first control a large 
proportion of the financial resources available 
for industry (this is clearly the case in South 
Korea, Brazil, Mexico, and Peru); second, the 
state must be able to introduce technological 
criteria without significantly altering its 
financing mechanisms. For example, in Peru, 
technological criteria were incorporated in 
loan evaluation without altering the 
procedures. Third, the state should have a 
clear conception of the direction and ways in 
which it wishes to channel technological 
behaviour. 
None of these three conditions is too 
difficult to satisfy in the STPI countries, and 
particularly in those like Brazil and Mexico 
that have a long tradition of state participation 
in industrial financing. But, once again, 
conflicts may emerge when S& T development 
objectives imply higher risks, delays, and a 
possible reduction in growth rates. 
State Purchasing Power 
Next to industrial programing and to 
financing, the state's purchasing power can be 
considered one of the most powerful policy 
instruments to promote the demand for local 
S& T activities and knowledge. In most of the 
STPI countries, state budgets represent a very 
large proportion of total consumption and 
investment, and the state is a most important 
producer, particularly in the basic industries. 
As a consequence, governments can 
establish directives that favour the 
development of indigenous scientific, 
technological, and engineering capabilities. 
For example, when purchasing goods and 
services, state enterprises and agencies can 
give preference to products that incorporate 
local technology and materials and can 
continually demand improvements in the 
quality of goods and services purchased 
domestically. The state firms or agencies must 
be willing to incur additional costs, tolerate 
delays, and accept lower quality standards 
during the "learning" period so that local 
suppliers have an opportunity to catch up with 
their foreign competitors. Unfortunately, the 
state has seldom been willing, in practice, to 
risk the time or money to promote local 
capabilities. 
Among the STPI countries, however, there 
are some positive examples. In Brazil, for 
instance, large state firms in the basic 
industries have created a demand for local 
capital goods, particularly those made to 
order, and have provided strong impetus for 
the development of the Brazilian capital goods 
industry. In Argentina, the experience of the 
Atomic Energy Commission shows what can 
be accomplished by a determined and well-
plan ned effort to incorporate local suppliers 
of equipment, engineering services, and 
technology: the first atomic power plant of 
Argentina, built in Atucha, incorporated 
nearly 50% of local inputs, including the fuel 
elements. At one time, Argentina had a "Buy 
Domestic" law, but it was seldom enforced 
before it was repealed. 
Other STPI countries where the state plays a 
powerful role in the economy, such as South 
Korea and Peru, have attempted similar 
policies with limited success. 
In contrast, Venezuela, because of the 
urgency in completing investment programs 
and because of the risk in local supplies, has 
invested in massive imports of technology and 
equipment. 
The conflicts associated with policy 
instruments that have multiple objectives are 
clear in the case of state enterprises. By virtue 
of being "enterprises," they have an 
accumulation function and are supposed to be 
profitable; and also, by being part of the 
"state," they have a social function and are 
supposed to further welfare aims. The relative 
dominance of one or the other role 
determines the state enterprise's potential 
achievement in social objectives, such as 
development of domestic S& T capabilities. 
Although the purchasing power of the state is 
potentially one of the most effective policy 
instruments for creating a demand for local 
S&T activities, it must be in the hands of 
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capable administrators who can make 
complex choices regarding technological 
purchases. 
Fiscal Measures 
In contrast, fiscal measures, no matter how 
ably administered, are weak policy 
instruments. Consisting primarily of the tax 
provisions that affect the economic 
environment of industrial firms, they usually 
cut tax burdens of industrial firms, thereby 
increasing profitability, in exchange for 
cooperation. 
The weakness of these policy instruments 
results from the fact that they do not affect 
business performance in a major way. 
Furthermore, there is usually a multiplicity of 
tax incentives available, which operate in a 
redundant and simultaneous way, canceling 
the potential effect of any single incentive. 
Under very special circumstances, however, 
some fiscal instruments can provide the push 
for new firms to enter the market and some 
can even boost the development of local 
technological capabilities. For instance, in the 
Colombian textile industry, fiscal rules 
established the linear depreciation of 
machinery over 10 years and, coupled with 
other factors, such as foreign exchange 
shortages, highly trained personnel, and a 
vigorous local industry, led to a substantial 
upgrading of local repair, maintenance, and 
machinery reconstruction capabilities within 
textile firms, as well as to a lively second-hand 
machinery market. However, because of the 
variety of additional conditions required for 
fiscal measures to operate as instruments for 
S&T policy, their potential use to develop S&T 
capabilities is rather marginal. 
Price Controls and Export Promotion 
Price controls are seldom, if ever, used as a 
means to promote the development of S& T 
capabilities. Yet, through their influence on 
profitability they can shape the production 
cost structure and through it influence 
technological considerations. Price controls 
that set minimums are usually applied to 
agricultural products whereas price controls 
setting upper limits are applied to industrial 
products. The latter can be used to encourage 
enterprises to increase cost-reducing activities 
and operate with greater efficiency. 
But the way in which maximums are 
calculated can profoundly affect their impact 
on technological decisions. For example, if a 
percentage markup on total cost (labour and 
material inputs) is used to define the profit 
margin and the selling price, then enterprises 
may be tempted to exaggerate depreciation 
and amortization charges to increase total 
costs and, hence, profitability. They would 
have little incentive to produce at capacity or 
improve efficiency. On the other hand, if price 
ceilings are fixed according to a 
predetermined cost structure and profit 
margins, there would be a reason for firms to 
use their capacity. 
In the STPI project, price controls were 
analyzed in several branches of Colombian 
industry. The findings, although not 
conclusive, indicated that one of the main 
options open to industrial entrepreneurs in 
the face of price controls is to adopt a strategy 
of technological improvements aimed at 
optimizing the use of equipment and 
machinery, thus reducing fixed investment 
per unit of output, accelerating capital 
rotation, and increasing profitability. 
Price controls need further study, but at 
present they appear to be a driving force for 
minor technological improvements. 
Most countries with industries eventually 
encounter limitations in the domestic market 
for manufactured products and attempt to 
break their growth bottleneck by encouraging 
exports. Thus, in the STPI countries, Brazil, 
Mexico, Colombia, and more recently Peru 
and Venezuela, have begun to promote 
exports, whereas Korea has emphasized 
export promotion since it began to 
industrialize. 
Policy instruments for export promotion 
aim at providing support and assistance to 
industries that are likely to penetrate the 
world market for manufactured products. 
They give incentives to enterprises that export 
and also give general support in the form of 
technical assistance, quality control, market 
information, and so on. It has been argued, 
particularly in the Korean and Mexican cases, 
that export promotion measures cannot be 
successful unless industry is reasonably 
efficient. In other words, industry must 
produce better and cheaper products, even 
for the home market, to compete 
advantageously with foreign products and 
imports. 
Policy instruments aimed at promoting 
exports, therefore, may apply pressures within 
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industry to increase efficiency, improve 
quality, and lower prices - all measures that 
may increase demand for local S& T activities. 
They may also encourage imports of foreign 
technologies to please the tastes of consume rs 
in developed countries. Both effects have 
been identified in the STPI project in different 
branches of Korean, Brazilian, and Mexican 
industry, and they point out the complexity of 
export promotion measures. Like other policy 
instruments that define the pattern of demand 
for technology, export promotion is not 
simple and straightforward, and it requires 
detailed analyses to unravel the implications 
for the development of domestic S& T 
capabilities. 
Other Measures 
The pattern of demand for tech no logy is 
also influenced by some administrative actions 
of the state, such as subsidies and bidding and 
contracting procedures. A particularly 
interesting mechanism tried in India has been 
the creation and support of "ancillary 
industries" that supply inputs to large public 
or private corporations. The ancillary 
industries receive technical and managerial 
assistance from the "parent" corporations 
with which they are associated and have a 
guaranteed market for a proportion of their 
total output during a certain period. 
Many of these ancillary industries employ 
modern production techniques and, after a 
short while, become relatively independent. 
They have been considered as a mechanism to 
promote enterprise, particularly in 
engineering. Their impact on the 
development of local S& T capabilities may be 
considerable in diffusing S& T knowledge and 
skills and, as their activities expand and 
multiply, even creating a demand for S& T 
services, activities, and personnel. Ancillary 
enterprises are a means of ensuring that 
demand is not held captive in large 
corporations. 
Promoting S& T in Enterprises 
Another cluster of policy instruments is 
directed toward inducing industrial firms to 
perform scientific and technological activities 
and to absorb technology, whether of foreign 
or local origin. In the last analysis, it is through 
improved productivity in enterprises that the 
advances in industrial science and technology 
have an impact on the economy. It is necessary 
that industrial firms fully assimilate the 
technology incorporated into their 
productive activities and be capable of 
improving on it. 
However, when foreign technology is freely 
available and technology imports dominate 
the supply, local firms are not likely to invest 
scarce technical and financial resources in the 
performance of S& T activities, except routine 
ones such as quality control, maintenance, etc. 
In the early stages of industrial development, 
local firms usually do not place importance on 
S& T activities; they can enter the market and 
compete effectively, particularly within a 
protected environment. The subsidiaries of 
transnational corporations usually do not 
engage in S& T activities either, relying on 
technology transfers from their own 
headquarters. 
As industry develops and competition 
increases, scientific and technological 
activities assume more importance. In the STPI 
countries that have moved into production of 
capital, intermediate, and basic goods 
(Argentina, Brazil, India, Mexico, and South 
Korea), firms have begun to perform in-house 
S& T activities that go beyond routine tasks. 
Measures to induce firms to perform S& T 
activities may be less important when firms are 
already convinced of the value of in-house 
S&T. 
The countries in the STPI project have not 
paid much attention to the design and use of 
policy instruments in this cluster. The two 
main types that have been employed are 
special credit lines for scientific and 
technological activities and tax incentives to 
encourage firms to do research and 
development. These two instruments are 
complemented by administrative measures 
that facilitate the import of equipment and 
materials for the performance of in-house 
R&D by industrial firms. Special credit lines 
have been offered both in Argentina and 
Brazil, and tax incentives have been used by 
Mexico, Peru, and Korea; the administrative 
facilities were found in India. 
Credit Lines 
In general, in the STPI countries special 
credit lines have not been very effective. The 
Argentine credit lines for prototypes of capital 
goods and pilot plants were used on few 
77 
occasions. Only one loan for pilot plants was 
granted in 1973-75, and the credit line for 
prototypes awarded only four loans during the 
same period. The reasons for this are the 
general lack of awareness and interest by 
industrialists (even though it was an industrial 
association which asked the government to 
establish the prototypes credit line); the 
cumbersome and erratic administrative 
procedures involved; and the lack of active, 
aggressive attitudes within the agency in 
charge of administering the loans. 
The National Fund for Scientific and 
Technological Development in Brazil is an 
omnibus financial instrument, providing 
funds for universities, research laboratories, 
and industry. Its main vehicle for channeling 
funds to industrial enterprises has been the 
industrial technology development program, 
which has not accounted for a major share of 
the resources allocated to the National Fund. 
At present, the overall impact on industry is 
uncertain. 
Although special credit lines have not had a 
major impact on the development of internal 
S&T capabilities within firms, they may 
perform more effectively if they are designed 
and operated with a clear understanding of 
the financial needs of industrial enterprises. 
New efforts are needed to devise policy 
instruments that provide risk capital to 
innovative firms. 
Fiscal Incentives 
Like special credit lines, fiscal incentives do 
not appear to have been very effective. The 
exceptions are the Peruvian 2% fund at 
ITINTEC and the Korean fund established by 
the Technology Promotion Law, both of which 
are compulsory as opposed to "incentives." In 
Argentina, incentives were established by law 
and operated for 4 years during which 281 
firms submitted more than 3000 applications 
for tax deductions based on R&D projects. 
In the end, only 30 projects were approved 
and deemed worthy of support by the agency 
in charge of applying the instrument. The 
majority of the proposals were considered as 
devices to evade taxes, rather than effective 
research and development projects. In 
Mexico, as part of the corporation income tax 
law, deductions are available for the scientific 
and technological activities performed by 
enterprises, but their impact on inducing firms 
to carry out research and development has 
been rather limited because, among other 
things, the tax authorities do not critically 
revise the deductions claimed, and the 
definition of scientific and technological 
activities is so broad that almost anything can 
be claimed as a deduction. Korea and India 
have similar tax incentive provisions, although 
their effects are also considered uncertain. At 
present Colombia and Venezuela do not allow 
tax deductions for research and development 
expenditures, and in Colombia, a proposal to 
introduce them was rejected in 1972 as a 
possible means for tax evasion. Venezuela is 
planning to set up a fund similar to the 
ITINTEC fund (in Peru). It will be based on a 
certain percentage of the gross income of 
firms, but instead of giving the enterprise the 
first option to use the funds, it will allow for a 
wide variety of exonerations. 
The ITJNTEC system established by the 
Peruvian government seems to have worked 
rather well for two reasons: first, the fund is 
compulsory, although the enterprise may use 
its contribution (2% of net income before 
taxes), either to conduct or to contract 
research; second, industrial research is 
broadly defined in accordance with the level 
of development of Peruvian industry. The 
Korean Technology Promotion Law obliges 
firms to set aside up to 100% of the amount 
spent in buying foreign technology or 1% of 
the value of imported products to do research, 
either in house or under contract with another 
institution. Like ITINTEC, it had an important 
impact on ·the development of industrial 
technological capabilities and appears to be 
adequate to the stage of development of 
industry in the STPI countries. These 
successful mechanisms require substantive 
administrative flexibility and a well-trained 
group of professionals in the government 
agencies that apply them. 
The lack of success of other optional tax 
incentives suggests that combining tax 
deductions with compulsory contributions, as 
is done in both the Peruvian ITJNTEC 2%fund 
and the South Korean fund associated with the 
Technology Promotion Law, may be more 
effective in promoting S& T capabilities within 
industrial enterprises. 
Policy Instruments for the Support 
of S& T Activities 
There are policy instruments that support 
the performance of S& T activities. However, 
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they do not form a coherent cluster, for the 
type of support each of the policy instruments 
provides is quite different. 
The policy instruments examined here -
technical norms and standards, information 
centres, personnel training, and consulting 
and engineering design organizations - are 
crucial for the development of domestic S&T 
capabilities. The first policy instrument 
consists of the organizations, measures, and 
procedures to define and enforce technical 
norms and standards for industrial 
production, and they are closely interrelated 
with quality control and raising the quality of 
industrial products. Information centres 
provide support to the performance of S& T 
activities and also deal with technological 
information for industry and extension. They 
constitute a complex area of study and were 
examined briefly as part of the STPI project. 
Personnel training comprises measures that 
range from on-the-job training to postgrad-
uate education and includes courses at 
universities, educational institutions, and so 
on. The scope of personnel training is quite 
vast, and the STPI project did not focus on it, 
although a few country teams touched upon 
it. The last instrument, consulting and 
engineering design organizations, is one of 
the links between the production of knowl-
edge, both local and foreign, and its 
utilization in productive activities. It is very 
important, and, as a result of the preliminary 
analysis of STPI, it is the focus of a new project 
for support by the International Development 
Research Centre. 
Technical Norms, Standards, and Information 
Technical norms and standards include 
standard dimensions, performance 
characteristics, and quality specifications for 
manufactured goods. They are a means of 
introducing uniform quality levels, 
dimensions and other parameters in products 
to promote competition and to allow larger 
scales of production. By standardizing 
products and intermediate inputs, they 
introduce competition among the sources of 
supply and can reduce significantly 
the inventories necessary to support 
production. 
Technical norms and standards can also help 
in reducing waste and, if they conform to local 
manufacturing capabilities, they can promote 
industrial development. They constitute a 
mechanism for the diffusion of technology, 
because, by definition, they comprise product 
specifications, testing procedures, and in 
some cases process specifications. They are 
also a means to protect the consumers, whose 
interests are, in principle, taken into 
consideration when the norms and standards 
are established. 
Although technical norms and standards 
can become a powerful policy instrument for 
the development of local S& T capabilities, in 
the less-developed countries, they are 
generally translated or copied versions of 
those used elsewhere, particularly in the 
industrialized countries. Few efforts have 
been made to model them to suit local 
conditions and technological capabilities; 
therefore, their potential impact on local S&T 
development is lost. 
Norms and standards, when used to 
promote quality improvements in industrial 
production, can be made progressively more 
strict as local industry is capable of complying 
with them. In this way, firms will upgrade their 
technological base. If the standards are 
compulsory (as in food and health products) 
or associated with policy instruments such as 
state purchasing, they are especially effective. 
Within STPI, several teams examined the 
system of technical norms and standards in 
their countries, and most highlighted the 
difficulties involved in replacing a system of 
foreign standards because of trade, 
technology, and investment ties. They pointed 
out that standards can actually become a 
barrier to exports, particularly when local 
industry is not in a position to satisfy them 
fully. 
South Korea, the most export-oriented of 
the STPI countries, has put great emphasis on 
designing standards and encouraging 
industrial enterprises to comply. As a 
complement to the system of standards, there 
are regulations on quality control of products 
to be exported, and several government 
agencies and trade associations assist firms that 
export to raise the quality of their products. 
South Korea illustrates that technical norms 
and standards are potentially v~ry powerful 
instruments to promote the development of 
local S& T capabilities, but further study is 
needed to discover ways to capitalize on their 
potential. 
Another means of supporting S& T activities 
is through information centres, of which there 
are basically two types. The first, an 
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autonomous information centre, defines the 
services to be provided, primarily revolving 
around the collection, classification, 
processing, and retrieval of documents and 
other sources of information. The second, a 
user-dependent centre, offers services 
requested and defined by users, particularly 
industrial firms. 
The first type supports research activities 
and acts as a depository and processor of 
documents and S& T information. The second 
is geared toward satisfying the technological 
information needs of industry. 
In STPI, examples of the former are the 
Brazilian Institute of Bibliography and 
Documentation and the National Informatics 
Centre in India. Examples of the latter were 
identified in Mexico and Korea, although the 
Mexican centre has adopted a more active 
stance on dissemination of technical 
information to industry. 
Information centres of both types are 
necessary for the improvement of 
technological capabilities in industry and for 
providing support to the institutions and 
individuals engaged in the performance of 
S& T activities. They constitute a policy 
instrument that cannot be ignored. 
Personnel Training 
A third policy instrument to support S& T 
development is personnel training. Rather 
than being a single instrument that is easy to 
identify, it consists of measures, organizational 
arrangements, policies, planning procedures, 
and so on, that deal with the educational and 
occupational structure of the labour force. Its 
importance for S& T development lies in the 
fact that, in the last analysis, human beings are 
the key resource for, and the main 
depositaries of, advances in sciences and 
technology. 
The two aspects of personnel training 
examined in the STPI project were 
postgraduate education and technical training 
- the system producing scientists, engineers, 
and skilled workers. The STPI study is but a 
taste of the issues involved in the complex 
interactions between S& T development and 
personnel training. 
South Korea has engaged in an ambitious 
program to expand the number of qualified 
scientists and engineers and has emphasized 
the creation and support of universities. The 
South Korean Advanced Institute of Science 
(KAIS) is a prime example. Devoted to the 
training of high-level scientists, during the last 
7 years, it has showed that it is possible to 
create graduate centres of excellence within 
the less-developed countries. 
In India, the electronics sector has 
attempted to work with universities and 
industry to set guidelines for the preparation 
of high-level personnel, considering both the 
quality and content of courses and 
curricula. 
The Peruvian STPI team examined the 
mining industry, and the metalworking firms 
providing machinery and equipment to it, to 
determine the workers' skill requirements. 
They compared the results with the existing 
curricula of mining and mechanical 
engineering schools to identify discrepancies 
and suggest corrective measures. 
Workers' training schemes operate in 
several STPI countries attempting to upgrade 
the skill levels of industrial workers. In 
Mexico, Colombia, Argentina, and Peru, there 
exist networks of training centres supported in 
part by the state and in part by private firms 
through a system of payroll deductions. They 
suffer from a number of ills, such as high 
withdrawal rates, the rudimentary literacy 
level of workers, the low status of skilled and 
semi-skilled occupations, and the deficiencies 
in the training systems and methods 
themselves. In addition, some of the training 
schemes lack an organic connection with 
industry that would ensure jobs for the 
trainees and would translate industrial needs 
into training schemes. 
From the data acquired by the STPI project, 
little can be said in general about the use of 
training as a policy instrument; further analysis 
is clearly needed. 
Consulting and Engineering9 
Consulting and engineering activities in 
STPI countries have been recognized as a vital 
component in the development of local S& T 
capabilities. They can be developed through 
the use of policy instruments, or they can be 
considered as policy instruments in 
themselves. In effect, these organizations can 
9For a more detailed discussion see Anil Malhotra. 
Consulting and Engineering Design Organizations 
in Developing Countries. Ottawa, International 
Development Research Centre. 
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contribute to more efficient purchases of 
technology, better use of indigenous R&D 
results, reduced technical vulnerability, and so 
on. 
The STPI project did not cover the full 
spectrum of consulting and engineering 
activities ( a new project on this subject was 
proposed); however, it did highlight a few 
issues. 
A number of policy instruments can be 
used to stimulate the demand for consulting 
and engineering services and, if compulsory, 
they can immediately and directly effect 
results. In Peru, for example. state financing 
agencies require that a feasibility study 
prepared by a local firm be included in 
investment proposals, substantially increasing 
demand. 
When demand for consulting services is 
stimulated quickly, however, the supply can 
become a bottleneck, particularly because the 
quality of such services may be poor. In other 
words, measures to increase demand must be 
accompanied by upgrading the quality of 
consulting and engineering capabilities. 
There are a variety of policy instruments that 
influence the growth of domestic consulting 
and engineering, such as the registering of 
contracts with foreign consultants, fiscal and 
financial measures to support consulting and 
engineering firms, measures to restrict the 
participation of foreign consulting and 
engineering firms in investment projects, and 
so on. All were identified in the STPI project as 
having potential importance, but their impact 
on the growth of a domestic consulting and 
engineering capacity, and, hence on S&T 
development, was uncertain, requiring 
further study. 
Interaction of Policy Instruments and Context 
The multiplicity of policy instruments 
available to promote the development of 
scientific and technological capabilities 
constitutes part of the complex picture of S& T 
policy implementation. The rest of the picture 
is composed of the context in which policy 
instruments are used. Science and technology 
are at the crossroads of many different 
development objectives, constituting the 
common ground where the impact of a variety 
of policies and policy instruments is felt. In 
addition, science and technology pervade 
many other development sectors so that it 
becomes practically impossible to isolate the 
development of S& T capabilities and to treat it 
independently. 
Many policies and policy instruments that 
have other functions as their raison d'etre 
have a significant impact on science and 
technology; for example, the clusters of policy 
instruments to regulate technology imports 
and to define the pattern of demand for 
technology may have positive or negative 
effects on the development of domestic S& T 
capabilities. In the STPI countries, to date, the 
effects have been mostly negative. 
There is an apparent need to turn the 
experience around, and policymakers for S& T 
development may be tempted to search for 
total coherence among the policy 
instruments, orienting all efforts toward 
enhancing the positive S& T impacts of implicit 
policy instruments. However, total coherence 
is a technocratic illusion, for it ignores the real 
conflicts of interest that emerge within the 
state, that condition the style of policy 
implementation, and that influence strongly 
the design and use of the various policy 
instruments. 
Furthermore, conflicts of interest and their 
reflection on the state apparatus are not the 
only influences in the design, performance, 
and impact of policy instruments, for the 
context created by historical, social, political, 
and economic factors is a strong control. In 
fact, the close interaction between the 
industrialization strategies, the style of policy 
implementation, and the clusters of policy 
instruments indicates that the context 
frequently overrides the impact of policy 
instruments. 
Government intervention to develop local 
S& T capabilities will be effective only when 
action is taken simultaneously to build up an 
infrastructure for the performance of S& T 
activities, to regulate technology imports, to 
define the pattern of demand for S& T 
knowledge, to promote the performance of 
S& T activities in enterprises, and to provide 
support for S& T activities. Although at times 
contextual factors may have a stronger impact 
than the policy instruments in a given cluster, 
their impact cannot be planned or programed, 
and trying to anticipate it by failing to act 
through a particular cluster of instruments 
would be leaving a key area for policy 
intervention to uncontrollable forces. 
Within each of the clusters, there are 
certain policy instruments that, because of 
their nature or their relation to the context 
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within which they operate, have a stronger 
impact than others. It is necessary to identify 
and articulate them so that they may reinforce 
each other and operate together as a driving 
force for S& T development. 
For example, S& T planning and funding, 
foreign investment regulations and import 
controls, industrial financing and state 
purchasing power, compulsory measures for 
the performance of S&T activities in 
enterprises, personnel training, and 
consulting and engineering services appear to 
have a stronger impact on S& T development 
than the other mechanisms in the clusters. 
Their relative weight in affecting S& T decisions 
by industrial enterprises, the extent to which 
other (maybe stronger) objectives prevail over 
their possible use as S& T policy instruments, 
the administrative complexity involved in 
their application, and the opportunity to 
control and influence their operation with 
S& T purposes in mind are some of the reasons 
why. 
Tables 1-5 summarize the policy instruments 
identified by the country teams in the STPI 
project. The list of policy instruments is by no 
means exhaustive for each country 
representing only a subset that was of interest 
to the STPI teams. 
A look at the information and findings from 
Mexico and Colombia illustrates how policy 
instruments interact among themselves and 
with contextual factors. The Mexican case 
demonstrates how policy instruments can be 
redundant, attempting one after another to 
facilitate the operation of industrial firms.10 
For example, any firm in Mexico (up to 49% 
foreign equity participation) has several 
options in securing foreign technology. It may 
seek and obtain credit at preferential interest 
rates from a state financial institution and then 
use the credit to acquire one or several 
machine tools abroad, a procedure permitted 
by the rules of internal operation of various 
financial agencies. It may also acquire the 
machinery by reinvesting profits, deducting 
the cost from income taxes. If it does the 
former, it can deduct the corresponding 
interest from taxable income. 
To import the machinery into the country, 
the firm can obtain a subsidy of 75% of the 
general import tax. Even without a subsidy, the 
i 0ro place this example in context, see the 
remarks made on the Mexican industrialization 
process on page 38 and on the Mexican style of 
policy implementation, page 60. 
Table 1. Infrastructure building in the STPI countries. 
Country Institution Building S& T Planning Financing S& T Other Mechanisms 
Activities 
Argentina National Institute of Permanent national 
Industrial Techno- fund for preinvest-
logy ment studies 
Brazil Basic Plan for S& T Development 
Scientific and Plan; S& T fund of 
Technological the National De-
Development velopment Bank; 




Colombia Industrial Sectorial plans for Research fund of 
Technology S& T development COLCJENCIAS; 
Institute national budgeting 
for S& T; national 
development fund 
(FON ADE) 
Egypt Plans for research 
and development 
India Network of Plan for S& T Import facilities for 
institutions in the development S& T institutes 
electronics industry. 
South Network of Interfacing Funds for S& T 
Korea institutions involved economic with S& T through national 
in S& T activities; plans 
Korean Institute 
of Science and 
Technology 
Mexico Plan for S& T 
development 







Plan for S& T 
development 
machinery is likely to be subject to low tariffs. 
Moreover, procedures for calculating taxable 
income, by allowing greater deductions for 
fixed investment, favour the acquisition of 
more sophisticated, labour-saving machinery. 
Once the machinery is installed, the 
company can apply the depreciation 
coefficients authorized by fiscal legislation for 
calculating the income tax base. In the case of 
machine tools, the normal coefficient is 35%, 
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budget; fund 
est ab I ished by the 
Technology 
Promotion Law 
Special fund for S& T 
of CONACYT; 





ITINTEC and other 
research institutes 
Financing of S& T 
activities through 
government budget 
which permits important deductions during 
the 1st years of the productive life of a 
machine : even once the goods have been 
depreciated from a fiscal point of view, they 
still have a long productive life ahead and can 
be easily sold on the secondhand machinery 
market. The company can then rei nitiate the 
process by acquiring new machinery through 
reinvestment of profits or other sources of 
financial resources. If the firm must reduce 
personnel, the compensation paid to workers 
is deductible for calculating the income tax 
base. 
The firm can also apply for and obtain a 
series of fiscal exemptions under the Decree 
on Decentralization and Industrial Develop-
ment, which protects machinery imports and 
offers 50-100% of the general import tax; up 
to 100% of sales taxes; authorization to 
depreciate investments in machinery and 
equipment in accelerated form (coefficients 
higher than 35%) ; and other incentives. 
Moreover, in addition to these federal 
incentives, the firm can also obtain other 
incentives from local government agencies. 
arrange for the import of competing products 
to be subject to the import permits system. The 
protection thus obtained offers access to the 
national market under extremely 
advantageous conditions that may relegate 
considerations of efficiency and cost 
reduction to second place. 
If the firm is in a position to export, it can 
negotiate for another preferential credit to 
finance its sales abroad and can obtain 
Certificates for Rebate of Indirect Taxes up to 
11% of the value of the transaction. These 
certificates can be used to pay federal taxes 
that are not earmarked for special purposes. 
The company can have access to the 
exemptions through approval of its 
"manufacturing program" and can also 
The firm also receives government subsidies 
through low prices for services or inputs such 
as electric energy, water, oil, and basic 







Table 2. Regulating technology imports. 
I rnport Controls Foreign Invest- Registries of Patent System 
ment Controls Licencing 
Agreements 
Protection of Foreign invest- National registry 
national labour ment law ,of technology 
and production (20.557), decree transfer 
law (20.545), 461/73 
decree 751174 
Tariffs to Foreign capital Registry of National 
regulate control laws licencing Institute of 



















Foreign exchangeRegulations on 
control law foreign 
444/67; collaboration 
regulation of agreements 
foreign capital, 
decree 1900/73 
(decision 24 of the 
Andean Pact); 








Foreign capital Technology 



























Tariff Commission and 
mechanisms; national registry 
import permits; of foreign 










National registry Industrial 
of licencing property law and 
Joint Ventures and 
Technology 
Transfer 
agreements the patent system 
Peru National register Law for the Registry of Industrial 
property regime of manufactures; regulation of licencing 
import permits; foreign agreements 
allocation of investment 18900 (ITINTEC) 
Venezuela 
foreign exchange and 18999 









(decision 24 of 
Andean Pact) 
represent a sizable percentage of the total 
cost, firms may be motivated toward 
technologies that save on their use; however, 
if they are subsidized, there is less incentive to 
conserve. 
The firm can also benefit from other 
instruments: expenditures on commercial 
publicity are deductible from taxable income, 
as are payments for royalties and technical 
assistance, expenditures for research and 
experimental development, tests of materials 
and quality control, management studies, etc., 
with the result that the base for income tax 
calculations is considerably reduced. Thus, 
corporations can benefit from many 
incentives that the state has designed in the 
interest of promoting investment and 
industrialization. Moreover, any firm (up to 
49% foreign participation) can benefit from 
the incentives, regardless of the industrial 
branch in which it operates. 
The cascade of fiscal incentives for Mexican 
industrial firms means that no single policy 
instrument will influence decision-making in 
enterprises. The possible impact from one 
measure is lost amidst the redundant effect of 
the other measures. Under such conditions, 
other sets of policy instruments will have to be 
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Industrial Joint ventures 
property regime in the 
and patent laws petrochemical 
sector 
used to influence technological behaviour 
and will have to be assessed in terms of their 
interaction with policy instruments of a fiscal 
and financial nature. 
The second example, derived from the 
Colombian textile and capital goods 
industries, illustrates how a variety of 
contextual factors and policy instruments 
interact with each other and affect the 
development of S&T capabilities in two 
different branches of industry. 11 The textile 
industry in Colombia is rather old and well -
established with a good entrepreneurial base 
and a relatively large number of efficient firms. 
The firms have enjoyed a certain amount of 
protection for considerable periods but have, 
nevertheless, become competitive in exports. 
Tariffs for the import of textile equipment and 
machinery are very low, but chronic foreign 
exchange shortages and input controls have 
limited the importation of capital goods for 
the textile industry. Furthermore, fiscal 
requirements have forced the linear 
11To place this example in context, see the 
remarks made on Colombian industrialization on 
page 38 and on the Colombian style of policy 


















Industrial promotion laws Corporation for the "Buy Domestic" Law 
(including decentralization); Development of Medium 
state corporations to and Small Enterprises 
promote industrialization 
(corporations of medium and 
small enterprises); 




policies and programs 
Industrial development 
policies and programs 
Industrial programing for the 
electronics industry 
Set of laws to define 
industrialization priorities 
Decentralization of industry 
manufacturing programs; 
Law of New and Necessary 
Industries 
General Law of Industries 
Set of laws to define 
Industrialization priorities 
Special fund for Industrial 
Financing (FINAME); 
subsidiaries of the National 
Development Bank (FIBASE 
for basic inputs, EMBRAMEC 
for capital goods; and 
IBRASA for other sectors); 
Fund for the Modernization 
and Reorganization of 
Industrial Activities; Regional 
and sectorial financing 
agencies 
State enterprises purchasing 
local technology 
Credit lines for purchase 
of local capital goods (IFI); 
credits for agriculture with 
impact on industry 
Array of financial mechanisms 
for industry 
National Fund for Industrial 
Equipment; National Fund for 
Industrial Promotion; Fund 
for the Study and Promotion 
of Industrial Parks and Cities; 
Fund for the Promotion of 
Small and Medium Industries 
Development financing 
corporation; Industrial 
Development Bank; Mining 
Development Bank 
Financial system tor industrial 
development; leasing 
companies for industry 
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coefficient for capital 
goods; tax deduction 
for expenses in 
repairing and recon-
structing machinery; 
fiscal treatment of 
payments for royalties 
Taxation of industrial 
enterprises 
Depreciation of co-
efficient for fixed 
assets; ·fiscal treatment 
of payments for 
royalties; taxation of 
industrial enterprises 
(income taxes) 









Special credit lines for 
the promotion of 
exports 











Export Inspection Law; 
free export districts 
Fund for the promo-
tion of exports of 
manufactured goods 







Table 4. Promoting S& T activities in enterprises. 
Country 
Argentina 
Special Credit Lines 
Special loans for pilot plants 
(National Development Bank) 
Tax Incentives Other Measures 




For S& T activities in 
enterprises 
India For R&D expenditures Administrative facilities for 
S& T activities in enterprises 
South Korea Technological Develop-
ment Promotion Law; 
fund created to support 
S& T activities in industry 
For R&D expenditures in 
industrial enterprises 
Mexico For R&D expenditures in 
industrial enterprises 
Peru ITINTEC system to promote 
S& T activities in enterprises 
depreciation of machinery and equipment in 
10 years and have allowed tax deductions for 
expenditures in repairs and reconstruction of 
machinery. Instead of investing in foreign 
imports, firms have developed highly 
competent repair and maintenance shops and 
have participated in a lively secondhand and 
reconstructed machinery market. They have 
absorbed imported technology and have even 
introduced minor innovations and 
adaptations. 
When the government decided to stimulate 
the growth of an almost nonexistent capital 
goods industry, it gave tax holidays, 
preferential fiscal treatment, credit facilities, 
and other incentives to the firms that moved 
into the capital goods industries. As a result, 
large textile firms that had internal repair, 
maintenance, and reconstruction capabilities 
profited from turning their workshops into 
independent machine shops. An incipient 
capital goods industry emerged for textiles but 
did not expand to other areas because of the 
low tariffs for capital goods imports and the 
lack of credit or other mechanisms to 
encourage the purchase of local machinery 
and equipment. 
The Colombian experience spotlights some 
interesting interactions. The two fiscal policy 
instruments, low depreciation rates and tax 
deductions for machinery repair and 
reconstruction, only elicited a positive impact 
on local S& T capabilities when a contextual 
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factor, the scarcity of foreign exchange and 
the consequent limitations in machinery 
imports, made them relevant. The scarcity of 
foreign exchange and the import controls 
associated with ft effectively neutralized the 
low tariffs on imports of capital goods and, 
combined with policy instruments, stimulated 
firms to develop their own machinery repair 
and reconstruction capacity. Furthermore, 
another contextual factor, the long tradition 
of the textile industry and its good 
entrepreneurial and technical base, made it 
possible for the firms to develop this capacity. 
Another set of contextual factors came into 
play in the textile industry. The fiscal measures 
put into effect by the government and the 
scarcity of foreign exchange did not have the 
same impact on industrial branches where 
machinery did not play an important role in 
the productive process (e.g., the 
pharmaceutical industry) or where it was so 
specialized that there was little scope for 
major repair and reconstruction activities 
(e.g., petrochemicals, automotive). In other 
words, the contributing factors were the set of 
policy instruments that operate at the level of 
the economy, the policy instruments 
employed by the state at the sectorial level, 
and the particular technological and econom-
ic characteristics of the industrial branch. 
The Mexican and Colombian cases both 
illustrate the dangers involved in making 
general recommendations on the use of policy 









Institute for Materials 
Rationalization) 
Technical Information Manpower Training 
Systems 






Fund for Reinvestment 
Studies; Buy Domestic 




Brazil Institute of 
Bibliography and 
Documentation 
Funds for supporting Financing of studies 
training activities and projects (FINEP) 
(FUNTEC and others) 
Colombia National Council of 
Technical Standards; 











Weights and Measures 
Law; Export Inspection 
Law 
National Apprentice- National Fund for 
ship Service Pre-investment Studies 
(FON ADE) 
National Information Manpower training for 
Center for the the electronics industry 
Electronics Industry 
Korea Scientific and Korea Advanced 
Technical Information Institute of Science 






Mexico Technical standards 
system 
Fund for Technical 
Information for 
Industry (INFOTEC) 
Centers of industrial National fund for 
and technical training pre-investment studies 
Peru Technical norms; 
standards 
Venezuela Technical norms; 
quality control 
instruments. The impact of fiscal incentives, of 
import controls, of financial mechanisms, and 
of other policy instruments will vary according 
to the way they interact with each other and 
with contextual factors. Although the 
exampl es have been taken from two specific 
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Educational reform Development 
with emphasis on Financing Corporation 
S& T training; National 
Service of Technical 
Training for Industry 
(SENA Tl) 
policy clusters, the same caveat applies to 
other policy instruments. Prescriptions on the 
use and impact of policy instruments must be 
examined and reinterpreted within context. In 
fact, there is no substitute for a thorough 
understanding of the specific local situation. 
Chapter 4 
Policy Instruments and Technical 
Change in Industry 
Industrial S&T capabilities are the 
aggregation of capabilities in enterprises, 
research centres, engineering firms, etc., and 
cannot be developed if the only perspective 
taken into account is that of policymakers and 
government agencies. Policy instruments 
must also be viewed from the perspective of 
decision-makers within industrial enterprises. 
This exercise requires an analysis of the 
factors that influence technical decision-
making and technical change in industrial 
branches and enterprises, with the aim of 
identifying and separating the influence of 
policy instruments (explicit and implicit) from 
that of contextual factors (within the 
economy, industrial branch, and firm). 
Because of the variety of sources of influence 
and the lack of well-accepted theories of 
technical change in the less-developed 
countries, the task is most difficult. 
The methodological guidelines of the STPI 
project offered an initial conceptualization of 
technological decisions. The country teams 
introduced modifications, and the concept 
was expanded to include technical change 
and the diffusion of innovations. Technical 
change is the manifestation of improved S& T 
capabilities, and conversely, improved S& T 
capacity in industrial firms, research centres, 
engineering firms, etc. is a prerequisite to 
technical change. 
The study of technical change and the 
factors that influence it in several industrial 
branches was one of the last tasks to be 
undertaken in the STPI project. Because of 
time limitations, the diverging views were not 
contrasted and examined with sufficient 
depth, and a heterogeneity of approaches and 
points of view resulted, militating against 
general conclusions. 
Because of their diversity, the STPI studies 
on technical change in industry do not lend 
themselves to interpretation according to a 
rigorous concept of "technical change," 
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applied a pos'teriori. Among other things, they 
differ in their depth of analysis. Those that 
clearly differentiated the concepts were less 
descriptive and more analytical than were 
others. 
Levels of Analysis 
There were three levels of analysis: the 
examination of patterns of technical change in 
an industrial branch, such as the Korean 
powder metallurgy industry and the Indian 
electronics industry; the analysis of 
technological behaviour of enterprises, such 
as the agricultural implements firms in 
Colombia and state enterprises in Brazil, 
focusing on the technological implications 
and determinants of a firm's decisions; and 
specific study of the direction and pace of 
technical change. 
Each level involves a higher degree of 
specificity, concreteness, and insight than the 
preceding one. They are roughly equivalent to 
approaches at the branch, enterprise, and 
plant level, respectively. The second and third 
levels include both internal industry studies 
and case studies of state enterprises. Case 
studies of specific innovations also fall within 
the third level. Each of the country studies 
focuses mainly on one level of analysis but 
usually covers aspects that are relevant to 
more than one. 
In retrospect, it seems the STPI studies on 
technical change would have benefited from 
conceptual refinements and clarifications. 
Most of the studies centred upon external 
sources of technology, implying that firms' 
efforts at generating and modifying 
technology were not systematically 
investigated; that the analytical framework 
advanced in some reports was not sufficiently 
explored in the empirical studies; and thatthe 
analyses of policy instruments focused mainly 
on investment decisions to establish or expand 
productive facilities rather than on the use of 
existing capacity and the S& T activities 
associated with the operation and gradual 
improvement of production technology in an 
enterprise. 
In general, S& T policy instruments acted in 
concert with other factors to influence 
technical change and the development of S& T 
capabilities. Their impact is almost impossible 
to separate from that of the other sources of 
influence. Nevertheless, in many instances it is 
possible to identify and appreciate their role in 
shaping technological decision-making by 
enterprises and the growth of a domestic S& T 
capacity and at the same time to obtain 
valuable insights to guide further research and 
policymaking. 
Toward a Framework for Study 
The studies suggest the existence of certain 
"key paths" or "sequences" that link the 
sources of influence at the overall or 
macroeconomic level with technological 
behaviour at the microeconomic level (within 
firms). Policy instruments, both implicit and 
explicit, intervene in the sequences as one of 
the sources of influence. The sequences 
produce patterns of technological behaviour 
in firms; if they remain in existence for some 
time, they may bring about changes in the 
technological base of industrial branches or 
even of other industries. 
The recognition, identification, and clear 
understanding of the sequences is needed to 
reinforce or offset the effects of contextual 
factors and implicit policies. At times, there 
may be little room for flexibility in the design 
of economic and industrial policies, and a 
knowledge of the sequences may introduce a 
certain degree of independence and 
autonomy in S& T matters, increasing the 
freedom within overall government policy. 
S&T policies may even have implicit 
nontechnological effects, which can be 
anticipated through study of the sequences. 
The identification and understanding of the 
sequences would also reduce uncertainties 
that plague the design and use of S& T policy 
instruments. 
The policy instruments and the key 
sequences operate in substantially different 
ways during periods of economic expansion 
or recession and are affected by the degree of 
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economic fluctuations (slight or accentuated), 
and by the long-term growth rates. Two 
hypothetical cases, based on conditions found 
in the STPI countries, illustrate the sway of the 
economy. 
In a country characterized by chronic 
balance of payments difficulties, a deficit in 
import capacity, and low long-term rates of 
economic growth, it could be difficu It to 
increase foreign indebtedness. The most likely 
economic policy measures would be to 
devalue the currency in a move to improve 
relative prices for export goods; to impose 
restrictions on imports; to raise interest rates 
to stimulate savings; and to introduce tax 
measures to postpone investments in plants 
and equipment. 
These measures would have some clear side 
effects. First, a devaluation increases current 
import prices and the burden of outstanding 
debts in foreign currencies. It also reduces 
domestic wages in comparison with those in 
foreign countries. The import restrictions, 
coupled with tax measures designed to 
discourage investment, reduce the rate of 
equipment renewals and additions, and the 
increase in interest rates will make capital 
more expensive and labour relatively cheaper. 
The resulting economic environment will 
encourage industrial firms to lengthen the 
average life of their equipment; to take full 
advantage of their available physical assets; to 
stretch plant capacity as much as possible and 
avoid the need for capital investments; and to 
look for ways of taking b~tter advantage of by-
products. 
Under different economic circumstances -
for instance, where a high rate of growth is 
expected, investment is promising, and 
foreign exchange is readily available - the 
policies and the firms' reactions would vary 
accordingly. Import restrictions would be 
lifted, accelerated depreciation regimes 
would be allowed, access to capital would not 
be very difficult or costly, and labour would be 
more expensive because of successful trade 
union pressures. The firms would likely 
undertake rapid expansion and investment 
programs that involve substantial additions to 
plant and equipment; they would also 
demand engineering services for the 
installation of new equipment rather than for 
improvement of old, and would launch new 
product lines in view of expanding market 
prospects. 
The side effect of price controls in 
encouraging unit cost reductions by means of 
plant engineering, process optimization, and 
other in-house S& T activities, is likely to be far 
greater in the first example than in the second. 
In the former, the firms would be pressured to 
undertake cost-reducing programs, whereas 
in the latter, they would be actively engaged in 
the introduction of new products that would 
make it easier to circumvent price controls. 
Similarly, depreciation rates and tax measures 
that encourage S& T activities to improve plant 
utilization, foster repair and maintenance 
activities, and stimulate the reconstruction of 
machinery are likely to have a greater impact 
in the first situation. 
The purchasing power of state enterprises is 
also more influential during economic 
conditions described in the first example. In 
the second example, both private and state 
enterprises are actively engaged in new 
investment, thus diminishing the relative 
weight of the state's purchasing power and 
increasing the competition and risks involved 
in choosing technology suppliers. As a result, 
the enterprises are more apt to purchase 
foreign technology than to invest in domestic 
S& T capabilities. 
On the other hand, policy measures 
designed to develop local engineering skills 
are likely to be weaker under the first set of 
conditions when firms will tend to rely on their 
own internal S& T skills. 
Finally, because of the greater tendency to 
rely on external S&T inputs during an 
expansion phase, measures to promote 
contract research are likely to have a greater 
impact under the second set of conditions 
than under the first. 
These examples highlight the interplay 
between macroeconomic conditions, 
economic and S& T policy instruments, and 
technological behaviour at the firm level. But 
there are two additional sets of conditioning 
factors that must be taken into account when 
examining the sequences of macro-micro 
interactions that influence the development 
of S&T capabilities. The first is the 
characteristics of the industrial branch, and 
the second, the characteristics of the firm. 
Among the characteristics of industrial 
branches that require particular attention are 
whether productive activities are in the hands 
of a few people or firms, how the branch is 
structured, how the firms compete, and how 
sophisticated is the technology associated 
with the industrial branch. In effect, the 
impact of macroeconomic circumstances and 
various policy measures may depend on 
91 
whether the firm belongs to a branch of 
industry where investments in fixed assets are 
of paramount importance (petrochemicals, 
fertilizers, steel) or where they are relatively 
less important (food processing, metal-
working); whether price competition plays an 
important role or is discouraged; whether 
technology is freely available or controlled by 
a few technology suppliers; etc. Finally, the 
characteristics of the enterprise itself 
-whether it is private, foreign, or state-
owned; whether it is large or small; whether it 
has a good entrepreneurial base or not - also 
filter and modify the impact of contextual 
factors and policy instruments. 
Therefore, the sequences of macro-micro 
interactions involve a variety of sources of 
influence ranging from broad macroecono-
mic conditions to specific characteristics of the 
firm, and the impact of policy instruments to 
foster the development of S& T capabilities has 
to be examined from the perspective of their 
place and relative weight within the 
sequences. Although S& T policies cannot be 
designed and operated just to influence a 
particular firm, they can be designed to 
correspond to a limited number of key 
sequences. The studies in the STPI project 
indicate that the sequences and the roles of 
policy instruments within them are most 
appropriately studied at the industrial branch 
level. 
STPI Studies on Technical Change 
The STPI studies on technical change and 
S& T development at the branch level were 
diverse in content and methods (Table 6), 
although they roughly fall into three 
categories: industrial-technological studies at 
the branch level; studies of technological 
behaviour of enterprises; and specific studies 
of technical change. 
One feature common to the manufacturing 
branches examined in the industrial-techno-
logical studies is the stratified nature of the 
market, i.e., the coexistence of different sizes 
and ages of firms, vintages of technology, 
ownership structure, and so on. The 
technological behaviour of the firms 
belonging to different strata is particularly 
varied, as is the impact of different S& T policy 
i nstru men ts. 
Table 6. Selected studies on technical change conducted in the STPI project. 
Bra~il 
;Spe~ific St4di~$ oi.Te\'hnical 
· ·· th~11ge 
Case studles on the diffusion 
of lnnoyati<ms (textiles, paper, 
~me.nt indl.l~tries) · 
~~h~~i:our cit 
.. 1mple"11eh(fi rms; 
aLbenaviour of/ 
fe~Jli.ze.~s 1 ni;jusu~y ... 
India 
··Cas~i~i~~~ elf tltlpa~~;of .. · .. 
frani~~th~:11al co~p6r.atjol'1s' 
orite~~nt,l1'~it ... 1:,' > · 
. .Qrientation of technical 
change in the capital goods, 
petrochemical, .food 
Powd~r rn~t~llurgy ...... . 
.df!~ef <it>ittenr · · · l.ndustries · 
"' ,', , 
Ven.ez9ela c~ .. pitaf'.;go9~s . . 
In broad terms, the firms serving export 
markets or the needs of higher income groups 
tend to be larger, more specialized, and 
technologically more sophisticated than are 
the others. They also tend to have greater 
involvement of foreign capital and to be 
relatively more efficient in scale of 
production. In contrast, firms supplying lower 
quality goods, primarily for the strata of the 
domestic market with lower income levels, are 
usually small or intermediate, versatile, and 
locally owned. They rely on foreign tech-
nology inputs to a lesser extent than do 
their larger counterparts, and they may 
undertake some routine S& T activities on their 
own. 
An exception is the electronics industry in 
India: through state intervention and policy 
measures, small firms have been able to enter 
and remain in market segments that otherwise 
would be dominated by large, usually foreign, 
firms. 
In Venezuela, the study on capital goods 
points out that small firms producing under 
order may require more sophisticated 
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. Atypical cases o.n i!lriovation 
technical skills than larger firms engaged in 
standardized production. It may be inferred, 
then, that technological constraints do not 
necessitate large firms - or their attendant 
market control. 
In Colombia, the agricultural implements 
branch is relatively easy to enter. Firms can be 
small but still have relatively free access to 
technology inputs that require only 
engineering efforts of a simple type. For these 
reasons, the branch has a low degree of 
concentration, and firms are largely locally 
owned. The firms compete mainly on the basis 
of product innovations (new types of 
implements) and distribution networks. 
In contrast, the fertilizer industry in 
Colombia is more difficult to enter. It is open 
mainly to large firms with abundant financial 
resources, and its technology inputs are 
largely controlled by equipment suppliers. 
Thus, the market is highly concentrated, and 
state and foreign-owned firms play an 
important role in it. Technological decisions 
about operations are mainly aimed at cost 
reductions, demanding repair, maintenance, 
and trouble-shooting skills. Furthermore, the 
focus on cost reductions is sharpened by 
government price controls and product 
standards that limit competition in price and 
product differentiation. 
As a matter of fact, there is little price com-
petition in the STPI countries. Competition 
revolves around controls of distribution 
channels (e.g., among the larger firms 
in the Brazilian textile industry); around 
product design skills (e.g., in the Korean 
powder metallurgy and the Colombian 
agricultural implements industries); or around 
access to know-how (e.g., in the steel and 
petrochemical industries in STPI countries). 
Competition is characterized by heavy 
reliance on product design skills, financial 
resources, fairly advanced knowledge of 
customers' requirements, control over 
distribution networks, and preferential access 
to technology. The STPI studies indicate that 
the patterns are especially prevalent when 
industrial modernization, often by means of 
import substitution strategies, is intensified, 
and progress is achieved in the vertical 
integration of industry. The studies also 
indicate that these patterns of competition 
erect the most effective barriers to entry faced 
by local small and medium-sized firms, 
particularly in branches that require stringent 
process and product specifications and 
management controls. 
Again, only in India are the entry barriers 
offset. Institutional devices, such as forcing 
foreign-controlled firms to direct a high 
proportion of sales to foreign markets, place 
local and foreign-controlled firms on more 
equal footing in the domestic market. 
All the studies portrayed fairly concentrated 
and differentiated oligopolies where price 
competition played a minor role-if any at all. 
The picture was most exaggerated when it 
included price controls imposed by the state, 
ruling out price competition altogether with 
foreign technology inputs acting as substitutes 
for innovative skills. 
Several studies (machine-tools in Argentina, 
capital goods in Venezuela, agricultural 
implements in Colombia) delineated the 
importance of trade and distribution agents in 
conveying technical information to firms from 
capital goods and material input suppliers, as 
well as from customers. In some instances, the 
agents even control supplies of technical 
services such as installation and starting up of 
equipment, as well as repair, maintenance, 
and reconditioning services. They also advise 
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on the choice of techniques, encourage 
technical updating, and, in general, affect the 
pace and orientation of the diffusion process 
in fields, such as metalworking, capital goods, 
and electronics. 
Also, some studies described the demise of 
traditional artisan skills as the industrialization 
process advances. Technical skills inherited 
from the cumulative experience of repair and 
maintenance shops and acquired through the 
empirical use of ingenuity in tackling 
problems played an important role during the 
first stages of development of domestic 
industry; however, they were gradually 
excluded by the increasingly stringent 
technical requirements posed by foreign-
owned or controlled firms; the need to enter 
and develop export markets; and the internal 
competitive conditions that emphasize access 
to foreign technology inputs. The resulting 
disappearance of skills and culture may be 
regarded as a social loss but is hardly 
considered when economic policies are 
geared to modernizing industry. 
Another feature highlighted by the STPI 
studies is that vertical links - i.e., the way in 
which a given branch is articulated with the 
rest of industry - strongly influence the pace 
and direction of technical change. Most of the 
studies agreed in this respect, pointing out 
that the standards demanded by industrial 
firms, particularly foreign-controlled firms, 
for their inputs have an important effect on 
the pace and orientation of technical change 
in supplying firms. When the industrial 
customers require high quality, they often 
hesitate to trust local firms. Only the larger and 
more technically competent firms, which 
usually rely on foreign technology inputs, can 
afford to upgrade their product quality and 
develop testing and innovative skills. 
The size of the market and the demand 
instabilities also have emerged clearly as 
affecting, not only the rate of technical 
improvement, but also the choice of 
technologies to ensure versatility in plant, 
machinery, and equipment. When there is a 
small and erratic demand, firms serve 
diversified tastes and produce a wide range of 
products. Firms look for versatile techniques 
both when making new investments and when 
adapting existing equipment to functions 
other than those originally contemplated. The 
policy instruments - for example, the 
state's purchasing power - that define the 
demand for technology are highly relevant in 
this regard, for they can create incentives for 
higher specialization and can help firms to 
avoid continuous shifts from one line of 
production to another. 
Almost all studies viewed the import 
substitution industrialization policies as 
important in generating demand for 
technology but acknowledged that these 
policies are seldom used for developing the 
local S& T capacity. Biases toward balance of 
payments and other nontechnological 
objectives, little selectivity, and lack of 
awareness of the technological consequences 
have been identified as reasons. In addition, 
the STPI studies pointed out the lack of 
relevance of domestic scientific and 
technological institutions for tackling the 
technc!ogical problems of industry. 
State Enterprises 
The studies focused separately on technical 
change in state enterprises, noting that profit 
maximization is not the only objective of state 
enterprises. An equally important goal is 
encouraging and creating better conditions 
for industrial growth. For this reason, the 
technological behaviour of state enterprises 
cannot be explained in terms of the variables 
applied to private firms. The conflicts that 
emerge between profit-making and social 
welfare, as well as the way in which they are 
resolved, condition to a large extent the 
possible impact of state enterprises on S& T 
development. These observations and a few 
issues associated with them emerge clearly 
from the STPI studies on the technological 
behaviour of state enterprises. 
Private· and state enterprises have at least 
one thing in common - the market - that 
markedly affects their technological 
behaviour, especially the way they articulate 
with suppliers and consumers. If an enterprise 
serves an atomized market, it may, within the 
constraints imposed by government 
authorities, exert strong pressures to raise the 
price of its products. On the other hand, if the 
market is highly concentrated, the buyers 
enjoy substantial bargaining power. Examples 
of both situations are found in the Brazilian 
studies. In power generation, state enterprises 
are able to impose a policy of differential 
tariffs (with higher rates for residential 
consumption), but in flat steel products, state 
enterprises find it difficult to manipulate 
prices because of the organization and 
bargaining power of consumer firms. 
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The pattern of finance - related, in turn, to 
pricing policies - has been singled out by all 
studies as the main determinant in the 
technological behaviour of state enterprises. 
The interrelations among finance, pricing pol-
icies, and technological behaviour are, how-
ever, far from being simple. For example, price 
controls on state enterprises may endanger 
their capacity to generate financial resources 
internally, forcing them to rely upon resource 
transfers from the government's budget or 
from foreign sources. Heavy reliance upon 
budgetary transfers may restrict an 
enterprise's autonomy, discouraging its plans 
to enhance its technological capabilities. In 
contrast, heavy reliance on foreign sources 
may be incompatible with low profit or 
unprofitable operations and lead an 
enterprise to pay attention mainly to 
short-term performance criteria. Foreign 
sources of finance often tie the supply of 
machinery, equipment, and engineering 
services, leaving little room for the local 
provision of inputs. To avoid indebtedness, 
state enterprises sometimes prefer package 
investment deals with rapid and secure results 
and engage in restrictive wage and personnel 
policies. 
When a state enterprise relies mainly on 
self-generated resources to finance its 
expansion programs, it usually has more room 
for maneuver in the choice of equipment 
suppliers. It may increase its purchases of local 
technological inputs and build up its own S& T 
capabilities to increase productivity and, 
hence, its financial resources. 
The Argentine, Venezuelan, and South 
Korean studies on state enterprises showed 
the underlying, long-term process of learning. 
They revealed that learning is not exclusively a 
product of success but can also be produced 
through failure (although the social costs in 
failure cannot be ignored). They also showed 
that the approach taken by state enterprises is 
substantially altered when undertaking 
projects that involve sharp discontinuities in 
the learning process, such as those that 
require going far beyond routine expansion 
programs when undertaking new ventures 
(e.g., the General Cerry ethane plant by "Gas 
del Estado" in Argentina). The studies also 
revealed that technological considerations 
become secondary when emphasis is placed 
on fast completion of import substitution 
projects. Evidence from Venezuela strongly 
supports th is assertion. 
Technical Change: the specifics 
Some of the STPI studies looked specifically 
at technical change and the factors that 
influence it. First, there were studies 
examining a wide array of innovations 
concerning processes, products, and 
materials; second, there were those centring 
on diffusion of single process innovations; and 
third, were those examining the main factors 
that affect technical change in various 
branches of industry. The first group 
comprised the Mexican studies on the capital 
goods, petrochemicals, and food processing 
industries; the second, the Brazilian studies on 
textiles, paper, and cement; and the third, the 
Colombian studies on agricultural 
implements, fertilizers, and food products. 
The Mexican team tried to go beyond the 
formal categories of "technological decision." 
They did not focus on a single innovation in 
the industrial branches because the diffusion 
of specific innovations was not the matter of 
concern. Instead, they concentrated on 
changes in process, product, and materials 
technology. 
They considered cost-reducing changes; 
product differentiation and diversification; 
adaptation of production technology to factor 
endowment; adaptation of production 
technology to size of market; adaptations to 
local materials and in puts; and adaptation of 
product technology to local "consumer 
preferences." In a sense, the lastthreetypes of 
changes are specific examples of the first two. 
However, given the importance that 
technology adaptation has for an economy 
relying heavily on imports of foreign 
technology, these technical changes were 
examined separately. 
The teams identified several structural 
characteristics of the branch that affected 
technical change: 
• Degree of concentration (i.e., volume of 
production or fixed assets controlled by the 
top four firms in each branch); 
• Foreign investment (presence of multi-
national firms); 
• Distribution by sizes of firms; 
• Capital-output, capital-labour, and lab-
our-output ratios; 
• Predominant channels of competition 
(prices, product diversification, cost 
reduction, marketing, etc.); and 
• Size of market and barriers to entry. 
Characteristics of the enterprise that 
appeared to affect technical change included: 
95 
• Ownership; 
• Size (by number of workers, by fixed 
assets); 
• Regional location; and 
• Volume of exports. 
The nature of production technology was 
considered as part of the characteristics of the 
industrial branches and intimately related to 
the capital-output and capital-labour ratios. 
The distinction was made between continuous 
flow, intermittent (or batch), and discrete 
processes. Continuous flow, as its name 
indicates, means that raw materials and other 
inputs cannot be divided into separate units, 
distinguishable from one another. Therefore, 
in order to transport these materials from one 
reactor or recipient to another, heavier 
outlays of equipment (tubes and piping, 
conveyer belts, etc.) are required. The 
intermittent processes are characterized by 
the fact that the physico-chemical reactions 
can take place in containers that can be 
charged and discharged; outlays may be 
smaller and there exists more flexibility forthe 
use of labour. Finally, the discrete processes 
are those in which raw materials, intermediate 
goods, and final products are distinguishable 
from one another and can be manipulated 
separately. Of course, some processes 
combine two or more features at one stage or 
another: for example, dairy products like 
cheese start as a continuous flow process and 
end as a discrete process with clearly 
distinguishable units. These characteristics are 
closely related to scales of production also, 
since an intermittent process may be feasible 
at small scales, and continuous flow obviously 
requires greater scales of production. 
During the STPI studies, it was postulated 
that the processes condition certain technical 
changes. For example, discrete processes have 
a higher elasticity of substitution between 
capital and labour than do continuous flow 
processes. However, the changes were 
dictated not only by the technical 
characteristics of the process but also by the 
characteristics of the branches and 
enterprises. 
The Mexican studies identified significant 
process innovations, which were linked to the 
scale of production within the innovating firm, 
size of the market served, and demand 
structure. A constant trend toward higher 
automation by larger firms was identified in all 
the lines of capital goods examined: machine-
tools, agricultural machinery and implements, 
and construction machinery. The size of the 
market was singled out as the key to product 
innovations and to changes in the output mix 
of the firms: the larger the market, the greater 
the scope for specialization, which is usually 
rather narrow. Incentives to produce capital 
goods also appear to have played a role. 
Output mix flexibility is related to strong 
cyclical variations in demand vis-a-vis the 
need to keep certain minimum margins of 
capacity utilization. 
Agricultural machinery producers are an 
exception to the general trend of output mix 
diversification, because they have standard 
product lines that lend themselves more to 
product adaptation than to changes in 
product mix. The optional features available 
may be considered as a means of diversifying 
the product. The product adaptations in this 
branch are intended as a non-price 
competitive device and are stimulated, in part, 
by price controls. 
Efforts to adapt materials and inputs do not 
appear to have brought about changes in 
process and product technology. The STPI 
studies found that changes in the 
specifications of material inputs were 
compatible with the initial process and 
product technologies that had different 
material inputs specifications. A provisional 
hypothesis, which was corroborated, was that 
the use of continuous processes in the 
petrochemical industry effectively blocked 
capital-labour substitution. 
Analysis of more than 20 policy instruments 
showed that they seldom affect the main 
orientations of technical change. The general 
conclusion was that the dynamics of the 
branch in which firms are operating and, to a 
lesser extent, the characteristics of the firms 
and the type of process being used (although, 
in fact, this last element can be considered as a 
characteristic of the branch) are responsible 
for intensified use of capital and adaptation 
and diversification of products. 
A look at individual policy instruments, 
however, shows some interesting facts. 
Although effects may be negligible, at times 
they may mean significant fiscal sacrifices for 
the state.12 Many are unnecessary and 
irrelevant. For example, the Registry of 
Transfer of Technology has no relevance to 
food industries because they are linked to 
suppliers of technology through the purchase 
of machinery and equipment, not through 
12See the Mexican case of redundancy of policy 
instruments page 81. 
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licencing or technical assistance agreements. 
Patents may have a role to play in some 
petrochemical processes, less importance in 
the capital goods industries, and almost no 
importance to the food industries; however, 
trademarks play a key role in food industries 
(where product differentiation is very 
important) and have no relevance in the 
petrochemical industries (where product 
specifications are more important). 
Trademarks of capital goods may influence a 
buyer's choice but are not usually as important 
as product performance. 
Depreciation coefficients also have 
differential effects. The high coefficients 
allowed for machine tools have encouraged 
much speculation and have stimulated the 
imports of capital goods that are later sold in 
the secondhand machinery market. 
Social charges (social security, unemploy-
ment benefits, training schemes, etc.) and 
other instruments normally considered to 
"increase the cost of labour" (and therefore 
promote the selection of capital-intensive 
techniques) were found to increase labour 
costs by only around 15%. It is difficult to 
conclude that this increment is responsible for 
orienting choice of techniques in one direc-
tion or another, and, in fact, labour costs were 
mentioned in a very limited number of cases 
by the firms that were studied. Clearly, the 
move toward capital-intensive methods is due 
to more complex reasons than the simple 
"rise" in labour costs. 
Some fiscal incentives have proved to be 
unnecessary state sacrifices. For instance, the 
Decree for Industrial Development and 
Decentralization, which offers incentives to 
firms decentralizing their operations, does not 
have any impact on firms but cuts back the 
state's revenue. Some firms must locate in 
highly developed areas near markets or 
supplies of intermediate inputs (capital goods 
producers), whereas others must locate in 
less-developed areas to be close to the sources 
of raw materials (food processing plants). 
Brazil 
The studies on technical change conducted 
by the Brazilian team traced single process 
innovations embodied in particular pieces of 
equipment. They distinguished between a 
firm's choice of techniques and a branch's 
acceptance of techniques, the latter resulting 
when a technique has been introduced into a 
branch and diffused among the firms. The 
studies showed that diffusion of innovations is 
associated with market structure and conduct, 
the characteristics of the firms, and the specific 
nature of the innovation. 
In the textile industry, different behavioural 
and structural features, such as slow 
modernization, sparse radical innovations, 
process discontinuity, diverse degrees of 
market power associated with locationa I 
factors, product differentiation, and ease of 
entry, led to an accentuated heterogeneity in 
the industry profile. This contributed to the 
uneven diffusion of innovations such as the 
shuttleless loom. In STPI, it was found that the 
patterns of diffusion are related more to the 
structu ra I and behavioural characteristics of 
the textile industry than to the innovation. 
The study of the diffusion of special presses 
in the Brazilian paper industry found that the 
decision to adopt an innovation was 
influenced mainly by the technical 
requirements imposed by the production 
process. In contrast to the shuttleless loom, 
the diffusion of the special presses was little 
affected by market structure and enterprise 
behavioural traits. 
The other study on diffusion concerned that 
of the dry process in the cement industry. It 
explained diffusion in terms of the 
technicalities of the innovation (the extent to 
which it could actually be introduced) and 
market structure and behaviour (the firms' 
propensity to adopt the innovation). Other 
influential factors were the concentration of 
technology supply in the hands of one large 
firm and the Brazilian National Development 
Bank's decision not to finance expansions of 
existing plants or new plants that did not use 
the dry process. 
Colombia 
The Colombian studies on technical 
change at the industrial branch level sought 
to identify the dominant patterns of 
technological behaviour. They determined 
whether an enterprise was mainly involved 
in product diversification to increase its 
market share or in plant modifications to 
reduce costs. They also examined behaviour 
in terms of the significance of the different 
S& T activities (research and development, 
reverse engineering, product design, 
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etc.). The idea was to determine how the 
various influences condition the impact of 
policy instruments. 
Three categories of factors were found 
relevant: the technological characteristics of 
the branch; the structural, mainly economic, 
characteristics of the branch; and the 
characteristics of the dominant enterprises. 
The three categories were considered 
simultaneously because of the high degree of 
interaction among them. Taken together, they 
produce a particular pattern of technological 
behaviour and decide the possibilities for the 
development of local S& T capabilities in 
different branches. 
For operational and conceptual reasons, the 
studies examined the technological 
characteristics of industrial branches as the 
starting point. They postulated five ways of 
incorporating technology into the productive 
processes: through process and operations 
specifications; through plant and equipment; 
through product specifications; through raw 
materials and inputs; and through personnel. 
Although all five ways intervene in all 
productive activities, one of them may play a 
dominant role in a particular industrial 
branch. For example, the agricultural 
implements industry was considered as one 
where product design and specifications 
constituted the main channel for 
incorporating technology into production. 
The branch was characterized by small and 
medium-sized enterprises and a high degree 
of competition. The barriers to entry were not 
very significant: modest investments were 
required, access to technology was not 
restricted (product designs were rather easily 
copied), and raw materials were readily 
available. The local market is relatively small, 
and customers are dispersed, demanding a 
large variety of products. Thus, marketing and 
distribution mechanisms play an important 
role in the branch. The firms compete mainly 
by diversifying products and adopting new 
designs. Enterprises are very sensitive to policy 
instruments related to credit for the 
commercialization of their products, as well as 
protective tariffs and measures designed to 
encourage exports. On the other hand, they 
show little sensitivity to fiscal policy 
instruments, price controls, or financial 
measures. 
In the fertilizer industry, technology is 
incorporated into production mainly through 
investment in plant and equipment, including 
the basic engineering integrated into the plant 
layout and the technology embodied in 
machinery and equipment. Fixed assets in the 
branch require large investments and have a 
cost structure in which their depreciation and 
interest payments play an important role. The 
structure of production in the branch is highly 
concentrated, and the important barriers to 
entry are high investments. Access to process 
know-how and equipment is relatively easy. 
Under these conditions, firms compete 
mainly by reducing their costs; product 
diversification is almost nonexistent. The firms 
in this branch are highly sensitive to policy 
instruments that provide credit for 
investments in fixed assets and that allow tax 
exemptions and establish depreciation rates. 
They are also highly sensitive to price controls. 
On the other hand, credit mechanisms for 
product commercialization, the registration of 
licencing agreements, and export promotion 
measures are less important. 
The Colombian pesticides industry is 
characterized by the use of imported raw 
materials and inputs that incorporate 
technology to a high degree and by the 
extensive use of licencing agreements. The 
process specifications are relatively simple as is 
equipment. Production is not concentrated, 
·even though barriers to entry are very high, 
reflecting the dependence on inputs 
protected by patents and secret know-how 
and the high obsolescence of products. The 
firms providing raw materials and inputs are 
few, and the possibilities of vertical integration 
98 
for local firms are severely limited. Foreign 
investment plays a major role. 
Under these conditions, the competition 
strategy of the firms is based on access to 
licencing agreements and to the import of raw 
materials and inputs. Financial, fiscal, and 
export promotion mechanisms have 
practically no impact on the technological 
behaviour of firms in the pesticides industry, 
whereas mechanisms such as the registry of 
licencing agreements, import controls, and 
price controls are particularly influential. In 
general, protectionist measures also have an 
important impact on the firms in this branch, 
because they are responsible for creating a 
local market. 
The diversity of approaches to the study of 
technical change in the STPI countries is an 
indication that there are several different ways 
of assessing the impact of policy instruments 
on technical change and on the development 
of domestic S&T capabilities. In any event, one 
conclusion that can be derived from the STPI 
studies of technical change is that the 
technological characteristics of the branch, 
the structure of the branch, and the nature of 
the dominant firms in each of the branches are 
major determinants of technical change. 
Combinations of these three factors need to 
be investigated within a specific economic, 
industrial, and S& T context and a given style of 
government to identify the most effective 
policy instruments. The research in STPI 
pointed in some directions that may lead to a 
better understanding of the phenomena. 
Chapter 5 
Conclusions and Suggestions for Further Research 
There is no adequate way of summarizing 
the research results obtained in the STPI 
project. Furthermore, some results are 
especially difficult to capture and convey 
through written reports, because they are in-
tangible, coming from the close interaction 
between researchers and policymakers. There 
is no way to summarize the many instances 
where policymakers were influenced by STPI 
findings or to describe the changing 
perspectives of researchers as a result of their 
interaction with policymakers. 
It is, however, worthwhile recalling some of 
the basic premises of the research in STPI. In 
the first place, the development of indigenous 
S& T capabilities was considered as an essential 
condition for achieving a certain degree of 
autonomy in decision-making on industrial 
development. The possibility for a country to 
control its future industrial evolution and to 
achieve some self-reliance depends 
increasingly on the capacity to take decisions 
on technology, to generate technology critical 
for national development, and to evaluate, 
absorb, and improve imported technology.n 
The development of local S& T capabilities in 
less-developed countries is a long-term 
proposition. It requires determined efforts on 
the part of government, anticipating changes 
in the international situation and contextual 
factors. A careful appreciation of the 
international context and its likely evolution is 
necessary to determine the "room for 
maneuver" at present and to design policies 
accordingly. The aim is to take full advantage 
of the limited opportunities available for the 
development of domestic S& T capabilities. 
This requires an appreciation of historical 
conditions, international relations, the role of 
science and technology, and the nature and 
characteristics of the state. 
At present, there are several trends that 
non this matter see 0. Cardettini, ed. Technolog-
ical Dependence and Self-reliance in Under-
developed Countries. Ottawa, International 
Development Research Centre. 
99 
merit special attention in th is regard. 
Industrialized countries are becoming 
increasingly reluctant to transfer their 
technological know-how and to put their S& T 
capabilities at the disposal of less-developed 
countries, particularly in those areas where 
Third World countries may obtain a 
competitive edge and displace their 
productive activities. There has been a rising 
wave of protectionism in the industrialized 
countries, under the pressure of trade unions, 
local manufacturers, and politicians. It seeks to 
curtail the import of certain manufactured 
goods from less-developed countries because 
they are perceived as a threat to industry, 
employment, and the general welfare of 
industrialized countries. This trend represents 
a complete change from a few decades ago, 
when the industrialized countries enjoyed 
substantial advantages in manufacturing and 
were the champions of free-trade policies. 
Another trend is the increasing 
differentiation that can be observed among 
Third World countries, with a few large ones 
emerging as intermediate industrial powers. It 
is likely that a new stratification will emerge 
du ring the next 30 years and that the least-
developed countries will face not only the 
constraints imposed by the industrialized 
countries of today but also those imposed by 
the emerging intermediate powers. 
The trends illustrate the importance of 
taking a long-term view when designing 
policies and policy instruments to foster the 
development of domestic S& T capabilities. 
These are but a few of the relevant issues. 
As an action-oriented research project, STPI 
aimed at reducing the uncertainties in S&T 
policymaking through improved information. 
It also attempted a better understanding of the 
factors that affect the development of science 
and technology. The experience in the project 
suggested: first, that the countries must 
continue to explore new research areas and 
revise some old ones, primarily because of 
changing circumstances; second, that more 
effort must be devoted to understanding the 
role of S& Tin the development process; and, 
third, that the type of analysis carried out 
during the initial phases of the STPI project 
(covering the nature and characteristics of 
contextual factors, the role of the state, and a 
first-cut appreciation of the room for 
maneuver in S& T development) is essential for 
adequate policymaking. 
In any case, research should be viewed as a 
permanent process of monitoring the design 
and impact of policies and policy instruments 
for S& T development. 
Several new research areas emerged 
directly from the STPI project. Only a few that 
relate mainly to the S& T policy instruments 
and their impact will be examined here. 
One is the need to explore further the 
nature of conflicts and contradictions among 
the various interest groups that struggle for 
control of the state apparatus. The groups' 
views on S& T development need to be closely 
examined to produce a better understanding 
of the obstacles they impose within a country 
and, particularly, within the state. Closely 
related to this is the need to study institutions 
and organizations involved in the design and 
implementation of S& T policies, following the 
general approach advanced in the STPI 
project. 
Second is the need to refine and examine in 
further depth the concept of "room for 
maneuver," which determines to a large de-
gree the impact of policy instruments on local 
S& T capabilities. This involves an appreciation 
of complex trends in the developed countries, 
of the changing interactions between 
industrialized and less-developed countries, 
and of the evolution of relations among less-
developed countries, focusing in each case on 
the S& T aspects of the networks of trends and 
interactions. Because of the relatively limited 
research capacity of individual less-developed 
countries, this may be a fruitful area for Third 
World collaboration. 
Practically all the specific policy instruments 
identified and examined in the STPI project 
require further study and analysis. The 
knowledge acquired thus far may soon be 
obsolete, and a few key policy instruments are 
a priority for research. They are price controls, 
financial mechanisms, state purchasing 
power, and fiscal measures, consulting and 
engineering design organizations, technical 
norms and standards, ·and personnel training. 
Research not only on existing policy 
instruments but also on the design of new 
policy instruments is needed to affect the 
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performance of S& T activities in enterprises. 
Less research is needed on the policy 
instruments for building up an S&T 
infrastructure and for regulating technology 
imports. 
The most intensive research efforts need to 
be devoted to investigating the impact of 
policy instruments on technical change and 
on the development of S& T capabilities. The 
links between macroeconomic conditions, 
contextual factors, government policies, and 
characteristics of industrial branches are the 
paths and sequences (see page 90) that form 
technological behaviour and their 
characterization in different branches is 
crucial to S&T policy design and 
implementation. The nature and orientation 
of technical change in various branches and 
the differential impact of policy instruments, 
are two additional aspects that require study. 
The results obtained in the STPI project have 
helped in clearing the road for further 
research efforts and pointing out what 
remains to be done, particularly in following 
through and comparing the different 
approaches adopted by the STPI country 
teams. 
Research is needed to cover a wide area, 
ranging from a study of the historical 
conditions producing certain patterns of S& T 
underdevelopment, to a study testing a theory 
of technical change in the less-developed 
economies. It appears necessary to do 
additional work on the development of a 
framework that could coherently link the 
various issues and aspects involved in the 
development of local S& T capabilities. 
Designing such a framework is by no means an 
easy task, but it is much more fruitful than 
developing partial theories. It would help in 
putting together the various pieces of 
knowledge acquired not only in the STPI 
project but in many other research efforts 
conducted during the last decade in the field 
of science, tech no logy, and development. 
It is absolutely necessary to de-emphasize 
industrial technology and focus on 
agricultural problems, particularly, S& T 
capabilities for rural development; to examine 
the S& T characteristics of various social 
services such as health and education; and to 
expand studies of the STPI type to other 
productive activities such as mining, 
commerce, banking, and so on. 
In the last analysis, it is only through a better 
understanding of the factors and influences 
that shape the development of science and 
technology that the less-developed countries 
will be able to take control of their own future. 
The next few decades will see the rise of 
science and technology as the key 
determinants of relations between 
industrialized and Third World countries, and 
hence it is imperative to learn more about the 
social conditions that lead to their 
development. The STPI project was an effort in 
this direction, and one that aimed at bridging 
the gap between policymakers and 
researchers, paying attention to what Francis 
Bacon postulated 4 centuries ago: Nam et ipsa 
scientia potestas est: "knowledge in itself is 
the source of power." 
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January 1977 I April 1978 
Initial idea put forward at a meeting of Latin American 
science policy organizations in Lima and Cuzco, Peru. 
Meeting at the Science Policy Research Unit, Sussex 
University, to discuss project identification report 
commissioned by IDRC. 
Feasibility studies carried out in Peru and Argentina 
sponsored by OAS. 
Project identification meeting convened at Barbados by 
IDRC. Project proposal prepared by participants. 
IDRC Board of Governors approves funding of international 
component and of some country proposals. 
Country teams established. 
Field coordinator appointed and first meeting of the 
coordinating committee, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. 
Field coordinator's office established in Lima, Peru. 
IDRC Board of Governors approves funding of the rest of 
country proposals. 
Working meeting held in Lima to discuss methods 
guidelines. 
Field coordinator's office staff appointed. 
Second coordinating committee meeting held in Mexico 
City. 
Thi rd coordinating committee meeting held in Cairo, Egypt. 
Working meeting on technology transfer held in Ohrid, 
Macedonia (Yugoslavia). 
Working meeting on science and technology planning held 
in Villa de Leyva, Colombia. 
Fourth coordinating committee meeting held in Seoul, 
South Korea. Discussion started on procedures for drafting 
comparative reports. 
Working meeting on state enterprises and technology 
policies held in Buenos Aires, Argentina. 
Working meeting on consulting and engineering design 
organizations held in Naiguata, Venezuela. 
Extension of the international component agreed by IDRC. 
Fifth coordinating committee meeting held in New Delhi, 
India. Agenda and procedures for Sussex workshop agreed. 
Sussex workshop held to prepare drafts of main 
comparative report and review other reports for 
publication. Editorial Committee appointed. 
Field coordinator's office closed down. Field research 
concluded. 
Preparation of STPI comparative reports and meeting of the 




Organization of the STPI Project 
and its Evolution 
The STPI project was an experiment - a 
large, self-managed, action-oriented 
international research project by researchers 
and policymakers from less-developed 
countries. The STPI network comprised 
autonomous country teams, led by country 
coordinators who were responsible for the 
project in their country. The coordinating 
committee, composed of all the country 
coordinators, was the top authority of the 
project and was responsible for the conduct of 
STPI. It met twice a year to monitor and 
evaluate the progress achieved, as well as to 
exchange information on the work of each 
team and the field coordinator's staff. 
To ensure continuity and facilitate 
communication in the STPI network, a field 
coordinator was appointed to oversee the 
international component of the project. He 
was responsible for organizing communi-
cation and information flows, for providing 
methodological assistance to the country 
teams, and for organizing and preparing the 
comparative reports. The field coordinator 
also acted as secretary to the coordinating 
committee. 
At a January 1973.meeting in Barbados, the 
STPI project proposal was prepared, and the 
functions of the coordinating committee and 
of the field coordinator were defined as 
follows: 
Coordinating committee: 
• Approves the work of the field coordina-
tor, who is accountable to the committee for 
all technical matters; 
• Identifies the international consultancy 
studies to be commissioned for the project; 
• Sets the time, location, and agenda of its 
own meetings, and chooses its cbairperson; 
• Establishes the procedures for preparing 
the comparative reports in the final phase of 
the project; and 
• Specifies the terms on which additional 
funds will be accepted for the international 
component of the project. 
Field coordinator: 
• Helps to develop methods guidelines for 
the country studies and consultancy studies 
and makes the reports available to the country 
teams; 
• Coordinates the work of the country 
teams and encourages communication among 
them; 
•Carries out troubleshooting at the request 
of the teams; 
• Organizes the meetings .of the 
coordinating committee; 
• Organizes training courses, commissions 
consultancy studies, and carries out other 
duties that might be assigned by the 
coordinating committee within the limitations 
imposed by the budget for the international 
component of the project; and 
• Prepares a comparative analysis of the 
project. 
The Barbados proposal for the international 
component of the STPI project was approved 
by the IDRC governors in June 1973, together 
with most of the country proposals. The 
governors agreed that the results and 
experience obtained in the STPI project 
shou Id be made available to countries that did 
not participate in the network and 
encouraged the dissemination of experiences 
and resu Its. 
The first meeting of the coordinating 
committee took place in Rio de Janeiro, in 
August 1973, and the operating procedures 
and rules by which the project was to be 
managed were drafted. Discussions were held 
and decisions made on the chairperson of the 
committee, the frequency and attendance of 
meetings, the maximum number of countries 
in the project, the sources of funds, the 
relations with other projects, and similar 
issues. In particular, it was decided that the 
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field coordinator would be accountable to the 
coordinating committee in all technical 
matters, and to the IDRC for administrative 
matters. Procedures for handling potential 
conflicts were also devised; it was agreed that 
the main decisions were to be taken by 
consensus, and voting procedures were also 
specified. A distinction was made between 
working meetings and coordinating 
committee meetings, restricting the former to 
technical issues and opening them to any 
member of a country team. Finally, decisions 
on training programs and consultancy studies 
were made, expanding on the initial ideas put 
forward at Barbados. 
The relations with the sponsoring agencies, 
IDRC and OAS, were also defined at this 
meeting. The IDRC representative would 
monitor the progress of the international 
component through the field coordinator and 
would establish a similar relationship with the 
country teams. The OAS liaison officer with 
STPI would observe the work of the 
coordinating committee and would oversee 
the use of OAS funds. 
The field coordinator's office was 
established in Lima in October 1973, and 
staffing was completed in April 1974, with the 
arrival of two assistants to the field 
coordinator. A bimonthly newsletter began in 
October 1973. 
Meetings 
The first working meeting took place in Lima 
in January 1974, where the draft of the first part 
of the methods guidelines was discussed in 
detail. Suggestions were made with regard to 
the contents of the consultancy studies. 
The second meeting of the coordinating 
committee was held in Mexico in May 1974. 
The revised guidelines were discussed in 
depth, consultancy studies were examined, 
and the first draft of the report on technology 
policies in the People's Republic of China was 
presented. Approval was given for three other 
consultancy studies, and there was a 
discussion of the country progress reports. 
Cairo was the location of the third 
coordinating committee meeting, which took 
place in November 1974. The problems of 
communication among country teams were 
highlighted, the second part of the methods 
guidelines was discussed, progress reports on 
consultancy studies were presented, the 
report of technology policies in post-war 
Japan was distributed, and there were 
discussions on the nature of the research in 
STPI, the pace of the research, the usefulness 
of some background studies, the policy on 
publications, and the first ideas on the 
evaluation of the organizational structure and 
of the approach to STPI were put forward. It 
was agreed that technical discussions of 
country team reports shou Id be expanded at 
coordinating committee meetings, and that 
working meetings should be programed on a 
variety of topics. A schedule of working 
meetings on technology transfer, science and 
technology planning, state enterprises and 
technology policies, and consulting and 
engineering organizations was set up. 
The next meeting of the STPI network took 
place in Ohrid, Macedonia, in April 1975. A 
working meeting, it dealt exclusively with 
technology transfer. In May 1975 another 
working meeting took place in Villa de Leyva, 
Colombia, where the problem of science and 
technology planning in less-developed 
countries was discussed. 
Seoul, South Korea, was the location of the 
coordinating committee's fourth meeting, 
which took place in July 1975. Country team 
reports and the issue of the final comparative 
reports were discussed at length. A policy on 
publications and dissemination of results was 
agreed upon, two working meetings were 
planned, decisions on consultancy studies 
were made, and a general overview of the 
evolution of STPI was presented and 
discussed. 
Two working level meetings were organized 
for the second half of 1975. Thefirsttook place 
in Buenos Aires in August and dealt with the 
role of state enterprises in technology policy. 
The second was in Naiguata, Venezuela, and 
examined the problem of consulting design 
organizations in less-developed countries. 
The fifth and final meeting of the 
coordinating committee took place in New 
Delhi in January 1976, where substantive 
discussions of the teams' research results were 
held. In particular, the difficulties 
encountered in examining technological 
behaviour and technical change at the 
enterprise level were considered. The general 
structure of the final comparative reports was 
discussed at length and an agreement was 
reached, which defined the framework forthe 
final synthesis workshop to take place in 
Sussex. Responsibilities were allocated in the 
preparation of the final comparative reports, 
an executive editorial committee was created 
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to review the work of the field coordinator 
and his staff after the Sussex meeting, and the 
procedures for the Sussex workshop were 
defined in detail. 
The Sussex workshop was organized in 
June/July 1976, and the preliminary drafts of 
many parts of the main comparative report 
were prepared. Participants at the meeting 
divided into working groups and reported 
regularly to plenary sessions. They also took 
responsibility for tasks, working closely with 
the field coordinator. The present report and 
the other technical studies produced by STPI 
are mostly the result of decisions made and 
work carried out at the Sussex workshop. 
As cou Id be expected in a large and complex 
undertaking like the STPI project, many 
difficulties emerged during its lifetime. The 
problems encountered at the country level, 
which were varied in nature and complexity, 
were dealt with for the most part by the 
country coordinators, although in some cases 
the field coordinator intervened. A few 
problems affected the international 
coordination and the subsequent comparative 
reports; they will be examined here. 
The first problem that emerged was the 
limited communication among the 
participating teams, particularly on technical 
matters. Excluding three or four teams, which 
remained in close contact with each other and 
with the field coordinator's office, the flow of 
information was limited and took place mostly 
at the coordinating committee meetings. The 
reasons for this were varied, but there was a 
structural problem that was not perceived in 
the project's initial design. 
The lack of communication meant that 
researchers did not benefit from one 
another's experience. For example, 
researchers who encountered difficulties in 
interviewing firms in some industrial branch 
might have gained from another team that had 
already encountered the problem. However, 
by the time a question was formulated and 
posed to either another team or the field 
coordinator, and an answer received 
(generally by mail), it was too late. The 
researcher who asked the question had 
already started work without the benefit of the 
other team's experience. There were many 
examples where a more flexible and closer 
interaction among teams would have helped 
greatly. Two solutions to the communication 
gap were rejected because they were 
inconsistent with the STPI approach. One 
proposal was to slow the pace of the research 
to allow for interactions, and the other was to 
require a highly centralized methodology. 
A second problem was that the meetings of 
the coordinating committee, which all 
country coordinators were supposed to 
attend, took place at 6-month intervals. In 
practice, the participants hardly had enough 
time to absorb the ideas from one meeting 
before they were asked to prepare a progress 
report for the next. This problem was related 
to the relatively short time available to 
complete the multiple tasks of the project. 
A third problem related to the way in which 
coordinating committee meetings were 
conducted. In retrospect, too much time was 
allocated to discussions on operations, and to 
the presentation of progress reports, and too 
little time was devoted to in-depth discussions 
of empirical results, technical issues, and 
problems encountered during the research. 
Although the working meetings offset this 
problem slightly, they were limited to a single 
technical issue that usually was not central to 
the main work of the teams. 
The last problem was the uncertain 
relationship between the country teams and 
the field coordinator. Exacerbated by the 
communication problems, difficulties 
emerged from the multiplicity of roles the 
field coordinator and his staff were supposed 
to play. The roles were in conflict at times and 
required that efforts be spread, perhaps too 
thinly, among a variety of technical and 
administrative functions. The fact that the field 
coordinator was not engaged in empirical 
research limited his ability to answer specific 
technical queries, although his involvement 
with an institution dealing with industrial 
technology policy helped him to maintain a 
sensitivity to the requirements of 
policymakers. 
The relationship between the country 
coordinators and the field coordinator went 
through three distinct phases. In the first, the 
field coordinator provided the country teams 
with organizational and methodological 
support, helping the coordinators to establish 
their teams and launch their research efforts. 
The second phase saw the field coordinator 
and the country teams working more or less 
independently, the former on the 
organization and supervision of the 
consultancy and background reports and the 
latter on the conduct of the research in their 
own countries. In the third phase, the field 
coordinator prepared the comparative report, 
using the inputs provided by the teams. The 
106 
first phase went approximately from the 
beginning of the project (August 1973) until 
the Mexico meeting of the coordinating 
committee (May 1974); the second phase from 
that meeting to the Seoul meeting of the 
coordinating committee (July 1975); and the 
third from then to the end of the project in 
December 1976. 
Finally, there were several delays in the 
project. Although the timetable called for all 
the country work to be completed by 
February 1976 and the comparative analysis by 
August 1976, the complexity of the research 
tasks and the organizational difficulties 
encountered by some teams made it 
impossible to meet the deadlines. The project 
was extended, and the teams were asked to 
present their results at least by June/July 1976. 
Most of the teams did so, although a few 
delivered their reports to the field 
coordinator's office after the Sussex meeting. 
Consequently, the inputs to the international 
comparative reports vary considerably in 
content and degree of completion. 
The setup for the conduct of comparative 
action-oriented research succeeded in 
keeping the STPI network together and in 
providing a forum for the exchange of points 
of view and results. It also allowed for the 
preparation of several reports on subjects that 
had not previously been researched. It created 
a learning environment for the participants 
who were highly motivated and took 
advantage of the opportunities offered by the 
unique structure of STPl's autonomous teams 
and international coordination. 
Appendix IV 
Survey of the Country Teams' Work 
The organization, composition, and 
orientation ot each of the country teams 
reflected their own interests and those of the 
institutions that hosted them, always within 
the framework of the STPI project concerns. A 
brief review of the approach and the work of 
each team may help to place the STPI project 
and the comparative reports in perspective.To 
complete the survey, a description of the field 
coordinator's office work is given. 
Argentina: The initial location for the 
Argentine team was the Department of 
Economics of the Catholic University. 
However, after some months, the university 
decided to withdraw its application and the 
country coordinator moved to the Argentine 
branch of the executive secretariat of the Latin 
American Social Science Council (CLACSO). 
The team was headed by Eduardo Amadeo, an 
economist, and two other members were 
appointed to work full time on the project. An 
advisory committee of several researchers and 
policymakers active in science and technology 
policy was formed. To carry out the research, 
the team relied on consultants who wrote 
reports on specific subjects that were 
integrated into a final report. 
A significant change took place when the 
country coordinator was named president of 
the lnstituto Nacion al de Tecnologia Industrial 
(INTI), the national industrial technology 
institute, which is the largest and most 
important industrial research organization in 
Argentina. Mr. Amadeo never relinquished 
his formal role as coordinator; after 6 months, 
he left his new post and resumed his position 
as country coordinator. Because most of the 
work was well under way, his absence did not 
substantially alter the team's pace, although 
the preparation of the Argentine synthesis 
report was postponed. Part of the team's work 
was reoriented to be most useful to the 
coordinator in his new position. 
The Argentines focused on two branches of 
industry - machine tools and petrochemicals 
- but studied many broader issues. For 
instance, the reports include a document on 
the technological content of the 3-year 
development plan (1974-77), a study of the 
Argentine industrial structure, a description 
and brief analysis of technology policy 
instruments in Argentina, a study of the system 
for regulating technology imports, and several 
short reports on international technical 
assistance as an instrument of technology 
policy. 
The structure of the Argentine scientific and 
technological system was studied in detail, as 
were the conditions under which it could be 
made more responsive to industry's needs. 
The Argentines covered the public sector, 
examining the possible role of the public 
sector as promoter of scientific and 
technological development. Detailed studies 
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were carried out at two enterprises; one in 
charge of generating electricity in Buenos 
Aires (SEGBA) and the other in charge of 
generating and distributing gas for household 
and industrial consumption. Other 
contributions of the Argentine team were a 
study of the emergence and development of 
engineering and consulting firms in the 
chemical process industries, a detailed analysis 
of two research centres within the national 
industrial technology institute (INTI), and two 
short papers on capital accumulation and on 
the crisis of capitalism. 
The Argentine team followed the methods 
guidelines; however, they produced a series 
of thematic reports on issues of actual and 
potential interest to policymakers in the 
country, coinciding with the themes selected 
for study in STPI. 
Brazil: The Brazilian team was hosted at the 
research group of the Financiadora de Estudos 
e Projetos (FINEP), the state agency in charge 
of financing studies for investment projects 
and also the executive arm of the national 
fund for scientific and technological 
development. The first coordinator was the 
director of the research group, Fabio Erber. 
When he took a leave of absence from FINEP 
in September 1974, he was replaced by Jose 
Tavares, the new head of the research group. 
The group at FINEP had been carrying out 
research on science and technology policy for 
some ti me, and the STPI assignment was one of 
its tasks for 1973-76. Practically all of the work 
was done by members of the FINEP research 
group, although two or three reports were 
contracted to professionals outside FINEP. 
From the beginning, the Brazilians decided 
to concentrate on the role of state enterprises 
in technology policy. They chose branches of 
industry that were dominated by state 
enterprises (oil and petrochemicals, steel, and 
electricity), conducting detailed interviews, 
analyzing existing data, and testing 
hypotheses systematically to cover issues such 
as the selection of equipment and processes, 
the purchase of engineering services, the 
performance of research and development, 
and the planning activities at these state 
enterprises. 
In addition to the new material generated 
by the Brazilian team during STPI, several 
reports based on past research carried out by 
FINEP were made available to the STPI 
network. These included background reports 
on the organization and structure of the 
Brazilian science and technology system, a 
study on the machine tool industry, a report 
on the demand for services of 12 research 
institutes, and a background report on 
industrial policies in Brazil during the last 2 
decades. 
In parallel with the work for STPI, the Fl NEP 
team was also engaged in a research project on 
the diffusion of technical innovations in three 
industrial branches (pulp and paper, cement, 
and textiles) and they agreed to put their 
results at the disposal of the STPI network as an 
additional contribution. 
The Brazilian team used the guidelines only 
as a general reference, given that most of their 
work went along different lines from those 
originally envisaged for the project. 
Nevertheless, the richness and variety of their 
material effectively upgraded the comparative 
reports. 
Colombia: No Colombian participant was 
present at the Barbados meeting, and the 
Colombian application to join the STPI 
network was received later and formally 
accepted at the Rio meeting of the 
coordinating committee. The team was hosted 
by the Colombian Council for Science and 
Technology, COLCIENCIAS, and was headed 
by a sociologist, Fernando Chaparro. In spite 
of joining the STPI network late, the Colom-
bian team caught up with the pace of work and 
finished all its work by the deadline. 
COLCIENCIAS organized a special team 
with five members who devoted practically all 
their time to research in STPI. Several other 
consultants were also asked to prepare reports 
on issues of specific interest such as selected 
policy instruments. For example, a study was 
commissioned on the impact of tariff 
mechanisms; a report was prepared on the 
influence of price controls; and a preliminary 
analysis of the possible use of the state's 
purchasing power as an instrument of 
technology policy was also prepared. The 
branches chosen for study were all linked to 
agriculture: fertilizers and pesticides, 
agricultural machinery, and food processing, 
taking into consideration the interests of 
Colombian policymakers as perceived by the 
team. In these branch studies, the methods 
guidelines were closely followed. 
Other reports prepared by the Colombian 
team include a study of science and 
technology planning, an analysis of implicit 
industrial technology policies, a conceptual 
framework for the study of consulting and 
engineering organizations, a series of reports 
on industrial branches based on discussions 
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with panels of experts, a study of science and 
technology policies in the agricultural sector 
(to complement the analysis done for 
industry), and two essays on the process of 
industrialization in Colombia and its 
technological implications. 
Five groups of policy instruments were 
studied in detail, and their impact on each 
branch was examined through interviews at 
various enterprises. All of the findings were 
integrated into the final report of the 
Colombian team. 
Egypt: Although an Egyptian representative 
participated in the initial deliberations leading 
to the STPI project, it was not possible to 
organize the team to carry out research and 
prepare inputs for the international 
comparison. There were several administra-
tive difficulties and staffing problems that 
prevented the organization of a working team. 
The host institution was the Academy of 
Scientific Research and Technology and the 
first coordinator was Adel Sabet, who was 
replaced by Gamal A. Samie in July 1975. The 
Egyptian team presented papers that were 
personal contributions based on past 
experience rather than the result of research 
carried out by a team; and research was not 
begun at the academy until the second half of 
1976. 
India: The host organization in India was the 
National Committee on Science and 
Technology, and the first coordinator was Anil 
Malhotra, who was replaced in June 1975 by 
S.K. Subramanian. Mr Subramanian resigned 
in March 1976, and no one replaced him. No 
funds were requested to set up a country team 
in India, and the Indians provided background 
material that had already been collected as 
background for a new science and technology 
plan. 
Three background documents were 
distributed along with the final S&T plan to all 
the teams in STPI. In addition, a report on 
foreign collaboration, a note on science and 
technology planning in India, a survey of 
engineering consultancy services, a report on 
the development of the electronics industry, 
and two papers on small-scale industries and 
technology transfer were distributed by the 
Indian coordinator. No empirical research was 
done following the methods guidelines, and 
the Indian contribution to the comparative 
reports reflects this. 
South Korea: The South Korean team was one 
of the first to be organized and was established 
at the Korean Advanced Institute of Science, 
KAIS, as part of the activities of its science, 
technology, and society program. KunMo 
Chung was named country coordinator and 
the team consisted of five other members. All 
but one of them had other academic duties 
and could allocate only a portion of their time 
to STPI research. Then, Graham Jones was 
hired to advise in the preparation of the report 
for phase 1. 
The South Korean team advanced rapidly 
and completed its work in time for the Sussex 
workshop, following the methods guidelines 
and introducing modifications only where 
necessary. Two reports were produced 
corresponding to the requirements for phases 
1 and 2 of the project. 
The branches chosen for study were 
electronics, petrochemicals, and powder 
metallurgy, and a report was prepared for 
each one. In addition, the team prepared 
documents on engineering services and 
industrialization in South Korea, on the 
Korean Institute of Science and Technology, 
on transfer of technology in the electronics 
industry, on the interface between the science 
and technology plan and the economic 
development plan, and on state enterprises in 
technical development. 
Although most of the work was done by the 
team located at KAIS, consultants were asked 
to deal with specifics. The team predominantly 
represented engineering and physical 
sciences, but an economist who was a senior 
government official, helped to relate the 
results to South Korean policymakers and to 
balance the other team members' biases. 
Mexico: The Mexican team was among the 
first to start working in STPI and was located at 
El Colegio de Mexico, an academic and social 
research and graduate training organization. 
Alejandro Nadal was country coordinator and 
there were four other members of the team 
who worked full time on STPI. The Mexican 
team initially followed the guidelines rather 
closely and was one of the first in suggesting 
modifications and changes as a result of 
contrasting concepts with preliminary 
research findings. In particular, the team 
found it difficult to interpret the results of 
interviews in enterprises using the schema 
proposed to study technological behaviour. 
The branches chosen for detailed study were 
capital goods, food processing, and petro-
chemicals. 
A background report on the structure and 
evolution of the Mexican scientific and 
technological system was prepared, together 
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with a description of the industrialization 
process and of agricultural development. 
Documents on particular subjects included a 
report on engineering firms, a study of the 
technology policy of PEMEX (the state oil 
monopoly), and progress reports dealing with 
hypotheses on the impact of policy 
instruments on technical behaviour at the 
enterprise level, a description of policy 
instruments in Mexico, etc. 
Most of the findings of the Mexican team 
were integrated into the main final report, part 
of which was delivered at the coordinating 
committee meeting in New Delhi (January 
1976) and the rest at the Sussex workshop 
(June 1976). The work of the Mexican team 
covered practically all the research topics 
considered in STPI, and its contribution to the 
comparative report reflects this. The Mexican 
report was published in Spanish in 1977 and 
was awarded second prize in a contest for the 
best works in economics. 
For various reasons, the Mexican team 
chose to limit its direct interaction with 
policymakers and followed its own research 
program. Results were made available to 
policymakers in the form of draft reports, and 
through the participation of the coordinator 
in one of the committees established to 
prepare the Mexican plan for science and 
technology. 
Peru: The Peruvian team was established 
within the research group of the National 
Planning Institute. A series of administrative 
difficulties affected the progress of the team, 
including a change of technical director, when 
Fernando Gonzales Vigil was replaced by 
Roberto Wangeman in February 1975. 
Approximately two-thirds of the research was 
completed in time for the Sussex workshop. 
From the beginning, the team decided to 
adopt a sectorial approach to the research. 
Efforts were focused on the study of industrial 
branches connected with the extraction and 
processing of minerals and with the provision 
of machinery for the mining industry. The 
steel industry was also studied, with emphasis 
on the state enterprise in charge of the largest 
steelworks. This meant that the guidelines 
were used primarily in sectorial studies and in 
the analysis of policy instruments. 
Background reports on the situation of the 
scientific and technological system and on the 
evolution of Peruvian industry were prepared 
following the general framework put forward 
in the guidelines. In addition to these and the 
sectorial reports, the team prepared other 
documents, dealing with issues such as explicit 
and implicit science and technology policies, 
consulting and engineering capabilities, the 
possible use of state enterprises as instruments 
of technology policy, and the government 
administrative machinery for science and 
tech no logy policy. 
The Peruvian team was located within an 
official government organization, but its 
direct impact on policymaking is difficult to 
assess because it took the form of daily contact 
with government officials. On the basis of the 
sectorial reports on mining, a committee has 
been set up to review the findings of the STPI 
team. 
Venezuela: The Venezuelan team was hosted 
by the national council of science and 
technology (CONICIT) and was among the 
first to start working. The team was initially 
dominated by sociologists, although 
economists increased their participation at 
later stages. The first coordinator, Dulce de 
Uzcategui, was replaced by Luis Matos, who 
was soon followed by Ignacio Avalos. Three 
other members worked full time, and the team 
was biased toward sociology and economics. 
They progressed through two stages 
punctuated by a change in government. In the 
first stage, most of the background reports 
corresponding to phases 1 and 2 of the STPI 
methods were prepared, covering the science 
and technology, the political, theed ucational, 
and the economic systems. These reports were 
made obsolete by the change in government. 
In the second stage, the team tried to adjust to 
the new situation, repeating some of the 
earlier studies and continuing the research. 
However, the organization of a national 
congress on science and technology, which 
mobilized all the staff working at CONICIT, 
affected the team's progress. 
The branches chosen for study were capital 
goods, electronics, and petrochemicals. In 
addition, reports were written on specific 
issues such as the government organizational 
structure for science and technology policy, 
instruments for industrial science and 
technology policy, economic and financial 
policy instruments and their impact on 
technology, the purchase of capital goods in 
two industrial branches, and the relations 
between the financial system and technology 
policy. The Venezuelan tear:n concluded its 
research shortly after the Sussex workshop. 
The fact that the Venezuelan team was 
located in a government agency that took a 
very active role in science and technology 
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policy after the change in government created 
both opportunities and problems. As a result 
of the new tasks undertaken by CONICIT, the 
pace and continuity of the STPI work was 
frequently altered. On the other hand, there 
was more possibility for actively contributing 
to policymaking. The Venezuelan 
contribution to the comparative reports 
reflects this situation. 
Yugoslavia (Macedonia): The Macedonian 
team was organized at the faculty of 
economics of the University of Skopje. A 
senior faculty member, Nikola Kljusev, was 
appointed coordinator. The team was 
composed of a very large number of faculty 
members and researchers who devoted part of 
their time to STPI. The tasks were subdivided 
and individual reports requested from various 
members of the team, although at a later stage 
two team members were asked to work full 
time on STPI. 
The Macedonian team did not follow the 
guidelines, except in the preparation of a 
background report for phase 1. Individual 
reports were submitted on issues of interest to 
the STPI network, covering topics such as the 
problems of research and development in 
industrial enterprises, aspects of science and 
technology policy in Yugoslavia, the 
metallurgi"cal industry in Macedonia, and the 
growth of engineering firms in Yugoslavia. 
The Macedonian team's specificity is 
reflected in their relatively limited 
contribution to the comparative reports. At 
any rate, given the high degree of 
participation of professionals at all levels in 
policymaking in the Yugoslav self-managed 
economy, it is rather difficult to assess their 
contribution toward policymaking in 
conventional terms. 
The Field Coordinator's Office: In August 
1973, at the first meeting of the coordinating 
committee, Francisco Sagasti was appointed 
field coordinator of the project and his office 
was established shortly thereafter and began 
operating in a limited way. Staffing was com-
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pleted in April 1974 with the addition of two 
members. 
The field coordinator's office was 
independent from the teams and was not 
engaged directly in empirical research. It 
offered organizational and technical support 
and contracted consultants to prepare reports 
on topics defined by the coordinating 
committee. 
The field coordinator, first, drew up 
methods guidelines for phases 1 and 2 of the 
project. Background reports on technology 
policy in China, on technological 
dependence/self-reliance, on science and 
technology planning, on technology policies 
in Japan, and on tech no logy transfer were also 
prepared, either by staff members of the field 
coordinator's office or by consultants. The 
guidelines for phases 3 and 4 of the project 
were prepared jointly by the field coordinator 
and a consultant. The office also organized the 
Sussex workshop and drafted the comparative 
reports. The field coordinator was also active 
in the board of the Peruvian Industrial 
Technology Institute (ITINTEC). 
With the exception of the teams that were 
engaged in science and technology policy 
research as part of the activities of their 
institutions (the Brazilian and South Korean 
teams, for example), the teams were 
dismantled after the STPI project was 
completed. The field coordinator's office was 
closed in December 1976, and the 
comparative reports were prepared during 
1977/1978, although some teams had not 
finished their work by April 1978. Even though 
most teams had concluded their STPI activities 
by the end of 1977, this does not mean that the 
team members left the field of S& T policy 
research and that their effort in STPI was not 
followed up. What was dismantled, as planned 
from the beginning, was the formal structure 
of the STPI project. The network of personal 
contacts remains in operation and most of the 
former team members are active in the field of 
science and technology policy, carrying the 
experience accumulated in STPI to their new 
positions. 
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